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ABSTRACT
The purposes of this study were to epply standards of rhetorical
analysis and criticism to the presidential press conference as an
oral communication situation, and more specifically, to examine
Lyndon Johnson's effectiveness in his official, presidential news
conferences.
Before Woodrow Wilson, few presidents had direct, regular deal
ings with reporters.

Under Wilson, the presidential news conference

became an institution, as he and later chief executives continued
the practice with varying degrees of success.

While most modern

presidents have contributed to the evolution of the conference,
Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy were unusually productive in
establishing and maintaining presidential leadership through that
channel of communication.
President Johnson experimented with a variety of formats, but
preferred informal, impromptu meetings with reporters.

Johnson's

press relations were mercurial and were criticized severely by news
men.

Reporters complained of his secrecy, his lack of candor, and

the propagandists nature of his press communications.

President

Johnson was annoyed by personal criticisms, speculation, and inter
pretative journalism.

Johnson's goals were to explain, publicize,

promote, and defend his administration.
his image.

Further, he wanted to improve

He also wanted to control the conference and to regulate

what correspondents reported.
iv

President Johnson's opening statements and reporters' questions
generated the content of the meetings.

Johnson frequently used

lengthy opening remarks to announce executive appointments, deci
sions, and policies.

Newsmen asked about presidential, political,

domestic, and foreign affairs.

They inquired more about Vietnam

than about any other matter.
The development of Johnson's opening statements was characterized
by the use of statistics, details, narration, and testimony.
tition and restatement were used often for amplification.

Repe

Johnson's

announcements were presented to avoid specific Issues, to anticipate
and direct inquiry, to demonstrate progress of "Great Society" pro
grams, to reply to critics, and to reiterate policy statements.
of the announcements were newsworthy.

Some were dramatic.

Many

Often,

however, they were so redundant, long, and promotional that they ap
peared to be ineffective.
Reporters' questions were timely, important, and appropriate
for the situation.

Newsmen seemed to have been clear, concise, and

tactful for the most part.
President Johnson used a variety of techniques to control and
fence with the press in his answers.

He anticipated questions, inter

rupted and instructed reporters, demanded sources, attacked questions,
and used sarcasm and humor.

Johnson employed the devices of back

grounding, repeating, amplifying, exhausting, generalizing, arguing,
and appealing to discuss issues in his replies.

To avoid answering,

he used a variety of tactics associated with the strategies of refusing
to answer, referring questions, and circumventing specific ideas raised
v

by questions.

In general, he probably avoided Inquiry so exten

sively that his general effectiveness was diminished.

In terms

of audience adaptation, Johnson may have been too unresponsive to
the needs of the press and the public to fulfill his presidential
press conference purposes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Study
The presidential press conference is an unusual communication
situation.

The format challenges the nation’s leader to stand be

fore representatives of the news media for an extemporaneous exchange
of questions and answers.

The meeting is a test of the president’s

character, especially his skills in listening and speaking.

A chief

executive who meets the press in this manner has much to gain, de
pending upon those skills.

He listens to understand more than the

substance of inquiry and he replies for more than a mere release of
information, just as he analyzes his audiences and carefully prepares
for such other communications as formal addresses to the nation.

The

news conference provides more than a passive expression of leader
ship.

The situation allows a salient demonstration of ability and a

platform for persuasion.
For these reasons, a president's performance in his attempts to
Influence the press and, ultimately, the public seem highly amenable
to analysis and evaluation.

Unfortunately, few attempts to study the

presidential press conference from other than a historical or descrip
tive standpoint have been made.

Moreover, rhetorical assessments of

communication in the news conference situation do not appear in
many academic studies, let alone professional publications.
1

2

Another Impetus for the present work lies In the speaker selected.
Lyndon Johnson's speaking has received little attention from research
ers in speech.

This partial void Is probably due to several factors.

Johnson is a fairly recent president and background materials on his
administration are just now becoming available.

Further, Johnson's

public speaking, while forceful and probably very persuasive at times,
lacked the polish and charm of such previous presidents as John Ken
nedy.

Finally, Johnson left office without accomplishing an end to

what is and was one of the nation's most serious problems, a war.
Johnson retired from public life with low national esteem.

Many more

years may pass before major consideration is given to his spoken
communication.
Nevertheless, Johnson was a fascinating and powerful politician
and president.

More significantly, his approach to the presidential

press conference was unlike that of any other individual president.
His dealings with reporters and even the variety of ways he held news
conferences became the subject of much reporting and commentary by
contemporary print and broadcast journalists.

Further, Johnson met

so often with reporters, both informally and officially, that a large
body of transcripts of the press conferences became available.

Be

cause President Johnson's press conferences were not only news events
but often yielded important communications to the public, they merit
more than cursory consideration.
This study may be of value in demonstrating some ways in which
speech critics can evaluate the performance of speakers in question
and answer sessions, especially press conferences involving important
government officials.

The paper may also contribute to a fuller
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understanding of Lyndon Johnson's speaking abilities and his effective
ness with press relations.
The problem then Is two-fold.

First, previous studies of presi

dential press conferences do not use the viewpoint of rhetorical
criticism, so models for applying speech criticism to the format do
not exist.

A major purpose of the study has been to discover and

apply appropriate standards of rhetorical evaluation to the press con
ference situation.

Second, the study seeks to assess Johnson's com

munication skills in the meetings with reporters.

This study attempts

to describe and evaluate Johnson's attitudes toward the press and the
press conference situation, his general and specific preparation, his
aims, and the techniques he used.

Also Included are such aspects as

the Importance of the content of the conferences and the quality of
the questioning.

The main objective of this study, then. Is to deter

mine President Johnson's effectiveness in his press conferences.
A variety of materials are used In the paper.

Historical studies

of the press in America and of the history, evolution, and Institu
tion of the presidential press conference give important background
material.

Books and essays on the presidency and on presidential

press relations further contribute bases for analysis.

Newspaper

and magazine articles found in a variety of periodicals help explain
Johnson's press conference style as do biographical and autobiographi
cal pieces on various presidents, especially those on Lyndon Johnson.
Taped interviews with George Christian, correspondence with Bill
Moyers, and books by Pierre Salinger and by George Reedy provide data
and reflections from the men who were Johnson's press secretaries at
different times between 1963 and 1969.

Specifically, Johnson's one hundred and thirty-five official
news conferences are studied.

Only written transcripts of the meetings

are presently available for extensive research.

All but one and the

opening of another of the conferences appear in transcripts released
by the White House which are published in Johnson's Public Papers by
the Government Printing Office.

The published transcripts correspond

with transcripts published in the New York Times and assure textual
authenticity.
The conferences have been examined carefully.

First, each con

ference was read to gain a general idea of the content, questions,
announcements, and answers.

Next, each transcript was analyzed for

specific content in tenns of general topic areas and with regard to
specific Issues.

The subject areas were studied quantitatively to

discover trends in announcements and in questions.

Newspaper and maga

zine articles and chronologies of current events surrounding various
conferences provided reference materials by which to gauge the quali
ty of the content.
Criteria from traditional and contemporary works on persuasion,
communication, and speech criticism were refined to devise a means
for qualitative assessment of the opening statements, the questions,
and the answers.

The conferences were then restudied in light of those

criteria.
Finally, a few terms bear brief explanation.

Words such as "the

press," "correspondents," "reporters," and "newsmen" generally refer
to representatives of newspapers, syndicates and agencies, wire
services, and broadcast networks or stations.

The term "press con

ference" (or "news conference") refers to official question and answer
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sessions end not to "briefings" or other encounters with the press,
unless otherwise stipulated.

"Impromptu" press conferences are those

held without advance notice.

"Formal" conferences were announced,

usually at least twenty-four hours in advance.

"Broadcast" con

ferences were usually "live," although a few were taped or filmed
for later broadcast.

The terms "desk" and "office" conference

occasionally appear in related literature and refer to informal,
usually impromptu meetings in the president's office in the White
House.
Introduction to the Presidential Press Conference
The remainder of this chapter provides a background for under
standing the institution of the presidential press conference.

Four

sections present (1) a discussion of the functions of the presiden
tial press conference, (2) a general characterization of the confer
ence, (3) a brief history of early presidential relations with the
press, and (U) a review of the modern evolution of the conference.
Functions of the Presidential Press Conference
The purposes and functions of the presidential press conference
must be considered from the point of view of the participants: the
president and the press.

The conference also serves the needs of

the public and. In this country, the purposes of a democratic society.
Because of the nature of this study, the purposes of the press con
ference from the president's point of view will be prominent in the
following discussion.
A president has numerous means of communicating with a variety
of audiences.

Among his audiences are the citizens of the country.

6

the congress, government employees, heeds end citisens of foreign
governments, special Interest groups, end the press itself.*

The

meens of communication available to the president to reach those
audiences a w also numerous.

Pollard has listed twenty-five "chanp
nels and devices" for the president's communications.
Among these

are formal addresses, written messages and proclamations, briefing
sessions, press releases, correspondence, executive orders, and press
conferences.
Of all channels of presidential communication, one of the most
unusual Is the press conference, which, according to Zelko, is "the
most challenging communication experience of the President's many
public appearances."-^ Rosslter has referred to the conference as
"The most influential channel of public communication to and from
the President . . . "

lx

A president has several purposes in using the press conference
for communication.

Generally, they are to Inform, to persuade,

and to receive feedback.
The first presidential purpose is to provide information to
the public about the affairs of government.

The chief executive

does this through opening announcements and with replies to questions.
*Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (New York: Vin
tage, 1965). pp. 26-27.
^James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 19&+T, pp. 13-15.
3Harold P. Zelko, "President Kennedy’s Press Conferences: Some
Observations," Speaker and Gavel. I (1963)» 21.
^Clinton Rosslter, The American Presidency, rev. ed., (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Company, i960), p. Il4.
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Llppmann has carried the informational aspect of the press conference
further by saying that "The purpose of the press conference Is to
explain the news . .

not just to provide it, ^ Indeed, the presi

dential press conference can serve this purpose of explaining, since
reporters can probe for clarification in the questions they ask.
The second purpose, persuasion, is best understood with refer
ence to the leadership role of the president, especially as it has
emerged in the twentieth century.

Few students of government would

deny that the office of the president has become more and more impor
tant and powerful over the years, especially in this century.

This is

due to several factors, including the many roles that the chief execu
tive must play.

The president is "Chief of State, Chief Executive,

Commander in Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator . .

He is

also head of his party, the "Voice of the People," "Protector of the
Peace," "Manager of Prosperity" and "World Leader."

7

All of these are

roles of leadership, and as Rosslter asserts, these roles have made
Q
"external leadership a requisite of effective operation,"
To carry out the leadership functions of the executive, a presi
dent has the power to command and, more importantly, the power to per
suade.

The most important aspect of presidential power, according to
9
Neustadt, is the power to persuade.
Neustadt's thesis is taken from
^Walter Lippmann, "The President and the Press," Newsweek. March 1,
1965. P. 17.
^Rosslter, p. 30*
7Ibid., pp. 30-40.
8Ibid.. p. 28.
^Richard £. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Mentor, 1964),
p. 41; and Douglass Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Vintage, 1964).
p. 104.
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a cue by Truman, who analysed the presidency by saying, "I sit here
all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to
have sense enough to do without my persuading them. . . . That's
all the powers of the President amount to."^

Among the chief ob

jects of presidential persuasion are congress and the public.

To

reach congress, the president must sometimes use the force of public
opinion.

As Sorenson wrote, "He has a responsibility to lead public

opinion as well as to respect it, to shape it, to inform It, to woo
it, and win it.

It can be his sword as well as his compass."**

The president has more of an advantage, perhaps, in persuasion
than does any of his competitors.

This Is partially because of the

nature of the office and the great amount of public Interest in it.

12

There Is Increasing evidence that the president has been able to use
his advantage to win public attention.

The competition for publicity

between the president and congress is usually won by the president.*-^
A definite historical change in news patterns exists.

This trend

shows increased attention to the president at the expense of con
gressional news since World War I,***’
Attracting public attention is only part of the persuasive as
pect of the presidential press conference.

While the president must

*®Neustadt, p. 22.
**Theodore Sorensen, "The President as Political Leader," in The
American President, ed. Sidney Warren (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1967), p. 85.
*2Dorothy Buckton James, The Contemporary Presidency (New York:
Pegasus, 1969), p. ^5* Cater, Power in Washington, p. 76; and Daniel
Moynlhan, "The Presidency & the Press," Commentary. Mar. 1971, p.
*^Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 9-11.
*\lmer £. Cornwell, Jr., "Presidential News: The Expanding Public
Image," Journalism Quarterly. 36 (Summer 1959). 275-283.
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try to persuade congress and the public, he must also win reporters.
Former White House correspondent Tom Wicker has said that the presi
dent "has to make his case to the press; it's Just like an advocate
in court.

He has to cover up his weak points and emphasise his

strong points and the government does it all the time."*5 Added
to his other persuasive goals, the president, then, has the persuasive
function of building rapport with the press.^

This follows, because

the press determines, in some cases, the effect of the presidential
news conference on the public by what it reports in substance and
in tone.

The press not only helps to determine the persuasive ef

fect of the president's programs, it molds the president's public
image as well.*?
The third function of the press conference from the presiden
tial point of view is that the conference can serve as a vehicle
of feedback.

To the extent that reporters are in tune with public

attitudes and Interests, the questions asked at the conference may
reveal to the president some of the main concerns of the public at
the time.

The questions, to some ertsnt, are an index of public

opinion and interest. 18 Awareness of public opinion is vital to
the leadership function of the chief executive.
*^As quoted in G.R. Berdes, Friendly Adversaries: The Press and
Government (Marquette University: Center for the Study of the Ameri
can Press, 1969). p. 110.
16
Emory S. Bogardus, "Sociology of the Presidential TV Press Con
ference," Sociology and Social Research.
(Jan. 1962), 182; and
Zelko, p. 26.
17
Cater, Power in Washington, pp. 228-229.
18
Faunell J. Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," in ^ie
Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 19^9)»
PP* 33^-335; Hugh A. Bone, "The Presidential Press Conference," Parlia
mentary Affairs. *1 (Spring 1958), 1^*8; and Rosslter, p. 117.
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The purposes and functions of the presidential news conference
from the standpoint of the press must he mentioned.
allows reporters to get new information.
and news becomes a commodity in a

sense.

The conference

Reporters compete for news
^

The conference allows the

press not only news, but the opportunity to gain deeper understanding
of current affairs.

Direct contact with the president also provides

reporters and commentators with stories on the president's health
OA
and his moods.
While most newsmen would prefer private interviews
with the president, most of them use the press conference extensively
pi
as an important source. A
In some ways, the press acts as an "arbiter" of public opinion.22
According to Kraft, "the chief function of the Washington press, in
deed, is to put forward the conflicting arguments of the various ele
ments of the government and the Congress for public favor."23 The
presidential press conference thus serves the press in this role by
allowing it to present and elicit elements of differing points of view
in the questions that are asked and with the replies of the president.
As the "fourth estate," the correspondents may even use the confer
ence to influence the president.

For example, "as one systematic

channel of communication between Congress and the executive," reporters
^^Cater, Power in Washington, p. 225.
20
Harry W. Sharp, Jr., "The Kennedy News Conference," Dlss.
Purdue 1967. p. 104.
2*Dan D. Nimmo, Newsgatherlng in Washington (New York: Atherton,
1964), p. 146.
22Cater, Power in Washington, p. 225.
23joseph Kraft, "Politics of the Washington Press Corps,"
Harper's. June 1965. P* 102.
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may serve the congress to assert that branch of government's posttion.£

According to Reston, however, the idea that the press

serves as a "restraining influence" on the president is largely
igythlcal now since that power has gradually decreased.25

This notion

of the press as a "check" on the president is clarified in the dlscussion that immediately follows.

Ultimately, the presidential press

conference chiefly functions for the press as a staple of news.
Aside from the functions of the presidential press conference
in meeting the needs of the president and of the press, the conference
also serves the Interests of government and of the society as a whole.
Inherent in this idea is the suggestion that the press conference can
hold the president accountable for his actions.

In this way, the

conference is seen to serve as a "check and balance" mechanism on
26
the executive branch.
As an extension, perhaps, of the idea that
the press is a "fourth branch" of government is the common analogy
of the American presidential press conference to the question period
of the British Parliament.

In the House of Commons, a daily thirty-

minute segment is devoted to questions from members of the House to
the various ministers.2?
Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 14.
2^James B. Reston, "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs. 44 (July 1966), 559-562.
2^Rinn, pp. 330-332; Fauneil Rinn, "The Presidential Press Con
ference as a Communication Process," Studies in Public Communication.
1 (Summer 1957), 6-10; James E. Pollard, "The White House News Con
ference as a Channel of Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly.
15 (Winter 1951-52), 677.
2?For a discussion of this institution, see Robert R. James, An
Introduction to the House of Commons (London: Collins, 1961), pp. 5T-

dS~.
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Enough differences between the presidential press conference and
the question hour exist to merit discussion at this point.

These dif

ferences have been noted by C a t e r , R i n n , 2 ^ B o n e , a n d Rosslter.
First, the question period is a fixed, legal part of British govern
ment; the press conference is completely extra-legal.

Second, the

question period is a daily affair in the House, save Fridays;

the

presidential press conference is only as regular as the president
decides.

Third, questions are put to ministers of the British govern

ment by elected representatives, not by reporters.

Fourth, the ques

tion period is initiated by written questions from members, although
oral "supplementaries" may follow.
research.

This allows ministers time to do

Questions at presidential press conferences are oral.

Further, the British institution differs here in that there is a
built in system for follow-up questions, which is not always possible
in the American press conference.

Fifth, answers to questions put by

members of the House of Commons may be in writing or oral, or both,
depending upon a variety of circumstances; answers at presidential
press conferences are immediate and oral.

Sixth, ministers of the

British government are under more duress to provide satisfactory
answers to members' questions than is the president to reporters'
questions.

Seventh, queries at question time are screened by the

government for appropriateness in tone and content, while a reporter
at a news conference is free to ask any question in his own way.

pQ

The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 1^2-155*

Z^"The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 330-331*
30Bone, p. 150.
Rosslter, p. 117.
32R.R. James, p. 8ln.

Along this line, reporters may ask a wide variety of questions of
one man, the president: questions from the House are filtered auto
matically to appropriate ministers.

An eighth difference is that

the question period can be used to advantage by the opposition party
to exploit weaknesses of the party in power; this is not always true
in the press conference because of the power of the president and be
cause of the reportorial role of the correspondent.
to play a non-partisan role in the press conference.

Reporters tend
Ninth, the

question period is only held when the House of Commons is in session;
presidential press conferences often occur when congress is not in
session.

Tenth, the presidential press conference is largely designed

to Inform and persuade the public and to give the reporters news; the
question period Is more a function of government and has less news
value.

Finally, the question period is more institutionalised and

has a more formal procedural arrangement than the presidential press
conference.
The question period has some advantages over the press conference.
One is that the ministers can be pressed more severely for responsive
answers.

Also, the question hour is held regularly, when policy is

still being made, allowing the members of the House to Influence the
formulation of policy in a direct way.

In this manner, the question

period does more to hold the government responsible or accountable
for its actions.^
Other societal and governmental functions of the presidential
press conference exist.

The conference can serve as an executive

33
Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 148-151.

"check" on the congress and even on the Supreme Court.^

The presi

dent can use the conference to prod congress as well as to help deter
mine the impact of a decision of the courts.

The press conference

serves society by providing Immediate information.^

The conference

can help develop a "social nearness" between the public and the presldent.

Along this line, a broadcast conference can give the public

a sense of participation in government and can heighten public in
terest in governmental affairs.

Further, the public can monitor

governmental action and gauge the effectiveness of its leadership.3^
A final societal function of the conference is that it demonstrates
democratic ideals, that democratic government is working.39
In summary, the functions and purposes of the American presi
dential press conference are many.
dent in his leadership roles.

The conference serves the presi

The president informs the nation.

More

importantly, he uses the conference as a channel of persuasion to
reach public opinion, the congress, the press, and the world.

The

president gains publicity, argues for his policies, and defends his
actions.

The conference functions for the press to provide news.

The conference serves the government as a source of communication
and information and as a "check and balance."

The conference serves

society in providing prompt information, in holding the executive
accountable, and by allowing society to judge its leader's effectiveness,
^Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 331-332.
33Bogardus, p. 181.
^Ibid.
3?Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 332-333.
39Ibld.. pp. 333-335.
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Characteristics of the Presidential Press Conference
The presidential press conference in this country is an extralegal and extra-Constitutional phenomenon.

As shall be explained

later, the institution simply evolved over a period of years, chiefly
in our own centuiy, at the initiative of various presidents.

Fur

ther, most of the characteristics of the press conference are deter
mined by the individual president, although some features are con
stant and somewhat institutionalised.
The chief participants of the conference are the president and
attending reporters.

There are two variations to this composition.

Sometimes a president may share his conference with another official
or dignitary.

In 19M, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill

met the Washington press together, both responding to questions.
More commonly, a president will hold a joint conference with one of
his own cabinet members.

While the president usually faces the press

alone, he often has advisers, such as his own press secretary, nearby
to call upon for specific information if necessary.

Any number of

reporters, from twenty to five hundred, may attend, depending upon
the circumstances and the location of the conference.

Generally, any

reporter, domestic or foreign, with official credentials may attend.
The second variation to the composition of the conference is the broad
cast news conference, where the listening or viewing audience becomes
an indirect participant.
Locations vary.

Most conferences take place in Washington, D.C.

Recent presidents have held conferences in foreign countries as well
as at various sites within the United States while on tour or on vaca
tion.

Within the Capitol, specific locations also vary.

Some presi

dents meet the press in their White House office or in other rooms in
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the White House.

Large conferences, such as those which are televised,

meet in auditoriums such as that of the State Department Building.
Another varying characteristic is the scheduling of the news con
ference.

Timing is at the discretion of the president.

Some presi

dents have tried to meet regularly, at fairly predictable intervals,
with the press; others have been unpredictable in scheduling, as will
be seen later.

Some presidents have had favorite days and times for

their conferences while others have tried to accommodate reporters'
deadline problems by varying their scheduling.

The frequency of hold

ing the conferences has also varied considerably.

Finally, most con

ferences are announced in advance, although some presidents, notably
Lyndon Johnson, have held Impromptu meetings with the press.
The standard length of a press conference is thirty minutes,
especially if it is broadcast.

Some conferences have lasted only

ten minutes while others have gone beyond an hour.
length of the conference is determined by the press.

Ostensibly, the
By tradition,

the senior wire service correspondent ends the conference.
The degree of formality is another variant of the presidential
press conference.

Televised conferences are the most formal.

Frank

lin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson preferred small, informal conferences
in their offices, while they sat at their desks with reporters either
standing or sitting around them.

The degree of formality is also

influenced by the size of the group of correspondents, the location
of the conference, and the individual president's personality.
The basic pattern of the conference is as follows.

After the

reporters have gathered, the president walks in and usually begins
the conference with a series of announcements.

He then calls for
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questions.

The president recognizes whichever reporter he happens

to notice.

The reporter states his questlon(s).

sponds and then calls upon another questioner.

The president re
Presidents before

F.D. R. required written queries and rarely entertained oral ques
tions.

Since F.D.R., only oral questions have been asked.

Sometimes,

before the conference begins, presidential aides will "plant” ques
tions with reporters to make sure that certain topics are brought
up.

The conference ends, sometimes abruptly, with the senior wire

service correspondent's traditional "Thank you, Mr. President."
The conference is usually "wrapped up" an hour later with a distribu
tion of transcripts of the conference prepared by the White House
staff.
Early Presidential Relations with the Press
Although the presidential press conference is a development of
the twentieth century in America, its foundations can be seen in
the evolution of presidential relations with the press since the
American Revolution.

This section traces those relations and the

way that Presidents Washington through Taft dealt with the press.
Up until the time of the Civil War, the most important periodi
cal publications were political, partisan organs.^

Administration

organs were used by the various presidents through the administration
of Buchanan. UO Some presidents were able to use the same organ as
their predecessors.

For example, the National Intelligencer served

■^Frank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: Macmillan, 19*H),
p. 253.
antes E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press (New York: Mac
millan, 19^7), pp. 291-292.

IS
most of the presidents from Jefferson through John Quincy Adams.***
Rival publications were numerous and espoused the views of anti
administration factions and parties.

To some extent, a president’s

press relations depended upon his capacity to use such party organs
effectively.

The administration organs not only became almost the

sole sources of White House news, but, to some degree, they controlled
much government news.

II?

George Washington found the press useful in two ways before be
coming president.

The press served during the Revolution to provide

military information.Also, Washington sought press approval and
itii

support for the new Constitution.

Washington, like most presidents

until Jackson, had little direct contact with the press.^

But

Washington was aware of the publicity power of the press as he sought
publication of his "Farewell Address."^
John Adams was a prolific writer for newspapers but had no direct
contact with reporters.**? He did propose an official government paper,
but the proposal was never taken seriously and partisan papers continued
Ml
to dominate.
Thomas Jefferson, one of the nation's leading champions
***Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 75-76.
**^William L. Rivers, The Qplnionmakers (Boston: Beacon, 1967). p. 3.
^-^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 1-2.
****Ibld.. p.

k.

^ I b l d . . pp. 1, 6.

**^William L. Rivers, The Adversaries: Politics and the Press (Bos
ton: Beacon, 1970), p. 10; and John K. Boas, "The Presidential Press
Conference," Diss. Wayne State 1969. P» I**1^?Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 36,*f6.
^ I b l d . . pp. U5J46 .
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for press freedoms, also worked behind the scenes.

He Is famous

for his attitude, expressed before the adoption of the Constitution,
when he said, "Were It left to me to decide whether we should have a
government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I
should not hesitate to prefer the latter."^9 Jefferson carried his
zeal for freedom of the press Into the presidency by pardoning edi
tors and publishers who had been convicted under the Alien and Sedi
tion Acts of 1795 for disagreeable criticisms of the previous adminis
trations.^®

As President, Jefferson was able to establish his own

organ, the National Intelligencer, under the direction of Philip Freneau.

He did this by offering Freneau a position in government, a

practice to be followed by other presidents.^
Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams continued the use of the
administration organ to release news.

Both Madison and Adams had

written for newspapers and were able to use the press to advantage.
Monroe was largely ineffectual in his press relationships. 52 Madison
suggested the establishment of a bi-partisan publication, but the
idea did not bear fruit.^
Until the time of Jackson, no president had been aggressive in
his use of the nation's press.

Jackson reversed the trend.

According

to divers, "Jackson used the party press so astutely that one noted
^Quoted in Mott, p. 170.
^°Mott, p. 152; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 71.
^Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 10-11; and Pollard, The Presidents
and the Press, p. 70.
52
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 96-1**6.
53Mott, p. 175.
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historian claims that Jackson actually ruled the country by means of
54

newspapers.Jackson accomplished favorable press coverage in
various ways.

One method was to award government printing contracts

to friendly publishers, a device used by previous presidents, and one
which remained useful until i860 when the Government Printing Office
was established.'^ Jackson also appointed many Journalists to important
government positions, perhaps as many as fifty-seven, including three
of the five members of his ''Kitchen Cabinet."^

Pollard concluded:

Andrew Jackson excelled in aggressive, partisan use of the
press. He knew what he wanted, he meant to have his own
way, and he was fortunate in finding journalists devoted
to him and capable of carrying out his desires. The result
was the most effective employment of the press for partisan
purposes in the long history of the Presidency.57
The presidents between Jackson and Lincoln were generally undis
tinguished in their use of the press.

Van Buren continued use of the

party organ and may be the first president who allowed publication of
an interview by a Journalist.^® William Harrison revived the National
Intelligencer for his administration^9 and used the press to defend
his war record, to refute chtiges of being an abolitionist, and to
campaign for the presidency.^

Tyler, who was a "strong believer in

54
The Adversaries, p. 12.
^Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 76; and Pollard,
The Presidents and the Press, p. 15^.
56

Pollard, The Presidents and the Press. p. 1^7; Rivers, The
Adversaries, pp. 5-6; Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 76;
and Mott, pp. 179-190.

cn

Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 1^7.

5®Ibid.. pp. 181-195; and Rivers, The Adversaries. p. 13.
59M0tt, p. 225.
®®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 201-208.
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the power of the press . . . set up a new paper, the Madisonian. In
Washington, and an organ in nearly every state, all of them bound to
the administration by patronage."**1 To those and other favorable
papers he submitted articles from time to time.^^ Polk again changed
organs to the Washington Union^

It was during the Polk administra

tion, in 1846, that a law was passed to give printing contracts to
the lowest bidder, a blow to the patronage powers of the presidency
64
with the press.
Polk disliked public attention and was distrustful
of the press, although he appointed journalists to government posi
tions.^^ While Polk realized the powers of the press, he was basically
unsuccessful in using them to presidential advantage.^

Taylor also

established a new paper but took little initiative with the press.

67

Although Fillmore had previously used the press to present informa
tion and publicize his opinions, his presidential efforts at using
the press were limited to the establishment of relations with a small
group of publishers.

68

use the Union as their
Pierce and Buchanan used

spokesman but made minimal use of the press. 69
6lMott, p. 256.
62
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 214-225.
63
Mott, p. 256.

w ibid.
^%*ollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 230,241, 252.
66Ibld.. p. 252.
67Ibid.. pp. 256-267; and Mott, p. 257.
**®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 268-276.
69ibld.. pp. 282-292; and Mott. p. 257.
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Like Jackson, Lincoln once again changed the pattern of presi
dential press relations.

Lincoln was a frequent contributor of re

ports and editorials to Illinois newspapers and discovered the power
of the press over public opinion early in his political career.7®
Dy making friends in the press, Lincoln was able to gain publicity
locally and nationally in his various attempts to gain office.
these friends was the powerful Chicago Tribune.^

Among

One way in which

Lincoln gained a favorable press was to provide copies of his speeches
to various papers, including his famous "House Divided" speech and his
address at Cooper Union.

Lincoln even took the trouble to read news

paper proofs to assure accuracy and emphasis in the printing of his
speeches.7^ Lincoln was an "Inveterate newspaper reader" and well
understood the workings of the press.?3
In the White House, Lincoln dropped the use of the partisan ad
ministration organ so that he might establish favorable relationships
7u
with a variety of publishers.' In fact, Lincoln sought to win under
standing and support of such antagonistic papers as Horace Greeley's
Tribune as well as the New York Herald. p e r h a p s even more important
is the fact that Lincoln cultivated the first really direct relations
76
with Washington reporters.
As President, he saw reporters often and
7®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 312-313.
71Mott, pp. 284-285.
72Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 325* 33^.
73Ibld.. p. 313.
^Rivers, The Onlnlonmakers. p. 7.
7^Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 15-16.
76
Boaz, pp. 22-23*
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at length and occasionally gave Impromptu Interviews.

He had many

informal dealings with correspondents and his accessibility laid the
groundwork for more extensive presidential press relationships. ?? In
sum, Lincoln’s press relations were probably better than those of any
previous president.
Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur were undistinguished
in their press relations.

Johnson's chief contribution was to give a

number of exclusive Interviews with reporters.78 Grant had had little
prior contact with the press and was not effective in dealing with it. ^9
Hayes knew mapy publishers well and attempted good press relations.

80

Garfield, too, had "extensive dealings with the press," but these
were more "personal than official," and were not used to advantage.

O1

Arthur began with bad press relations and stayed away from reporters,
preferring to work directly with congressional leaders.
While Grover Cleveland carried an "active antipathy" toward the
press throughout his years in office, he was fairly successful in
Q-a
using the press to support his programs.
Cleveland received ques
tions from reporters through his staff and often provided answers in
return, but indirectly.

He occasionally gave interviews to individual

77Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 348, 369-373.
78lbid.. pp. 413-427.
79Ibid.. pp. 434-452.
8QIbid.. p. 455.
8*Ibid.. p. 480.
82Ibld.. pp. 488-497.
83Ibld.. pp. 499, 533.
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and groups of reporters.
make announcements.

He frequently prepared news releases to

He also wrote a number of letters to papers In

order to defend and explain his policies, sometimes rebutting criti84
cism.
Cleveland disliked press speculation, was angered when re
porters interfered with his personal life, and he distrusted papers
so much that he was against the practice of providing advance texts
of his

speeches and messages.

Benjamin Harrison and McKinley remained inaccessible to Washing
ton correspondents.

Harrison did not get along well with the press,

although he appointed a number of journalists to positions in govern86
ment.
Falling to understand the power of the press, he was unable
to useit to his advantage.®?

McKinley, an avid newspaper reader,

also remained aloof to reporters.

His chief contribution to develop

ing relations between the White House and the press was to provide
QQ
chairs for reporters in a corridor of the White House.
It was Theodore Roosevelt, cognisant of the value of publi
city and not reticent about projecting his ego into the
front pages of the land, who first began to treat the news
papermen with a consideration calculated to have its
rewards.89
As Governor, Roosevelt had met the press twice daily with a free oral
^Ibld.. pp. 501. 513 , 516 , 528.
85Ibid.. pp. 500-501, 515, 522; and Mott, pp. 510-511.
R6Mott, p. 511.
8^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 538-539, 557.
^ Ibld.. pp. 551-557.
®^Leo C. Rosten, The Washlngton Correspondents (New York: Harcourt. Brace and Co., 1937), p. 21.
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Interchange of questions and answers, although direct quotation was
never permitted.9^

He carried his basic attitudes toward the press

to the White House.

"The thrust of his method was orchestration;

both courting the correspondents and commanding them."91

Roosevelt

established the first White House press room for correspondents.^
He wrote for several publications, prepared press releases, and sug
gested news Items to reporters.
carefully.

Roosevelt timed his press releases

Knowing, for example, that publishers lacked news for

Monday papers, he made a practice of Issuing news releases on Sundays
to capture attention In the next day's press.9** Roosevelt is also
credited with being the first president to use the "trial balloon"
technique, a device which allowed him to publicize an idea without
public knowledge of the

source.

95

Roosevelt's presidential press conferences were not the types of
meeting ordinarily thought of as press conferences in the modern sense.
He did not meet with large groups of reporters.

Instead, Roosevelt

called in selected "favorites," who would give him favorable publi
city.^

To these chosen few he gave exclusive interviews and answered

questions, but he always molded and directed these meetings to suit
9®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 510.
9*Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 18.
9^Ibld.; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 57^.
93pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 573• 59^.
9^Ibid.. p. 573; and Boaz, p. 36.

95Raymond P. Brandt, "The President's Press Conference," Survey
Graphic. 28 (July 1939), ^ 8; and Rosten, p. 22.
96flosten, p. 22.
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his own designs.

He continued the rule prohibiting direct quotation. 97

The meetings were held at various times and were not scheduled on a
regular basis, although Roosevelt remained accessible to reporters
throughout his administration.

Roosevelt's relations with corres

pondents were as mercurial as his personality.

He charmed reporters,

bullied them, lectured to them, and vented his wrath upon those who
(or whose papers) printed unfriendly articles.

Reporters who violated

Roosevelt's trust were "elected" to the "Ananias Club" and were likely
not to see the President again."
Roosevelt was highly sensitive to press criticism, and he in
turn responded with criticism as well as legal action.

In his first

message to Congress he placed a share of the blame for McKinley's
assassination on the press."

In 1909* he Instructed the Attorney

General to file libel suits against two publishers, including Joseph
Pulitzer, for stories on corruption in his administration.**^

He

Initiated other suits after he left office.
Roosevelt, then, was probably the most effective president since
Lincoln in his dealings with the press.

He saw reporters as public

servants, and he went out of his way to cultivate their services. 102
97

Ibid.: and Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 18.

"Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 18-19; Pollard, The Presidents and
the Press, pp. 5^9. 572, 57^+; Rosten, p. 22; and Mott, p. 60&.
"Mott, p. 5^1.
100Ibid.. pp. 605-606.
*°*Ibld.. pp. 606, 608.
102Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 59^.
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His understanding of the workings of the press and his deliberate
wooing of reporters paid off In large measure.
Taft's relations with reporters were not as successful.

Taft had

a working knowledge of the press, since, after graduation from college,
he had been a reporter in C i n c i n n a t i . S e c r e t a r y of War, Taft
held daily afternoon press conferences.

"He enjoyed the cross-fire

of questions at his conferences. . . ,»104 in the White House, Taft
attempted to hold weekly press conferences.*®^

Because of sensitivity

to press criticism and an inability to follow his predecessor's rapport
with reporters, Taft came to see the press less frequently and his
press relations came to be ineffective.*®^

It is paradoxical that

Taft was unable to utilize well his newspaper experience and relations
with the press as War Secretary to advantage during his term as president.
In reviewing this section on the early history of presidential
relations with the press, several points emerge.

Presidents Washing

ton through Buchanan relied chiefly upon partisan political organs to
promote their administrations.
the press.

Early presidents remained aloof from

They declined direct relations with reporters although

they favored editors and publishers with various types of patronage
and friendship.

The most successful early presidents were Jackson,

l03Ibld.. p . 601.
1a

/l

Mott, p. 608; and Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 20.
*®^Rosten, p. 23; and Mott, p. 608.
*®^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 605-620.
*®^Ibid.. p. 627; Rivers, The Adversaries. p. 20; and Boaz,
pp. 37-*0.
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Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt.

Jackson cultivated relationships

with many journalists and was thus able to have. In effect, more than
one administration organ.

Lincoln was the first president to become

accessible to reporters, and he vigorously sought press support in a
number of ways.

Roosevelt set the stage for the modem press con

ference In his meetings with reporters and used his contacts with
the press better than any previous chief executive.

How the modern

press conference evolved Is the subject of the last section of this
chapter.
The Twentieth Century Evolution of the Presidential Press Conference
The ten presidents that followed Taft developed relations with
the press In more sophisticated ways than those before them.

The

twentieth century witnessed a rise In the Influence of Independent
newspapers, an Increase In the powers of the presidency, and the
establishment and Institutionalisation of the presidential press con
ference.

The following discussion describes the evolution of the

presidential press conference as well as the Increased reliance of
the presidency upon the press.

Each president's press relations and

contributions to the press conference are considered separately.
Woodrow Wilson. Most historians of the institution credit Wilson
with the formal establishment of the presidential press conference.
Wilson was probably the first president to have a stenographer present
*^®Bogardus, p. 181, says Cleveland was the first to hold press
conferences, possibly because Cleveland granted interviews to report
ers. Other historians cite Theodore Roosevelt and Taft with the In
vention. But Wilson was first to hold formal and regular press con
ferences open to all accredited correspondents; see Pollard, The
Presidents and the Press, pp. 630-631.
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at press meetings.

109

He may have been the first to have a staff

member who served as a press secretary.1*0

Since Wilson did not

permit direct quotation, the "official spokesman" technique for
attribution was initiated under Wilson.***
Wilson held his conferences twice weekly, on Mondays and Thurs
days, during the first two years of his administration.
in 1915» he held only one a week, on Tuesdays.

112

Beginning

After the sinking

of the "Lusitania," Wilson discontinued his press conferences, par
tially as a security precaution, since foreign correspondents were
allowed to attend. 113
Wilson's conferences were of three types.
a broad range of questions.

In some he answered

Other conferences were held on one sub

ject only.

In the third type, Wilson lectured at length on his atti114
tudes and policies.
In the first type of conference, Wilson took

little initiative and allowed reporters to determine the content and
direction of the meeting.

He had a "self-imposed rule of passivity.m11^

In the conferences with a single topic, Wilson "fenced" with corres
pondents and was probably more a g g r e s s i v e . T h e third typ®

of

10^Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Press Conferences of Woodrow
Wilson," Journalism Quarterly. 39 (Summer 1962), 293; and Boaz, p.

94.

**^Boas, p. 48; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 632.
***Rosten,

pp. 24-25.

**^Cornwell, "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson," p. 294.
11^Rosten, p. 25; and Boas, p. 56.
**^Boas, pp. 54-55.
1 ^ C o r n w e l l , "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson,"
ll 6 Boaz, p. 54.

p. 299.
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conference revealed Wilson's habit of lecturing to reporters.

"There

was In Wilson's manner something of a professor facing a classroom.
He regarded newspapermen as Intellectual inferiors. . . . "

117

In

general he was somewhat unresponsive in his press conferences.
remained cautious, aloof, and at times terse with reporters.

He
He was

even evasive and misleading on occasion.**®
Although reporters were friendly with Wilson, several factors
lessened the effectiveness of his conferences and his press relations.
There Is evidence that Wilson did not really like the cross examina
tion atmosphere of the news conference.**^
to reporters did not help.

His tendency to lecture

He was especially sensitive toward ques

tions about his personal and family life and rebuked prying reporters. 120 Wilson was bothered by criticism in papers and was hurt by
unfavorable publicity about his administration.

121

Wilson was probably glad to discontinue his conferences.

122

When

he did, he turned his press relations over to his secretary, Joseph
Tumulty, who met the press daily to provide news and answer questions.
This practice was the forerunner of contemporary press secretaries'
news conferences, now usually held twice dally in Washington.

123

In

117
Rosten, p. 25; and M.L. Stein, When Presidents Meet the Press
(New York: Messner, 19^9)» PP» 55-56.
1.18

Boas, p. 46; and Brandt, p. 448.

**^Cornwell, "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson," pp. 298299; and Stein, pp. 56-57.
120
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 633-638.
l?i
Ibid.. pp. 634-642.
l22u
czBoaz, p. 56.
123
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 659.
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19171 the White House became less of a news source.

Wilson estab-

llshed the Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel,
to coordinate and disclose government information.

Although Wil

son no longer had many direct contacts with the press, he continued
to be irritated by "leaks," by speculation in the press, and by inade
quate publicity for his programs.
Warren Harding. Harding published his own paper in Marion, Ohio,
many years before he entered politics.

His prowess in understanding

the needs of newspapermen was shown in his campaign for the presidency,
as he made special efforts to accommodate reporters and meet with
126

them.
After the election, Harding reinstated the press conference.
was affable and communicative, the epitome of good-fellowship.

"He

He

met the corps twice a week and enjoyed a high degree of popularity.
He was the first President to divulge, quite carelessly, what went on
127
at cabinet meetings."
Harding liked the press, treated it well,
and enjoyed his meetings with reporters.
well by reporters.

1

He was, in turn, treated

His conferences were on Tuesday and Friday

afternoons, after cabinet meetings.
The basic policies of Harding's conferences were as follows.
Like Wilson, Harding occasionally spoke off-the-record.
124
Ibid.. pp. 659-687.
123Ibid.. pp. 654-655, 658, 690, 686-687.
126
127

Ibid.. pp. 697-701.
Rosten, p. 27; and Stein, p. 71.

Brandt, p. 448.
129
Boas, p. 60.

As Roosevelt
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had done, Harding demanded that reporters not break that confidence
when he did speak off-the-record.

Another rule was that Harding was

not to be quoted directly without permission.*3®

In November of

1921, another change came about: written questions were to be sub
mitted in advance.

This rule evolved as a consequence of an embaras-

sing slip of mind and tongue on a delicate matter of foreign policy
during a news conference.

131

The rule was relaxed as time went on so

as to allow oral follow-up questions and oral questions on topics
132
initiated by Harding.
Toward the end of his administration, press criticism and breaches
of his trust led Harding to become more cautious in his dealings with
reporters. 133

In sum, Harding had made a contribution to presidential

press relations.

He helped the development of the press conference

by making it permanent and regular and by participating with reporters
actively.
Calvin Coolldge. Coolldge continued most of Harding's press
conference practices, meeting reporters twice a week on Tuesdays and
Fridays.

13^

Written questions were required and Coolldge answered as

many or as few as he liked.

He so rarely allowed direct quotation

thathis conferences were basically off-the-record.

Coolldge viewed

the press conference

as a source of

background information rather

*3®Pollard, The

Presidents and

the Press, p. 70*f; and Boas, p.6l.

*3*Pollard, The

Presidents and

the Press, p. 705.

132
Rosten, p. 27.
133Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 705; *nd Stein, p. 71.
*^Boas, p. 67,

than a source of news. 135 His penchant for forcing reporters to use
the "White House spokesman" attribution device led Lyle Wilson to
suggest that. "Calvin Coolidge was t.he contriver of the most persis-

tent and transparent political hoax of twentieth-century America."
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Coolldge would not even permit reporters to publish the fact that he
refused to comment on a particular question.

Coolidge sometimes

used his conferences to make announcements, but his replies to ques
tions provided so little and such dry information for reporters that
the press was forced to manufacture news and to embellish Coolidge's
remarks.
gave

The correspondents "exploited the trivial material he

them. . . . "
Coolidge was friendly with the press and actively sought its

support.

The real story of Coolidge's success with the press lay in

his use of the press conference to promote himself* politically, since
he had no substantive legislative program to

p u b l i c i z e .

With the

help of reporters who dramatized his statements, Coolldge rose to
prominence from an unknown because of his ability to focus public
140
attention on the White House.
He courted the press on vacations
and on the election trail and used the press to his advantage to win
135Ibld.
*^In The Talkative President: The Off-the-Record Press Confer
ences of Calvin Coolidge. ed. Howard H. Quint and Robert H. Ferrell
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 196^). P» v.
*^Brandt, p. ^ 8 ; and Rosten, p. 31.
13®Brandt, p. ^+8; and Rosten, p. 3^«
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "Coolidge and Presidential Leader
ship," Public Opinion Quarterly. 21 (Summer 1957), 273-277.

1^0

.,

the 1924 election.1^1 The press made Coolldge a public legend.

As

Rosten put It.
The Washington correspondents had been presented with the
considerable task of popularising a man of no historic talents,
no engaging graces, no compelling personality. Ihey had to
transform a New England politician Into a statesman. . . .
The press hammered the Coolldge legend into the public mind.
Mr. Coolldge was astute enough to let newspapermen pressed
for copy endow him with extravagant talents which he did not
possess, and magnify him to a stature which he could not have
achieved by deliberate exertion.
Proportionately speaking, Coolidge held more news conferences
than any previous or later president.

He held 520 conferences for

an average of about eight a month during his tenure.
In a way, Coolidge's only contribution to the evolution of presi
dential press conferences was that he held them unfailingly.

More

important was his contribution to presidential press relations.

He

demonstrated, even more sharply than Theodore Roosevelt, the use of
the press to gain personal political advantage.

He was one of the

few presidents to enjoy mutually cordial relations with the Washing
ton press throughout his administration.
Herbert Hoover.

While Commerce Secretary under Harding, Hoover

had developed unusually good rapport with the press.

He had met with

reporters informally and often and proved to be a valuable source of
news.^^

His high popularity with the press and his favorable dealings

*^*Brandt, p. 448.

Rosten, pp. 38-39.
*^Boaz, pp. 63 -65 .

*iiji

Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 717.

^^Rosten, p. 39.
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with reporters came to an end, as had Taft's, when Hoover came into
146
the White House.
Hoover changed several of the policies of his predecessor.
met the reporters less frequently than had Coolidge.
he averaged only two conferences a month.

Hoover

In his first year,

In his last three years, he

held slightly more than an average of one conference a month, for a to
tal of only sixty-six in four y e a r s . A n o t h e r change involved the
abolition of the "White House spokesman" attribution device.
set up three categories of answers:

Hoover

(1) direct quotation by permission,

(2) background information for use but not for quotation, and (3) con
fidential data which could not be used in any way.

Hoover retained

the requirement of written questions, which had to be submitted twentyfour hours in advance of a given conference.***^ Hoover's press secre
tary then screened the questions, and many never reached the Presi150
dent's eyes.
Like Coolldge, Hoover then decided which of the re
porters' questions he wanted to answer and went as far as denying that
he had received a question if a reporter pressed for an

a n s w e r .

*^1

Hoover's press conferences and press relations were marred in a
number of ways.

Hoover read his answers, which were not particularly

informative anyway.

He demeaned reporters.

He often gave out mis

leading and Inaccurate information and was generally reticent. *52
146Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 737; and Boaz, p. 73.
147
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Brandt, p. 448.
***9Ibid.
l5°Stein, p. 74.
*^*Rosten, p. 40,
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Boaz, pp. 74-80.
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Hoover disliked stories about his personal and family life and grew
more and more resentful of press criticisms of the policies of his
administration. 1S3 He attempted to coordinate all news in the execu
tive branch through the White House press secretary and reporters
cried " c e n s o r s h i p . " j n « downward spiral of distrust and dislike.
Hoover became increasingly distant and the press more bitter in criti
cism.

Relations deteriorated to such an extent that in September of

1932, Hoover discontinued meeting with the press.
Hoover contributed little to the evolution of the presidential
press conference and the development of presidential press relations.
Many reasons account for his failures with the press.

An economic

depression, problems with congress, and a hostile press added to his
demise.

Hoover's administration was also to blame.

Pollard con

cluded:
Much of its personal failure and political tragedy lay in
his inability to keep the confidence of correspondents.
It remained for his successor to prove over a far longer
and vastly world-shaking time what really skillful and
adroit handling of press corps could accomplish in fat
years and lean.*5°
Franklin Roosevelt. As Governor of New York, F.D.R. had estab
lished the practice of holding regular press conferences.
that practice into office as President.

He carried

157

*^Rosten, pp. *K)-^1.
1^*Ibld.. pp. i+2-^4.
*-^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 768.
1^6Ibld.. p. 770
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Pollard, "Franklin D, Roosevelt and the Press,"
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As President, Roosevelt met the press twice a week, holding 998
158
conferences In all.
He dropped the requirement of written ques
tions.

He had four categories of replies which Included (1) direct

quotation, (2) Indirect quotation, (3) background information unattributable to him, and (^) off-the-record, confidential information not for
publication in any form.

The second of those categories was an inno

vation.*-^
Roosevelt seemed just the opposite of Hoover.
frank, and forceful.

He was friendly,

He flattered reporters with his candor and by

the amount of background and off-the-record Information he provided
them.

According to Rosten,

His answers were swift, positive, illuminating. . . . He was
informal, communicative, gay. When he evaded a question it
was done frankly. He was thoroughly at ease. He made no
effort to conceal his pleasure in the give and take of the
situation.160
Like Wilson, Roosevelt prepared for his conferences.

He was

adept at anticipating questions and sometimes used prepared answers.*^*
Roosevelt may have been the first president to use the "planted"
q u e s t i o n . T o further guide reporters, he even suggested how sto
ries might be w r i t t e n . H e used other tactics in his conferences.
He used the "trial balloon," for example, on his idea to restructure
* ^ Ibld.. p. 197; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 773.

*59ft08t,erif p# 48 .
160Ibid.. p. 49.
*^*Pollard, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Press," p. 199.
l62
Dorothy B. James, p. ^7; «nd Brandt, p. Mr6,
*^Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 35.
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the Supreme Court.

164

He sometimes made lengthy announcements In

anticipation of reporters' questions.Roosevelt also set prece
dent by holding special conferences for groups other than the White
House press c o r p s . R o o s e v e l t was probably the first president to
hold a news conference with a visiting head of state when he invited
Winston Churchill to join him in his conference of December 23. 1941.*^
Roosevelt's strength with the press was shown in other ways.

He

was often critical of newspapers and occasionally took reporters to
task, threatening to revive the "Ananias Club." and sending reporters
"into the corner" or telling them to put on a dunce cap.
presented a reporter with a German cross.

He once

"He lectured the reporters.

He called them liars and used the mighty weight of his high office in
pile-driving fashion against the press."

l66

These attacks, however,

were usually more a result of his hostilities with a number of Repub
lican publishers.

Aside from occasional flare-ups, Roosevelt general

ly got along extremely well with Washington correspondents.
Roosevelt deserves mention here for other novel features of his
public relations program.

First, Mrs. Roosevelt played an important

role in publicizing F.D.R.*s administration with her travels, speeches,
l6^Brandt, p. 447.
l^^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 779-780.
l66Ibld.. pp. 783. 803.
167
Bone, p. 144.
l68Merriman Smith, Thank You. Mr. President (New York: Harper,
1946), p. 15.
*^Pollard, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Press," pp. 200202.
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newspaper columns, and her own press conferences. *7® Another innova
tion was Roosevelt's use of the "Fireside Chat," although, according
to Rivers, Koosevelt. preferred to communicate with the public through

his press conferences, 1 7'1

Further, Koosevelt made such extensive use

of public relations personnel that a congressional investigating com
mittee reported discovering 270 public information officers working
for him.172
Roosevelt's publicity campaign paid off.

He won a large and sym

pathetic following among the Washington press corps.^7^ More tangible
results followed.

Cornwell analyzed selected periods in the adminis

trations of Roosevelt, Truman, and Elsenhower and found that F.D.R.
got more news stories per press conference than either of the other
174
two presidents.
Toward the end of his career, as the United States became more
involved in the war, some changes marked Roosevelt's press policies
and relations.

Roosevelt cancelled a few of his news conferences.

In his meetings, some topics were not discussed, and the off-therecord method was employed more frequently.
ences became less jovial.

The tone of the confer

To some extent, the White House coordinated

news from various agencies, and there was a degree of censorship and
*^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 774; and Rosten,
pp. 51-52.
171
The Oplnlonmakers. p. 137.
172
ir Ibid.. p. 139.
^7^Rosten, pp. 49-51.
17\lmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Presidential Press Conference:
A Study in Institutionalization," Midwest Journal of Political
Science. 4 (Nov. i960), 387-389.

^0
secrecy which aroused complaint from the press.

Roosevelt also became

less available to reporters.
The reasons for Roosevelt's extraordinary success with the press
were summarized by Raymond Clapper, a Washington correspondent:
Clapper gave five reasons for Mr. Roosevelt's high
standing with the White House corps.
One was that their
personal contacts were not only pleasant but often inti
mate.
Another was that his press conferences were almost
always certain to yield live news.
Again, they admired his
political skill and craftsmanship and, even when they disa
greed with him, they generally believed in his sincerity,
his courage and his readiness to experiment.
Finally,
Clapper observed that the original Roosevelt theme of doing
otten man struck a responsive chord

On balance, Roosevelt did more than any previous administration to
develop and utilize the presidential press conference to its fullest
advantage.
added.

By scrapping the written questions, spontaneity was

By holding frequent and regular conferences, Roosevelt fur

thered the institutionalization of the news conference.

Roosevelt's

personality and his interest in newspapers led him to improve presi
dential press relations more than any previous president.

He delib

erately courted the press, understood reporters' problems, and enjoyed
being with correspondents.

He used every possible public relations

technique in his dealings with the press.

His carefully planned strat

egies as well as his habitual congeniality with reporters were highly
successful.
Harry Truman.

Truman must have learned much from his predeces

sor, f o r he followed many of Roosevelt's practices in press relations.

^ - ’Pollard, The Presidents and the P r e s s , pp.

176Ibld.. p. 780.

83O-836.
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Nevertheless, Truman injected his own personality and made some minor
changes.
In his press conferences, Truman kept the four categories of an
swers used by Roosevelt.
the off-the-record reply.

Unlike Roosevelt, Truman rarely employed
178

Truman also chose to meet reporters

once a week rather than twice, 179

Roosevelt had met reporters while

seated at his desk in his White House office.

The size of the White

House press corps had grown to such an extent that, in 1950, Truman
moved the location to the Indian Treaty Room of the old State, War,
l80
and Navy Building.
Another change was to require reporters to
identify themselves by name before asking a question.Further,
Truman stood behind a desk and reporters sat, whereas in Roosevelt's
conferences reporters stood and Roosevelt sat.*®^
ferences also varied in length from Roosevelt's.
occasionally lasting only ten minutes or

Truman's con
They were shorter,

so.

Changes in the content of the conferences also emerged.
did not make use of the "trial balloon" device as had F.D.R.

Truman
Although

he was willing to allow partisan political questions, Truman did not
*^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson,
p. 27.
*^®A.L. Lorenz, Jr., "Truman and the Press Conference," Journa
lism Quarterly. 43 (Winter 1966), 678.
^^James £. Pollard, "President Truman and the Press," Journalism Quarterly. 28 (Fall 1951)# 457.
1®°Lorenz, p. 679.
^Pollard, "President Truman and the Press," p. 458.
l82Pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson.
p. 28.
lg3Ibid.

l>2

like to comment on pending Supremo C’ourt cases and did not elucidate
foreign policy matters.

He was not good at explanations and inter

pretations of policy and "hesitated to use the press conference to
introduce and promote legislation, as previous Presidents had done. "I8**
Truman's answers tended to be shorter than his

predecessor'

s . j n

the latter part of his administration, Truman used announcements and
prepared statements more frequently in his news conferences.

In

1951# Truman began the practice of allowing edited excerpts of his
conferences to be broadcast on radio, the first president to do so.^8?
Truman went beyond Roosevelt in preparing for his conferences.
Truman held meetings with his staff about thirty minutes before his
conferences in order to anticipate questions and gather information.
By 1952# the preparation process was so systematized that Truman's
press aides put together a notebook of information for Truman to
IBP
review before each conference.
Truman's press conferences sometimes proved to be embarrassing.
On several occasions Truman made statements, which, when interpreted
by the press, caused the White House to issue corrections and clari
fications, a problem also faced by Eisenhower.

Perhaps the most

famous of these incidents was Truman's statement in his conference
*^Lorenz, p. 675.
1^5pollard, "President Truman and the Press," p. ^58.
l86Ibid.. pp. ^63-^6*+.
l8?Lorenz, p, 679.
l88Ibid.. p. 674.

I*3

of November 16, 1950, on the possible use of nuclear weapons.

The

impulsiveness of his remarks and misinterpretation by reporters
forced the White House to release an angry denial several hours
l.ter.'89
Other aspects of Truman's policies led to a waning of his rela
tions with the press.

Truman angered reporters when he gave an exclu

sive interview to Arthur Krock in 1 9 5 0 . When Truman placed restric
tions on dissemination of military information by government agencies,
he further displeased the press.*9* jn his conference of April 17,
1952, Truman caused a stir when he implied that he had the power to
take over the nation's press just as he had the steel mills.*92
Other developments led to exchanges of criticism between Truman and
the press, especially in the last two years of his administration.
As a whole, Truman's press relations were good.

Although Truman

was sometimes at odds with the press, he seemed to enjoy his confer
ences and established a fair degree of rapport with reporters.*93
As he gained confidence in himself and when he was elected in his
own right, he matured in his dealings with the press.

Although he

made a few minor changes in his conferences, he generally followed
Roosevelt's pattern,

rie did less than Roosevelt to use his conferences

to promote legislation.

In spite of that, his concern for publicity

led Truman to develop a public relations staff larger than any of his
189

Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 37.
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*92 Ibld.. p. 280.

193Ibld.. pp. 273, 286.
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predecessors.

His administration employed over 3.000 public informa

tion officers at one time, according to one investigation.^**

Truman,

then, contributed to the development of the presidential press con
ference and to presidential relations with the press with a good degree
of success.
Dwight Eisenhower. The army of information officers amassed by
Truman was even doubled under Eisenhower.

"In 1957. the Civil Service

Commission was listing 6,8?8 'Information and Editorial Employees.'
The increase continued during the second term."*9^

Eisenhower had

dealt with the press often during his military career and was aware
of its value,
Eisenhower continued many of Truman's press conference policies
and added his own innovations.

Eisenhower met less frequently with

the press, averaging only one conference every two w e e k s . T h e
conferences were held in the same location as Truman's,
stood and so did reporters asking questions.
themselves as they had for Truman.

Eisenhower

Reporters identified

The average conference lasted

thirty minutes, and the President did not like exceeding that length.*97
The conferences were usually held on Thursdays, the favorite day of
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

iq P

Eisenhower tried to aid re

porters by varying the time of his conferences so that writers for
199

Rivers, The Oplnionmakers. p. l9l.

19^Ibid..
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192.
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Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First TWo
Years," Journalism Quarterly. 32 (Summer 1955). 285.
*9^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 69.
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Douglass Cater, "The President and the Press," Reporter.
April 28, 1953, p. 27.
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morning papers would have an equal advantage with correspondents for
afternoon papers In breaking the news which resulted from his conferences.

199

Other changes Included allowing reporters greater free

dom In direct quotation and a more extensive use of opening state
ments.^®

Eisenhower's staff Issued transcripts of the conference,

but the replies were edited.2®*

In 195^» Eisenhower became the first president to allow live
radio broadcast of his press conference.2®2

And in 1955 he permitted

filmed recordings of his conferences to be televised, having hired
actor Robert Montgomery as television adviser.2®^

The White House

reserved the right to edit the sound track of the television film.2®**
The delayed television broadcasts of Eisenhower's press conferences
caught the interest of the public at first, but as time wore on,
fewer broadcasts were carried because of decreased popularity.205
Eisenhower was more reserved with the press than Truman or Roosevelt.

He saw reporters less frequently.

^^Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press:
p. 285.

He made it a habit to
The First Two Years,"

200iMd.
20Cornwell, "The Presidential Press Conference: A Study in
Institutionalization," pp. 382-383.
202Pollard, "Eisenhower and the
p. 293.
203
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I bid. . p. 285.
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Pollard, The Presidents and the Press:
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p. 77.
2^"*Bone, p. 1^5.
2®^James E, Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press:
Journalism Quarterly. 38 (Spring 1961 ), 183 .

The Final Phase,"
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refuse personal interviews.

207

Elsenhower carried his aloofness into

his conferences, remaining formal and business-like in his deportment.
"There was little of the banter that sometimes cropped out under
Franklin Roosevelt or Truman,
In many ways, Eisenhower failed to use his potential initiative
in his conferences.
tion.

He was not forceful enough in pushing legisla

He refused to criticize his opponents or congress and avoided

discussion of personalities and partisan political m a t t e r s . E i s e n 
hower also had difficulties expressing himself.

His famous convoluted

syntax provided one reason for editing his conferences. 210

Eisen

hower's occasional bursts of temper at news conferences were also
counter-productive to his press relations.

In his conference of

April 29. 195^* *n irritating question caused him to walk out of the
conference abruptly. 211

Eisenhower was criticized for giving ambiguous

answers and for failing to understand the intent of some questions. 21 2
Lapses in control were seldom, and Eisenhower generally got
along well with reporters.

He was not intimate, but he won respect,

20^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 62.
208Ibld..

p.

64.

2®^Cater, "The President and the Press," pp. 27-28; and Wallace
Carroll, "Press Conferences: Five Men, Five Methods," New York Times
Magazine. Feb. 21, I960, p. 16.
^l^For an examination of Eisenhower's problems with language in
his press conferences, see Charles L. Marlin, "Eisenhower Before the
Press," Today's Speech. 9 (April 1961), 23-25.
2**Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First Two Years,"
p. 295.
2*2Pollard, The Presidents and the Press:
P. 75.

Truman to Johnson,

Eisenhower contributed to the evolution of the presidential press
conference by gradually allowing more freedom in direct quotation
and by permitting broadcasts of his conferences.
John Kennedy. Both Kennedy and his wife had gained valuable
newspaper* magazine, and broadcasting experience before Kennedy en
tered public office.

As President, Kennedy "revolutionized relations

between press and P r e s i d e n t . ^ e expanded presidential press rela
tions in numerous ways, and his policies brought praise, criticism,
and success to his administration.
The press conference was for Kennedy "the primary communications
arm" of his administration.

Kennedy moved the conference to the

State Department's auditorium.

He met the press about twice a month,

for a total of sixty-five conferences in thirty-four months.

His most

remarkable innovation was to hold his conferences before live tele
vision.

Kennedy also changed the time of the meetings, holding most

of them in the late afternoon.

215

J

Televising and carefully timing his

conferences helped Kennedy achieve his primary goal with them, which
was "to inform and impress the public more than the press.
Other aspects of Kennedy's press policies were innovative.
granted frequent exclusive interviews.
of editors and publishers.

He

He held luncheons with groups

He established close personal and social

21\orth Bingham and Ward S. Just, "The President and the Press,"
Reporter. Apr. 12, 1962, p. 18.
2***Sharp, p. 1.
215pollard, The Presidents and the Press;
p. 96.

Truman to Johnson.

^l^Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York; Bantam, 1966),
p. 361.

relationships with a number of reporters and he frequently held offthe-record meetings with them.

"The personal approach was used in

the Kennedy administration to a degree unmatched previously."217
Sensitive to the value of newspaper publicity, Kennedy read the papers
voraciously.

He developed the habit of issuing reprimands and plau

dits to reporters for their stories, either personally or through his
press secretary.

According to Knebel, his administration paid "closer

attention to the press than any in modern times."219
Kennedy probably prepared for his conferences more elaborately
than his predecessors, although "His own extensive reading, and his
participation in every level of government, was his best

preparation."219

The preparation process began on Tuesdays at Press Secretary Salinger's
weekly meetings with public information officers of the various execu
tive departments.

At these meetings, the press agents anticipated

questions of reporters and prepared a briefing book.
reviewed the information which had been prepared.

Kennedy then

On the morning of

the day of his conference, Kennedy met with Salinger* Vice-President
Johnson, Kennedy's aides, and cabinet members.

In these breakfast

sessions, Salinger would review the questions for Kennedy and Kennedy
would decide if more information was needed on particular topics.
Salinger would gather any additional data, presenting them to Kennedy
about an hour before the conference began.

A last minute review of

the latest news and government information took place about ten minutes
^*^James £. Pollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the Press,"
Journalism Quarterly. ^1 (Winter 1964), 13»
^^Fletcher Knebel, "Kennedy vs. the
p. 18.
219
Sorensen, p. 362.

Press,"

Look, Aug. 28, 19&2,

**9
before the conference,
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Kennedy never rehearsed nor did he write

out or attempt to memorize answers, but he was fully prepared.
Kennedy and his staff were so adept at anticipating questions that
the only times when Kennedy was not prepared for a question was when
the question dealt with some local affair or some minor subject
area. 222
In the press conference, Kennedy appeared warm, frank, and witty.
He was "quicker and more articulate than

Eisenhower. "223

His answers

were also more direct and brief than his predecessor's.
Kennedy usually opened his conferences with some short announce
ments.

Facing a sea of often more than **00 correspondents, he then

recognized one reporter after another.
planted questions.22^

He occasionally employed

The conference lasted thirty minutes.

each conference, transcripts were distributed.

After

Kennedy returned to

the White House and watched a tape of the conference, making notes
and criticizing his

performance.

225

Kennedy's press conference techniques brought criticisms.

One

was that correspondents used the occasion to gain publicity for them
selves, to ask lengthy questions, and even give

speeches.

226

Some

reporters complained about the size of the group of correspondents.
22®Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York: Avon, 1966), pp. 181183; Sharp, pp. 116-127; and Sorensen, pp. 362-363.
22*Sorensen, p. 362.
222Salinger, pp. 182-183.
22^Pollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the Press," p. 6.
^^Salinger, p. I87.
225ibld.. p. 186.
226pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson, p. 101,
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There were also complaints of favoritism in recognizing correspondents
to ask questions.

Others contended that the lack of privacy afforded

by the conferences made the President, more cautious in his replies. 227
Displeasure with other aspects of Kennedy's press policies led
to a series of articles charging Kennedy with "management of the news,"
a phrase coined by James Reston.

The way that Kennedy flattered some

reporters and his habits of praising and blaming writers were disliked.
Suspicion arose because of Kennedy's frequent interviews with reporters
and the number of "favorites" he purportedly had among the White House
press corps.22^

Kennedy was even accused of using the F.B.I. to seek

out sources of news leaks within his administration.22^

Further sus

picion and criticism came about when the White House Issued orders to
other executive agencies on the release of information to the press.
This attempt to coordinate all news was designed to avoid conflicting
statements but was viewed as another form of news management or excessive
control.2^® So many complaints were made that in March, 19^3. the
House's sub-committee on Government Information undertook hearings on
the administration's news policies.2^
On balance, Kennedy proved to be more effective than any previous
president, save Franklin Roosevelt.

Kennedy made the White House the

chief source of news in the nation.

His many efforts to win the respect

227
Bingham and Just, p. 20.
22®Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the News," Fortune.
Mar. 1963, pp. 82, 199-202.
229Ibld.. p. 201.
2^°Ibid., p. 199; end Pollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the
Press," p. 7.
23*John H. Kessel, "Mr. Kennedy and the Manufacture of News,"
Parliamentary Affairs. 16 (1963)* 293.
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and favor of reporters were highly successful.

J.F.K. made effective

use of television to promote his personal image and gain favorable
public opinion.

He

conducted his press conferences astutely.

De

spite complaints over somo of his practices, Kennedy made great strides.
"News management, and mismanagement, did not mar the Kennedy image for
a simple reason:

He

was the most sophisticated shaper of public

opinion in Presidential history."2-^2
Lyndon Johnson. Johnson's press practices were a result of many
factors, including habits formed while he was in the Senate and, possibly, an emulation of F.D.R.'s policies with the press.

233

In the Senate,

Johnson met daily with reporters and held numerous background sessions
with writers.

0 3 /4.

As Majority Leader, Johnson's relations with the

press were sometimes stormy.
with correspondents.

He carefully controlled his meetings

He was so sensitive to criticism that he casti

gated some reporters and was known to dismiss a reporter who proved
to be unfriendly. ? 3 5

Johnson's press relations as Vice-President were

limited to interviews and off-the-record meetings.

According to Jack

Bell, Johnson
. . . always had on the desk before him written answers to
every conceivable question, just as he had carried written
statements into the Senate to read to reporters at his center
aisle desk a few minutes before that body convened. 3°
212

Rivers, The Opinlonmakers. p. 155.

2-^L.L.L. Golden, "The President and the Press," Saturday Review,
May 9, 1965* p. 65.
2^\jack Bell, The Johnson Treatment: How Lyndon Johnson Took Over
the Presidency and Made It His Own (New fork: Harper and Row, 19^5T»
pp. 139-1^0.
235
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Johnson went to the White House with a determination to win
press support.

His policies went beyond Kennedy's in intensity,

lie employed almost every technique that his predecessor had used to
court the press.

For example, he cave 17^ individual interviews

with correspondents in his first fifteen months in office.2^

He

also met frequently with groups of writers in off-the-record encoun
ters.

"His private background sessions rarely lasted less than an

hour.

Three hours was not unusual.

One Saturday meeting with staff

and reporters went for seven hours. . . ."238
Johnson's press conferences were markedly different from Kenne
dy's.

On Salinger's advice, Johnson undertook a program of experi

mentation in news conference formats,2^
such a variety of press conference types.
in his office.

He met with small groups

Johnson had conferences as he strolled around the

lawn of the White House.
in Texas.

fjQ other president used

He held conferences outdoors at his ranch

He once held a conference with reporters and their wives

and children on the lawn in front of the White House.

He waited

until his hundredth day in office to hold a televised press confer
ence, the type he disliked most and used least.

His favorite format

seemed to be the impromptu conference, which he held in his office
for the thirty or forty reporters who happened to be in the White
House at the time.

He was unpredictable in his scheduling.

In the

span of a week in November, 1966, he held five press conferences.

2 3?Kraft,

P- 104•

23®Hugh Sidey, £ Very Personal Presidency; Lyndon Johnson in the
White House (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 117.
^^Salinger, pp.
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He sometimes held two In one day.

In his first six months he held

twenty-six news conferences, twice as many as Kennedy had in a simi
lar period.

Later, months would go hy with only one or no meetings

with the press.

In all, he held 135 official conferences in his

sixty-two months in office, for an average of two a month.
Johnson's press conferences varied in other ways.
opening announcements than any of his predecessors.
questions were much longer than Kennedy's.

He used longer

His answers to

The length of his con

ferences ranged from ten minutes to over an hour.

Johnson also ten

ded to be more informal and "folksy" in his conferences than either
Eisenhower or Kennedy.

Oilf)

Despite his massive efforts, Johnson encountered so many diffi
culties with the press that they will only be summarised here.
were many criticisms of his press conference techniques.

There

Johnson

was faulted for holding surprise conferences, for failing to hold
many televised conferences, and for failing to hold his conferences
with regularity.

Other aspects of his press relations were challenged.

Whereas the Kennedy administration was known for its "news management,"
Johnson's was the administration of the "credibility gap."

L.B.J.

was accused of undue secrecy, prevarication, ambiguity, excessive
control over other government agencies, and censorship.

He was criti

cized for his obvious attempts to woo and manipulate reporters and
even for spending too much time with the press,

Johnson's own sensi

tivity to criticism led him to retaliate to such an extent that after
five months his press relations had reached a point of mutual antagonism
2i|0Pollardt The Presidents and the Press;
p. 113.

Truman to Johnson,

5^
and distrust between the President and the press.

During his five

years in office these relations waxed and waned but were never excep
tionally good.
Cornwell described Johnson's approach as follows:
This then is the Johnson public relations style:
massive and unrelenting use of available channels to
reach the public, a restless experimentation about
technique, a tremendous (to the point of being dys
functional) amount of personal Presidential involve
ment in the process and a determination to wring
the maximum in favorable and tactically useful publi
city out of a pattern of feverish and carefully con
trived White House activity.2^1
Kennedy's chief success with the press had been to build his image
and gain favorable public opinion.

Johnson, on the other hand, was

never able to establish a high degree of rapport with the press.
Nevertheless, Johnson was able to gain considerable attention in
the media for his programs, especially for his domestic legislation.
Johnson's impressive legislative record may have been due, to some
extent, to his ability to use the press to arouse public attention
and interest.
Richard Nixon.
press relations.

Nixon did not enter the W hite House with good

His problems with the press began as early as his

I960 campaign against Kennedy.

"The candidate and his staff decided

very early in the year that the press was their enemy. . . . "

2^2

Nixon then saw reporters in a "hostile conspiracy" against him, and
his lack of trust in reporters and in the value of good press coverage
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Johnson Press Relations Style,"
Journalism Quarterly. ^3 (Spring 1966), 8.
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, i960 (New
fork: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 329-330*
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hindered him.^*^

Two years later, losing the race for Governor of

California, he attacked reporters with his well-known statement,
"Yon won't have Nixon to kick aronnd any more, because, gentlemen,
this is my last press conference."2**^ Poor press relations and a
negative image had to be overcome to win the 1968 election.

One way

in which Nixon overcame these difficulties was to exploit the medium
of television, circumventing, to some extent, direct relations with
the press.
As President, Nixon, like Johnson prefers direct radio and televion contact with the public.
reporters.

Nixon has kept his policy of avoiding

"President Nixon is the most aloof President of modern

times, maybe in history," wrote one editorialist.2**** Nixon had eight

press conferences

in his first year of office, four in 1970, and nine

in 1971, averaging fewer than one a month.

Nixon seems to prefer

the live television conference and evidently makes elaborate prepa
rations for them.^**^ Nixon has also done some experimentation with
formats.

An example is his televised interview with one correspondent,

Howard K. Smith, March 22, 1971, the first of its kind.
2**3lbid. • pp. ^02-^3; and Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 35-^2.
2^Theodore H. White, The Making of the President. 1968 (New
York: Atheneum, 1969)# p. ^8.
2**%or a discussion of Nixon's television techniques in the
1968 campaign, see Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President. 1968
(New York: Pocket Eooks, 1970).
2**^TRB, "Nixon the Aloof," New Republic. Feb. 12, 1972, p.
2**^News Conferences Really Put Pressure on Nixon," Sunday Advo
cate (Baton Rouge), July 11, 1971, p. 2-B; and William A. Linsley,
"90 Per Cent Proof," Southern Speech Communication Journal. 37
(Winter 1971), 200-201.

5*
Nixon's press policies have been faulted on several counts.
he has been criticized for his reluctance to see reporters.

First,

The

Washington News Committee of the American Press Managing Editors
Association commented that "It is obvious that the President's rela
tions with the press are more restricted and controlled in his behalf
than those of any modern-day president."

Further, Nixon's policies

have led to a renewal of charges of a "credibility gap" in his administration.

7 Nixon's effectiveness in his dealings with the press re

mains to be seen, but there is growing evidence that he has contributed
little to the development of the presidential press conference and to
presidential press relations in general,^50
Summary. The twentieth century evolution of the press conference
and of presidential press relations reveals several trends.

The press

conference emerged from haphazard meetings between the chief execu
tive and reporters into institutionalization under Wilson.

The first

of the modern presidents were detached and cautious with correspon
dents.

Formal categories of answers and strict rules regarding attri

bution gave way to more directness and openness as well as more infor
mality in presidential dealings with the press.

The passage of time

also showed an increase in presidential use of the news conference as
2^3"(jixon is Blasted by APME Group," State-Tlmes (Baton Rouge),

Feb. 5. 1972, p. 6-A.
the Credibility Gap?"
from
tion
tial
June

Time. Apr. 5* 1971. p. 13.

250pPesident Nixon's press philosophy was explained in a letter
Press Secretary, Ronald Ziegler, Oct. 6, 1972. Other informa
about Nixon's views may be found in transcripts of his presiden
news conferences of December 8, 19^9* December 10, 1970, and
29, 1972, available in releases from the White House.
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a means of power.

More and more, presidents have learned to use the

conferences to gain favorable public opinion, push legislation, and
publicize their programs.

Increases in the amount of presidential

leadership have gone hand in hand with increased exploitation of the
news conference as a means of communication and persuasion, beginning
especially with Franklin Roosevelt’s press conferences.
The development of the broadcast media is another trend affecting
the press conference and presidential press relations.

Our last

three presidents have shown more interest in going to the public
directly rather than through the press, although both Kennedy and
Johnson evidenced a high regard for the power of the press in reach
ing public opinion.

Televising the press conference has made the

public an immediate, if not direct, participant in the event, thereby
diminishing, to some extent, the importance of the press.

If future

presidents continue to seek direct communication with the public,
bypassing adversary proceedings with the White House press corps,
the institution of the presidential press conference will no longer
have Importance as a means of presidential communication.

CHAPTER II
JOHNSON'S USE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE
This chapter provides detailed Information on President Johnson's
handling of the presidential press conference.

The chapter's purpose

is to present a contextual setting preceding the chapters which analyse
the conferences.

Included here is a brief discussion of Johnson's

background before becoming President, with emphasis on his press rela
tions as Senator and as Vice-President.

Next is a section on Johnson's

attitudes toward and relations with the press.

A third part describes

Johnson's philosophy of the presidential press conference.

The last

section treats Johnson's press conference practices, including prepa
ration, timing, and other details.
Johnson's Background

A brief investigation of Johnson's background may provide some
understanding of the president's press conference habits, since, as
former Press Secretary George Christian wrote, Johnson "could not break
1
habits formed in his youth" in presidential relations with the press.
Johnson became interested in speech activities in high school.

As

a student at the Johnson City (Texas) Consolidated High School he entered
2
various contests in public speaking and debate.
These interests grew
*The President Steps Down; A Personal Memoir of the Transfer of
Power (New York; Macmillan, 1970X, p. 187.
William C. Pool, Emmie Craddock, and David E. Conrad, Lyndon
Baines Johnson; The Formative Years (San Marcos; Southwest Texas State
College Press, 1965). PP« 6^-65.
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when he entered Southwest Texes Teachers College in 1927.

Johnson was a

member of the college's debate team and was apparently successful. He
3
was reported to be especially good In refutation.
Also relevant was
Johnson's interest in journalism while in college.

He wrote for the
**

college's student paper, contributing many editorials and other pieces.
Johnson's interest in speech continued in his brief career as a
teacher.

In 1928, while still a student at Southwest Texas, Johnson

taught public speaking and debate in Cotulla, Texas.

After graduation,

he accepted the position of debate coach at Sam Houston High School in
Houston.

There he taught public speaking and debate and was successful
5
in directing extra-curricular debate.
More important than those early experiences, perhaps, were the

habits that Johnson formed with the press as he rose to power in congress,
especially during his years as Senator and Senate Majority Leader.
son's early associations with reporters were good.

John

"As a young Congress

man back in the Roosevelt days, he was remembered as one of the best,
most vigorous and earthiest conversationalists of the younger thinkers

6
who were then remaking America."

White described one aspect of Johnson's

image with the press as follows:
Among these men, for years Lyndon Johnson had been a folk
character, the man who dominated any conversations about the
Hill— at once respected, feared, admired, a huge yet often comic
figure. His almost daily briefings in the Senate when he was
3
Ibid.. pp. 101-102; and Robert N. Hall, "A Rhetorical Analysis of
Selected Speeches of Senator Iyndon B. Johnson, 1955-1961," Dlss.
Michigan 1963, ch. 2.
^Pool, Craddock, and Conrad, pp. 112-136.
5Ibld.. pp. lh-9-158.
6Theodore H. White, The Making of the President. 196** (New York:
Signet, I965)t P» 71.
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Majority Loader, his hunger for reaognltlon, his salty
phrases, his virtuosity In negotiation and compromise,
his professional dexterity as a lawmaker had enlivened
Washington conversation for decades.'

8
In the Senate Johnson preferred the small group approach.

As

Senate Majority Leader, "his press conferences were fiascoes," and he
9
was more effective in private sessions with reporters.
Johnson
developed the habit of "surprise" press conferences.

But Johnson did

not like the press conference fomat In dealing with reporters.

"He

had little patience for the normal press conference give and take. ..."

10

One of the characteristics of Johnson's relations with reporters in his
11
press conferences was the amount of control he exerted.
Aside from
timing, another aspect of this control was Johnson's determination of
what questions might be asked.

According to Sherrill, Johnson would

throw out a reporter who "veered too far off the course" with his ques12

tlons.
^Ibld.. p. 69.
^Robert N. Hall, "Lyndon Johnson's Speech Preparation," Quarterly
Journal of Speech. 51 (Feb. 1965), 168; and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The
Johnson Press Relations Style," Journalism Quarterly. *0 (Spring 1966), 5.
^Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of
Power (New York: New American Library, 19557, p. 106; and "President Keeps
Press on Alert," New York Times. Dec. 19, 1963. P* 17*
10Willlam MeGaffin and Erwin Knoll, Anything But the Truth: The
Credibility Gap— How the News is Managed In Washington (New York:
Putnam's, 1955), p. 1^9? and "Johnson and the Press— What the Grumbling
is About," U.S. News and World Report. Mar. 22, 1965. p. 51.
^-Personal interview with Sam Wood, editor, (Austin) AmerlcanStatesman. Aug. 17, 1971; and personal interview with Richard Morehead,
Capitol Bureau Chief, Dallas Morning News. Aug. 16, 1971.
12Robert Sherrill, The Aoddental President (New York: Grossman,
1967), p. 39.
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Johnson was even mor© forceful In his private sessions with
reporters.

Stuart Alsop described one of these as follows:

E(y gradual stages the relaxed, friendly and reminiscent
mood gave way to something rather like a human hurricane.
Johnson was up, striding about his office, talking without
pause, occasionally leaning over, his nose almost touching
the mesmerised reporter's, to shake the reporter's shoulder
or grab his knee. Secretaries were rung for. Memoranda
appeared and then more memoranda, as well as letters, news
paper articles and unidentifiable scraps of paper, which were
proffered in quick succession and then snatched away. Ap
peals were made, to the Almighty, to the shades of the departed
great, to the reporter's finer instincts and better nature,
while the reporter, unable to get a word in edgewise, sat
collapsed upon a leather sofa, eyes glazed, mouth half open.
Treatment A ended a full two hours later, when the majority
leader, a friendly arm around the shoulder of the dazed
journalist, ushered him into the outer office.
Johnson was generally successful in his courting of the press while
Senator, but his attempts to control reporters and his developing sensi
tivity to press criticism led to problems.

According to Bell, "As the

Senate's Democratic leader, Johnson had been known among the newsmen who
covered him as a whiner."^

White described that sensitivity:

As Senate Majority Leader and as Vice-President he would grow
furious at indignity or neglect to himself in print— he could
denounce in ugly terms an old friend who had reported on the
enormous gold cufflinks he wore with his shirts; or dress
down like a top sergeant the eminent head of a broadcastings
bureau who had been forced to cancel a broadcast with him.
Johnson's sensitivity toward criticism caused him to become wary of the
press.

He "developed a fine contempt for r e p o r t e r s . H i s sessions

*^William L. Rivers, The Qplnlonmakers (Boston: Beacon, 1967),
pp. 167-168.
l^Jack Bell, The Johnson Treatment: How Lyndon B. Johnson Took Over
the presidency and Made It His Own ('New York: Harper and Row, 1965). p. 139.
15White, pp. 71-72.
^Evans and Novak, p. ^10.

6?

with reporters were often stormy.

Coincidentelly, Johnson suffered a

major coronary after one explosive meeting with reporters in July,
1955.17
There was nothing remarkable about Johnson's press relations
during his three years as Vice-President.

"As Vice-President, John

son confined his remarks largely to off-the-record and background
18
interviews."
No longer in the public eye and no longer a major force
in congress, he was less of a news source than previously.

The Vice-

Presidency did provide Johnson an opportunity to view closely the
techniques of one of the most successful presidents in dealing with
correspondents.

For example, Johnson was a regular participant at

Kennedy's press conference preparation breakfasts.
Three other aspects of Johnson's background may have influenced
his later press conference practices.
tion of F.D.R.*s style.

The first was a possible emula

An editor, who had covered the press conferences

of Presidents Roosevelt through Johnson, opined that Johnson had "worshipped" Roosevelt and based almost everything on the letter's styxe.

19

7

Discussing Johnson's press relations. Golden expressed the same idea
when he wrote that "there is no closer student of how President Franklin
20
D. Roosevelt conducted himself than Mr. Johnson."
When asked if other
presidents' press practices had influenced Johnson, a former press
secretary under Johnson responded,

"He liked FDR's press conferences

17Ibld.. pp. 90-91.
l8Bell, p. 139.
^Interview with Sam Wood.
20

L.L.L. Golden, "The President and the Press," Saturday Review.
May 8, 1965, p. 65.

63

In the Oval Office around his desk, and was most comfortable in
21
imitating them,"
Another aspect in Johnson's background was his "contempt" for,
rather than rapport with, what has been stereotyped as the "Eastern
press."

22

Johnson entered the presidency with "a great uncertainty

and uneasiness about the press," and was especially concerned about
his image with the Eastern press, which he felt was not favorable.
Johnson had reservations about running for president in 1964 because
of that fear.

Concerning his possible election, he wrote*.

I was convinced. . . that the metropolitan press of the
Eastern seaboard would never permit it. My experience
in office had confirmed this reaction. I was not thinking
just of the derisive articles about my style, my clothes,
my manner, my accent and my family— although I admit I
received enough of that kind of treatment in my first few
months as President to last a lifetime. I was also think
ing of a more deep-seated and far-reaching attitude— a
disdain for the South that seems to be woven into the fabric
of Northern experience. This is a subject that deserves a
more profound exploration than I can give it here— a subject
that has never been sufficiently examined. Perhaps it all
stems from the deep-rooted bitterness engendered by civil
strife over a hundred years ago, for emotional cliches
outlast all others and the Southern cllchl is perhaps the
most emotional of all. Perhaps someday new understandings
will cause this bias to disappear from our national life.
I hope so, but it is with us still. To ny mind, these
attitudes represent an automatic reflex, unconscious or
deliberate, on the part of opinion molders of the North
and East in the press and television.
I expressed this feeling to James Reston of The New
York Times in the spring of 1964. Scotty Reston disagreed
with me, and a few days later he asked James Rowe to per
suade me I was wrong. Jim wrote to me expressing his belief
that as long as Reston and Walter Llppmann supported me, I
would "get a good press" from the rest of the Washington
^ L e t t e r from

Bill

Moyers to the writer, Feb.

7, 1972.

^Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York:
Praeger, 1966), p. 125.
23Bell, p. 140.

64

nows corps, who represent newspapers all over the country.
But It was not long before those two reporters ceased to
support me and began their tireless assaults on me and ny
administration. What then happened, I could not help noting
that It was hard to find many words of support anywhere In
the Washington press corps or television media,‘4
The passage, although written after Johnson's tenure in office, reveals
something of his distrust of the "established" press.

25

A final factor, not unrelated to Johnson's feelings toward the
Eastern press, was the new President's sensitivity to being compared with
his predecessor.

26

One way in which this was manifested was in Johnson's

selection of a press conference format.

Johnson had looked at Kennedy's

news conferences with "awe and secret admiration."27 According to
Moyers, "He feared . . . contrast with JFK's style and resisted televised
press conferences in the State Department Auditorium, where Kennedy had
pQ
been so successful."
Since Johnson and Kennedy were so unlike in style
and personality and since Kennedy had developed considerable rapport
with the press, it is not surprising that Johnson wanted to avoid being
compared with Kennedy.
In Johnson's background, then, were a number of factors which had
some influence on his relations with the press and his news conference
practices.

His early interest and activities in speech and in journa

lism provided some knowledge and experience.

Johnson's press relations

^lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the
Presidency. 1963-1969 (Now York: Holt, 1971). pp. 96-97«~'
^Johnson's biographer, also a newsman, shared a similar view:
William S. White, The Professional: Lyndon B^ Johnson (New York: Crest,
196*0, p. 44.
2^Geyelin, p. 128.
27Bell, p. 1^5.
28Moyers, letter; and Tom Wicker, "Johnson Seeks Policy on Press,"
New York Times. Feb. 9, 1964, sec. IV, p. 8*
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as Senate Majority Leader were narked with informality and a degree
of control over meetings with reporters.

Johnson also developed the

habit of holding surprise conferences and small, background sessions
with reporters.

It was in the Senate, also, that Johnson's sensitivity

to press criticism began.

Finally, Johnson's distrust of the Eastern

press, a possible emulation of F.D.R., and a dislike for being compared
with Kennedy may have figured in his background as determinants of his
presidential press policies.
Johnson's Attitudes Toward the Press
This section outlines Johnson's interest in and attitudes toward
the press, including his ideas regarding publicity, his relations with
individual reporters, his concept of journalism, and what he disliked
about the press.
To begin, the daily workings of the press were of great interest
to Johnson,

"He was fascinated by the news media,"^

Johnson was not

only interested in newspapers and television news, he was curious
about the craft of both broadcast and print media.
content and the use of emphasis in the news media.
habits also demonstrated this interest.

He liked to analyse
30

Johnson's reading

Aside from the Congressional

Record and other government documents, Johnson's reading was limited
31
almost exclusively to newspapers and magazines.
Other government of
ficials often began their day reading the Washington Post. But, accord
ing to Christian,
^Christian, p. 187.
•^®Harry Provence, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Biography (New York: Fleet,
19610, pp. 156-157.
■^Geyelin, p. 3^.
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Johnson was already ahead of them on reading the Post.
He had seen the bulldog edition at eleven o'clock last night.
So he gave the city edition . . . only a cursory reading and
turned to the other four papers he always rummaged through In
bed— the Hew York Times. Baltimore Sun. Wall Street Journal.
Christian Science Monitor. News stories and editorials were
first, followed by the columns and the business page. The
society section of the Post was always good for a few Washing
ton gossip Items and a "hard” news story or two. The sports
section was Ignored as too unrelated to business. Between
newspaper items, he listened to network news on the push-button
set the Signal Corps had devised for him. Three coordinated
television sets were on at seven o'clock, each tuned to a net
work. The sound was on Channel b, NBC, for a Presidential
favorite, the Today Show. If something Interested him on
Channel 7 or Channel 9» he changed the sound by remote control.
lyndon Johnson absorbed news and current events like a
blotter. During the day he listened to as many radio newscasts
as he could. And In the Oval Office the Associated Press and
United Press International teletypes clacked away until he
retired to the Mansion late at right. Whenever he entered
his office, morning or afternoon, he walked straight to the
tickers. And he monitored them regularly during the day.32
Johnson's extensive reading of papers and monitoring of news broad
casts went beyond a desire to keep current.
conscious of publicity.

Johnson was also highly

This desire was revealed in the instructions

he gave his staff. Theodore White recounts a pertinent episode which
took place in 1963:
Before going off for Christmas week, he assembled the senior
press officers of Defense, of State, of Justice and half a
dozen other departments at the White House, kept them waiting
for forty-five minutes in a small chamber, then came to give
them a brisk four minute dressing down: he was going off to
a reception with some important officials, and all he had to
say was they better get on the ball. The White House had been
on the front page with only one story that week— the lighting
of the Christmas tree, and he had done that himself. He was
going down to Texas now and they had to let Pierre (Salinger)
have as many stories as possible so he could release them down
there. Then, as a parting shot, the president added that he'd
been checking the Budget and the government was spending almost
a billion dollars on people like them and they better start
earning it.^3
32christian, pp. 6-7.
33|,rhite, p. 72.
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A further measure of this publicity consciousness extended to an Interest
In the dally affairs of his press secretary.-^* Johnson even took the time
to read the transcripts of his press secretary's press conferences, ana
lysing the questions that were

asked.

^5 Johnson, as was mentioned, also

monitored the teletypes of the wire services to see what was written about
him, sometimes immediately after a meeting with reporters.

On one occa

sion, following an announcement to the press, Alvin Spivak of United Press
International dictated a story over the phone in the White House press
Room.

The story was Immediately being sent out over the U.P.I. wire and

the following occurred;
"I reached about the fifth paragraph," Spivak recalls,
"and suddenly I realised that Bill Moyers was pounding on
the door of the phone booth. I stopped a minute and opened
it a crack and Bill said, 'Al, the President Is reading
your story as it comes into his office. He feels you've
given the wrong emphasis to the lead.'"36
Johnson's concern for good publicity led him to adopt Kennedy's prac
tice of calling reporters to praise them and having aides call writers
to complain about unfavorable stories.3? Pierre Salinger, who served as
Kennedy's press secretary, and for a time Johnson's, put it this way:
Both Presidents Johnson and Kennedy frequently told me
to call reporters to complain of unfair or inaccurate stories.
With JFK I knew that in most cases it was just a passing
irritation, and I wouldn't follow through. But I couldn't
3*ty,L. Stein, When Presidents Meet the Press (New Tories Messner,
1969). pp. 166-167.
^Charles Roberts, LBJ's Inner Circle (New York; Delacorte, 1965),
p. 119; "End of the Honeymoon," Newsweek, Feb. 15, 1965, pp. 62-63; and
Christian, p. 229 fn.
^Lis Carpenter, Ruffles and Flourishes (New York; Pocket Books,
1970),

p.

86.

^Ben H. Bagdikian, "Washington Letter: JFK to U3J: Paradoxes of
Change," Columbia Journalism Review. 2 (Winter 196*0, 36.

get sway with that with LBJ.
He not only expected me tp_make
the call b u t to report back to him on the conversation.
Johnson's views of the press and of individual reporters were mixed.
According to Strout, "He is divided about the press: he affects to decry
it, and reverences it; he patronizes it, and he writhes under it; he
will over-react in an extraordinary way to w o o some individual reporter."
Johnson had many battles with the press, b u t he seemed to enjoy reporters.

UO

Not only had he "liked them," he "enjoyed the adversary rela

tionship" that existed.

He took pleasure in debating w ith reporters

ill
and even "relished" some of his rows with the press.

While Johnson may

have liked many reporters, he was unlike Kennedy in that he generally

iip
eschewed personal relationships with them.
Johnson's attitudes toward the press are more clearly seen in his
expectations of correspondents.

To some extent, he expected loyalty.

In an interview for Newsweek magazine Johnson was quoted as saying,
"The press is one of the best servants I h a v e . " ^

as

Bill Moyers wrote,

"Like other Presidents he looked upon the press corps at the White
House as an adjunct of the Office, a tool to help him advance his
ifJf.

interests, almost as a member of the White House family. . . . "

^^Wlth

Kennedy

■^Richard

5^

(May

l

.

(New

York: Avon,

Johnson

1966), pp. M6-417.

strout, "Presidential Press Conference," The Q u i l l ,

1966), 9.

^°"The Widening No Man's Land: President vs. the Press," Life,
May

7, 1965, p. 36.

^ p e r s o n a l interview with George Christian, May
Christian, The President Steps D o w n , pp. 186-187.

26, 1971;

and

^^Chrlstian, The President Steps Down, p. 186.
^ " T h e Politics of Power: portrait of a Master," Newsweek.

1965.

P.

25.

^Moyers,

letter.

Aug. 2,

69
seemed to have w h a t one correspondent called a "mutual aid concept"
in dealing with reporters.
in his administration.

He tried to make a "deal" with them early

One story illustrating this has been recounted

so often that it has credibility and deserves mentioning here;
Flying back to Washington from the ranch after the
holidays of his first win t e r as President, LBJ laid out his
press doctrine to a group of astonished reporters, lnoludlng
such luminaries as the Hew York T i m e 's Reston, w h o had been
a ranch guest.
In the course of that rambling lecture he
declared that it was his desire to "make big men" out of the
newsmen who covered him.
He would confide in them and treat
them as his friends.
In return for that, he w o uld expect
them to forget certain of his indiscretions and to purposely
look the other w a y w hen he was doing something that would
embarrass him if it showed up in print.
It was clearly i m 
plied that he wanted them to write their stories as he sug
gested.
I f his expectations of reporters was demanding, so was Johnson's
concept of what a good journalist should be.

He discussed the qualifi

cations and requisites of a good reporter as follows:
I think that a good journalist should know American
and world history as intimately as does a competent his
torian.
He should have a substantial and specific under
standing of economics and politics and foreign affairs,
especially under the most recent five or six Presidents.
He should be able to find the meaningful in the welter of
data thrown at him— and not simply rely on someone's cyni
cal evaluation for a sensational lead sentence.
Second, I suggest that it may be time to change the
basic attitude of journalism.
Too little attention is
devoted to the common everyday problems that plague
society and to the efforts that succeed and therefore
contain lessons w e need to knew. '
W h a t Johnson disliked in the press also adds to an understanding
of his attitudes.

Among those dislikes were criticisms of him,

^^Frank Cormier, "Johnson and the Press," Saturday Review.

Sept. 10, 1966, pp. 70-71.
^ H u g h Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency: Lyndon Johnson in the
White House (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 172.
^ L y n d o n B. Johnson, The Choices W e Face (New York: Bantam,

1969), pp. 1^0-1U1.
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especially personal criticisms, speculation. Interpretations of his
motives, exaggeration, and "leaks."
Johnson's reactions to mistakes by reporters led to personal calls
to Individual writers, as has been discussed.

Even a typographical

error could send the President to the phone to get a correction.

UR

A more volatile sensitivity was to personal criticisms of himself
or his family.

An incident at the L.B.J. Ranch provides an example:

A curtain of ice first descended between press and President
in March, 1964, after reporters wrote that Johnson had sped at
80 or 90 miles an hour dc*rn a Texas highway in his white
Lincoln Continental with a Dixie cup of Pearl beer close at
hand. The President had entertained us at his ranch that
day. There was precious little drinking— of beer or any
thing else. When the first stories appeared, he felt, with
some justification, that his hospitality had been violated. ^9
Robert Sherrill wrote that, "On no point is Johnson more sensitive than
on the coverage he receives from the society writers . . .• He reads
every line of what the major society writers say about him."50 Johnson
defended his sensitivity to criticism after he left office when he
wrote;
Criticism of the errors committed by public leaders is a
necessary function of a free press in a democratic society.
Criticism of their character, in terras so stark that it makes
them appear monsters who have imposed themselves on a helpless
people, is likely to destroy any hope that they might unite
and lQfd the nation toward the goals it must achieve for great
ness.^1
Another of Johnson's dislikes with regard to the press was journal
istic speculation and unauthorised news "leaks."

If the media publi

cized an appointment or a policy before Johnson was ready to announce it,
^®Rivers, pp. 172-173.
^ C h a r l e s Roberts, "Fearsome

Antagonist," Nation. 203

406.
5°Sherrill, p. 49.
^Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 137.

(Oct.

24, 1966),
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he often became so irritated that he would withhold the appointment
or not cariy through with the policy.

52

Johnson's policy on specula

tion led to what reporters called the "Oshkosh rule."

In his press

conference of September 22, 1966, the President explained it as
follows:
The point I want to make to you— when you see on the ticker
that Oshkosh says that Bob Pierpoint may be Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, you don't necessarily need to give
much oredence to it, because the very fact that it is on there
is the best indication that it is not likely to happen.5^
The policy led to many charges of unwarranted secrecy,

Johnson defended

his practice of what he called "keeping his options open."

By doing so

he was able, as he said, "to maintain as much flexibility as a man can
until the moment a decision becomes final. ... I took no action that
would automatically trap me into a decision.
Another aspect of journalism disliked by Johnson was what he often
cited as exaggeration.
war in Vietnam.

He was especially sensitive to stories on the

He described reporting on the 1967 Tet offensive as

"emotional and exaggerated reporting. . . . The media seemed to be in
competition as to who could provide the most lurid and depressing
accounts,"^

Reporting on domestic affairs sometimes evoked the same

complaint from Johnson.

Mar.

57

^ D a n i e l p, Moynihan, "The Presidency and the Press," Commentary.
1971, p.

kk.

^ A r t h u r Kroek, Memoirs (New York: F unk & Wagnalls,

1968),

p.

383»

^ Public papers of the Presidents of the United States? Lyndon B.
Johnson. 1966. v. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1957), P* 105&*
-^Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 96.
^Ibld.. p.
57Ibld.. p. kkZ.
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A final sensitivity toward the press was revealed In Johnson's
attitude toward interpretative writing and broadcasting.
critical of his policies bothered him,

Editorials

Christian explained this and

Johnson's preference for factual reporting as follows:
The President had a special liking for reporters who
stuck to the "what, where, when, who" philosophy taught in
sophomore Journalism classes. When they wrote about the
"why" they were in dangerous waters, he believed. . . .
Johnson's attitude toward interpretive reporting had a
sounder base than one might imagine. He felt that most of
the interpretations were not calculated to help him adminis
ter the business of the nation in the mannerhe thought best,
and he reacted. To read abrasive editorialsand columns
every morning of the world does not help digestion, . . .
This is a negative power of the "opinion makers" as seen
through the eyes of a Chief Executive.
Johnson's attitudes toward the press can be summarised briefly at
this point.

Johnson was fascinated with the news media.

papers and monitored news programs extensively.

He read news

He had a keen interest

in publicity and made attempts to get attention for his programs in the
media.

He liked reporters but was not personallyclose to them.

He

expected reporters to help him achieve his administrative goals. John
son was also sensitive to the press.

He was displeased with much of

what he perceived, including mistakes, attacks on his personality, specu
lation, exaggeration, and interpretative Journalism.
Johnson's Press Conference Philosophy
If by "philosophy" is meant "an organized system of beliefs,"
President Johnson probably did not have a formalized philosophy to
shape his use of the presidential press conference.^9

Nevertheless, an

^^hristlan. The President Steps Down, p. 180.
59Mpy®rs, letter; and Glen D. Phillips, "The Use of Radio and
Television by Presidents of the United States," Diss. Michigan 1968,
p. 132.
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examination of Johnson's purposes, preferences, ideas, and attitudes
toward the press conference provides a general and useful understanding.
Johnson was indeed purposive in his view.
ferences to function for him.

He wanted his news con

Bill Moyers, Johnson's second press secre

tary, wrote: "He approached the press conference pragmatically, trying
to construct it the best w a y for his purpose.

. .

Another of

Johnson's press secretaries, George Christian, said that Johnson wanted
to use his conferences to get "his position over to the public and to the
w o r l d . T h e

press conference was,

then, a means of reaching public

opinion, a forum for presidential persuasion.

As Reston put it,

From the start of his administration. President Johnson
regarded the press conference not primarily as a duty to
respond to questions about his stewardship, b u t as an oppor
tunity to put over his views— an old FDR device— and he
quickly learned that the more he talked, the less time
there was for questions. . , . 2
Johnson occasionally used the
arousing public opinion.

press conference to prod congress by

As he said, "When traditional methods

fail,

a President must be willing to bypass the Congress and take the issue
to the people . . . sometimes a President has to put Congress' feet
to the f i r e . " ^
news

Johnson went on to cite an example of his use of the

conference for that purpose.^*- The President saw the conference

as a means of presenting new information.

He made extensive use of

^®Moyers, letter.
^ C h r i s t i a n , interview.

62James Reston, The Artillery of the Press (New York: Harper and
Row, 1967), pp. 52-53.
63
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. ^50.
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announcements and opening statements to announce presidential appoint
ments and to publicise new programs.^
Johnson was probably less concerned for the reporters' purposes at
the news conference.

As was mentioned, Johnson saw the reporters in a

role of serving the government.

Frank van der Linden of the (Dayton,

Ohio) Journal Herald commented, "Johnson uses the press merely as one
more group of spear-carriers in the grand opera of his public relations
66
build-up to the exclusion of the conference's stated purpose."
Another aspect of Johnson's philosophy was his preference for
informality, a habit developed before he became President.

His first

presidential press conference was held with reporters in the Oval
Office over coffee.
criticism arose.

After a few of these informal, impromptu meetings

Responding to that criticism, Johnson, at his con

ference of January 25, 196^, stated:
Don't run out of here if you have any questions you
want to ask. Ask them. This is not a quicky news con
ference. I don't know what you call a formal one. I guess
I ought to wear a white tie. I came to work this morning
and I didn't think it was formal. I just thought I was
supposed to be here, and if you.are all here, I will give
you anything I know at anytime.
A further attitude affecting Johnson's press conference philosophy
was the President's preference for direct communication with the public.
Moyers, commenting on Johnson's attitude toward the press conference,
wrote, "At times he seemed to think of them as ways of reaching the public
at large, but in fact, he preferred the televised announcement for that
65Bell,

p. 151.

^As quoted in Delbert MCGuire, "The Performance of the Presidential
Press Conference as a Medium of Communication Between the President and
the Nation Through the Mass Media," Diss. Iowa 1966, p. U4.
^Public Papers. 1963-6^, v. 1, p. 230.
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purpose . . . with no reporters to get between him end the viewers."®®
This desire for direct conteet with the nation through television is
Illustrated in several ways.

For example, the networks set up "a

highly expensive TV room in the White House with warm cameras manned
throughout the day . . . meeting high weekly bills for its operation."^*
Johnson used the facilities to make dramatic announcements of strike
settlements, to appeal for calm during the Watts riots, to announce
U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, to announce hostilities
in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in other ways.

During the period of November,

1963, through November, 1966, he pre-empted network television twentyeight times.
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Aware of the power of television to reach the public,

Johnson scheduled his televised messages to congress in the evenings,
to get larger audiences.7*

He also used the media of radio and tele

vision for major addresses, such as his policy statements on Vietnam.
Johnson's attitudes toward the televised news conference provides
a paradox, in light of his preference for direct communication with the
populace.

Johnson once told an interviewer for Newsweek. "They are a

kind of prearranged show where some reporters get to stand up and be
on TV."^

As Moyers put it, "Usually he'd rather go to the dentist

than submit to the formal setting of a televised conference which he
felt was more the making of the press than of his own design."73
®®Moyers, letter.
E. Reedy, The
Mentor, 1970), pp. 10^—105^George

Twilight of the Presidency (New York:

7°phillips, pp. 307-308.
^Cornwell, p. 6; and Reedy, p. 155»
72«End of the Honeymoon," p. 62.
^ M o y e r s , letter.
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Johnson's sttituds was that the tslsvlssd format did mors to suit the
needs of the press than his own.

As was noted, Johnson did not wa n t to

be compared w i t h Kennedy in that situation.

Also, Johnson was uncom

fortable in the televised situation because he was concerned about his
image and did not feel that he was capable in the broadcast setting.7**
Admirers of the Kennedy format and network representatives criticized
Johnson's failure to hold televised conferences and because of the
pressure of that criticism Johnson finally began to hold them from time
to time.

After leaving office Johnson

wrote:

I believe I should have held more regular televised news con
ferences.
I was always more comfortable meeting with reporters
around m y desk, as President Roosevelt did, because it often
gave us the opportunity to explore questions in greater depth
than in a televised spectacular.
Yet broadcast news conferences
are an effective means of communicating with the public and
should be widely used by national leaders.75
Aside from being more comfortable, Johnson preferred the non-broadcast
situation for other reasons.

One was that, in the informal conference.

If he made a mistake, he could recover

easily.

Also, he preferred

have a more natural give and take w i t h

reporters.

to

He liked "to have

newsmen a bit more Irreverent" in their questions than they might be
on television.7^

It is somewhat ironic that despite his dislike of

the televised news conference, his standing in the public opinion polls
often went up after he held that type of conference.77

^Phillips,

pp.

123-124;

and

Salinger, pp.

188-189.

?5j0hnson. The Choices W e F a c e , p. 138.

76Phillips,

p. 35.

77Reedy, p. 15 6 ; and "Poll Finds Johnson Reverses His Popularity
Loss," New York Times. Dec. 5. 1967. p» 18.
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Three other aspects of Johnson's personality came to bear on his
attitudes toward the presidential press conference.
love of secrecy and surprise.

First was Johnson's

Johnson had used that tactic of surprise

In holding his press conferences as Senate Majority Leader,

This habit

helps explain Johnson's preference for impromptu press conferences as
President.^®
A second and related habit was Johnson's desire to be in control of
his press relations.

Deakin wrote. "As President, Mr. Johnson wants to

announce all the news himself, at times and places of his own choosing."79
This urge for control extended to the handling of his news conferences.
In his conference of March 20, 1965, Johnson made it clear to reporters
what his position regarding his dissemination of Information was, saying,
"How and where I do that is a decision that I reserve for myself, and
shall continue to reserve for myself." He promised the same with regard
to meeting reporters;

"I will continue seeing the press at different

times, different places and different ways at my own choosing." 80

The

desire for control also led Johnson to disregard suggestions for improvement of his press conferences which came from his staff. 81
which Johnson exercised control over his conferenceswas
the spur of the moment, which led to criticism.

Cne way in

tocall

them on

JamesRestonpostulated

that Johnson called Impromptu conferences when only the White House
correspondents were around in order to avoid the penetrating questions
^®Geyelin, p. 156; and Warren Rogers, "The Truth About LBJ's
Credibility," Look. May 2, 19&7, P» 72.
^James Deakin, "I've Got a Secret; president Johnson and the
Press," Hew Republic. Jan. 30, 1965. P» 13.
®^Public papers. 19&5.

1. P« 303.

®*Christian, interview; and Moyers, letter.
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that night be asked by specialists, thereby giving Johnson control
over the content of the c o n f e r e n c e s . Johnson offered this rebuttal:
MT often wished that these critics had to subject themselves to the
questions of these bashful reporters.

I assure you they would be

singing a different tune."®^ Critics also saw Johnson as controlling
his conferences by opening them with lengthy announcements and by reply
ing to questions with long answers, thus limiting the number of questions
that might be asked,

Oh

A final Influence on Johnson's press conference philosophy was his
proclivity for experimentation.

During his first few weeks in office

Press Secretary Salinger advised Johnson to experiment until he found
the format he liked best.®'* And that he did.
a number of locations for his conferences.

He tried holding conferences

while seated, while standing, and even walking.
situation was explored.

Johnson experimented with

Almost every possible

Johnson hired a television executive, Robert

Fleming, to help with the experiments in broadcasting.®® A variety of
innovations were attempted with the televised conferences.
tried a number of lighting techniques.
He experimented with a teleprompter.

Johnson

For a while he used contact lenses.
In terms of delivery, the best of

®2James B. Reston, "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs, 44 (July 1966), 563*
®^Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 138.
®^This criticism was not without justification. One study showed
that the average number of questions at Johnson's conferences was 16.8,
while Elsenhower averaged 22.5 and Kennedy, 27.9; »•« MoGuire, pp. 58-70.
®^Salinger, pp. 413-414.
®®John D. Pomfret, "The President and the Press; Their Relationship
Continues to Be Uneasy," Hew York Times. Feb. 28, 1966* p. 13.
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Johnson's press conferences came as a result of an experiment.

In that

conference. Johnson freed himself from the lectern and used a lavalier
microphone.

As Reed described It, Johnson

stepped out from behind the podium and walked up and down in
front of the camera like a revival preacher.

He waved his arms, chopped the air, drew Imaginary lines
with his fingers, clutched his glasses, scowled, laughed, and
ran his voice through a range of sound from hlgh-volume to
quiet, self-deprecating greatness. Beyond theatrics, he en
livened the content of the news conference with historical
comparisons, scriptural quotations. Jokes and a bit of sar
casm. 87
Bu t this was only an experiment.

He never did i t again for television.

Further, he thought that the favorable reaction he got for the perform-

OQ
ance was "silly."
Several points have been made i n this section regarding Johnson's
presidential press conference philosophy.

His approach was pragmatic.

His purposes were to inform and to persuade the public, congress, and
the world.

His preferences for informality and for direct communication

with the public shaped his philosophy.

His habits of secrecy, surprise,

his desire for control, and his urge to experiment also affected that
philosophy, or rationale behind his press conferences as President.
Johnson's Press Conference Practices
Perhaps Johnson's philosophy toward the press conference is best
revealed in his actual news conference policies and practloes, as described
in this section.

The following discussion treats the types of confer

ences and his strategies in timing his conferences.

Also discussed are

On
Roy Reed, "A New Presidential Style: That Was the 'Real
His Old Friends Say," New York Times. Nov. 18, 19^7, p. 1.
88

Johnson,'

Christian, interview.
According to Christian, the suggestion for
Johnson's getting away from the lectern came from Senator John Pastore.
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the scheduling, locations, and other details of the President's meetings
with correspondents.
TVpes of Conferences

Johnson used several types of meetings with reporters, including
background and off-the-record sessions; official news conferences, both
formal and informal, scheduled and impromptu, filmed, broadcast "live,"
and not broadcast; private interviews and televised interviews.

Johnson

held a lot of meetings with writers, was fond of counting them and was
sensitive to criticisms of being inaccessible to reporters.

In his con

ference of March 20, 19^5. Johnson reminded reporters:
Today marks the 39th on-the-record press conference that I
have held, 18 off-the-record, or a total of 57. I have had
18 press conferences with advance notice, 16 covered by radio
and television. Bight of these were live television in
addition to 3 live television joint sessions in the little
over a year that I have been president.
There have been other occasions upon which I have seen
the White House press corps on an Informal basis in order to
give them some insight into vjy thinking. In addition to
these 56 formal meetings I have had 9 informal, lengthy walks
with the White House press corpe. Some of you who used to enjoy
those walks when they were scheduled a little earlier with
President Truman and from time to time those of you who enjoy
them will be invited back again.
On various occasions I have had conferences w ith pools
representing the W h ite House press. W e have had 173 airplane
flights with pools where they visited— two p ool visits while
I was in the hospital with a bad cold, and one pool visit in
tny bedroom in the Executive Mansion w hen I thought I was recu
perating from it.

I have had additional visits from 37^ accredited press
representatives at their request; in addition, 6k who requested
meetings with bureau chiefs, plus 200 telephone discussions
that I have responded to.
There have been 9 other occasions where I have met with
the press ranging from a barbeque at the Ranch to addresses
made to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associ
ated Press luncheon, and of course last year each one of the
social affairs. White House press conference and gridiron,
etc., I believe numbered 8.

I have had 9 special appearances renting from a television
interview with all 3 networks to special statements concerning
Vietnam and the railroad strike.^9
Perhaps the most frequently used type of meeting was the off-therecord conference and background briefing session held for individuals
and groups of reporters.

According to Strout, the reason that Johnson

liked this type of meeting was that Johnson's "ideal is a private audi
ence with selected reporters where he can talk and they can listen and
nobody asks too many unexpected questions."9°

At least one correspondent,

Arthur Krock, found the off-the-record sessions productive, even more so
than official press conferences.^^
According to George Christian, the off-the-record sessions were held
almost every day, and they often lasted two or three hours.^ Although
no agenda was used, the sessions were often arranged in advance.

When

they were scheduled, Christian made a list of seven or eight corres
pondents who were compatible with one another and then made invitations.
In those meetings there was a good "give and take" between the reporters
and the president, and Johnson was "at his best."^
of attribution employed by F.D.R. were followed.
the meetings to "leak" information.
"trial balloon" device.

The four categories

Johnson sometimes used

He also occasionally practiced the

Usually, no recordings or stenographic records

were kept of the meetings, although a press aide was always present to
^Public Papers. 19^5, v. 1, p. 303.
90
Strout, p. 9.
^Arthur Krock, "Johnson and the Press," New York Times. Dec. 20,
196**, sec. IV, p. 9; Krock, "Johnson and News TLeaks,*" New York Times.
Jan. 2k, 1965, sec. IV, p. 11; and Krock, "The Mirrors of 1600 Pennsyl
vania Avenue," New York Times. Feb. 18, 1965. p. 32.
92p©rsonal interview with George Christian, Aug. 19, 1971.
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take notes on the proceedings.

According to Christian, this type of

Oil

meeting was helpful to both the press and the President.7^

Another type of meeting with the press was the television inter
view with a small group of reporters.

For example, William Lawrence,

Eric Sevaried, and David Brinkley interviewed the President in March
of 196^.
The third general type of meeting with the press was the official,
or on-the-record press conference.

There were 135 of these.

According

to Johnson, over fifty of these were televised, either by video tape or
live.95

Most of the official conferences were impromptu and informal as

opposed to scheduled in advance and formal.

Johnson once held a "double

header," in which a non-televised meeting was followed by a televised
conference on the three most important topics (as selected by reporters)
96
of the first one.7

Preparation for press Conferences

Like Kennedy, Johnson's best preparation for a conference lay in
his daily work and his extensive reading.9?
read

Johnson reported that he

10 or 15 newspapers daily.9® Johnson also read the Congressional

Record daily, as well as volumes of other government memoranda and
documents.99

9*»lbld.
^Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 13?•
9^"0nce More, W i t h Feeling," Newsweek. July 4, 1966, p. 5**.
9?Moyers, letter; and Christian, interview. May 26, 1971.
9®Television interview of March 15, 196^. in Public Papers.
1963-6^, v. 1, p. 365.
^Christian, The President Steps Down, p. 6 .

President Johnson made no preparation for his Impromptu conferences,
some preparation for his formal ones, and even more careful preparation
for his broadcast conferences.*®®
The formal preparation process began two days in advance of the con
ference.

Notice was given to the various executive offices and cabinet

agencies, which prepared lists of anticipated questions and briefing
books of information to answer the questions.

Next, the presidents

press secretary and staff digested and filtered the briefing books and
added other anticipated questions and background information.

A press

aide prepared a notebook of the digested and refined materials for
Johnson to read the night before the conference.

Eisenhower and Ken

nedy's habit of holding breakfast sessions with staff and cabinet mem
bers was not a general practice during the Johnson administration.
Johnson occasionally held a pre-conference briefing session, especially
in the earlier years of his administration.
tapered off.

Later, this practice

"In critical times he might call a special meeting of

his foreign policy advisers in advance of the conference to discuss
his handling of key issues."*®*'

Johnson sometimes got advisers such

as Rostow and Rusk to prepare answers.

He also sometimes used prepared,

written replies on "delicate" subjects to avoid error and to make sure
that his statements conformed to previous positions as stated by the
administration.
conferences.

Johnson frequently took notes with him to his formal

He did not rehearse his answers.

*®®This and the following information is based upon the two inter
views with Christian and the letter from Moyers; both sources were
presidential press secretaries and participated directly in the prepa
ration process.
*®*Christian, The President Steps Down, p. 199*

Johnson tended to prepare more carefully for his broadcast con
ferences because he felt the public would notice If he was caught off
guard.

He was

very well

prepared on the matters he felt most important

or on toplos he wanted to emphasize during the conference.
Johnson’s preparation for his formal conferences was more extensive
in the earlier part of his administration than later.

He gradually did

less reading of the briefing books and sometimes just flipped through
them or did not look at them at all.

Alsof he gradually discontinued

seeing advisers before the conferences.

As Moyers put it, "That practice

disappeared as time went on, partly because I think the President thought
he knew more than we did and partly because the President did in fact
know more than we did.

There is no better preparation for the Presi

dential press conference than the president at work. . • ."102
In any event, the preparation was successful, at least in antici
pating reporters' questions.

Seldom was a question asked that had not

already been guessed by Johnson or his staff prior to the conference.
Press Conference Timing
Johnson was so unpredictable in the scheduling of his presidential
press conferences that it could easily be said that his personal whim
was the principal deciding factor.

Indeed, being unpredictable may have

been a strategy in itself since Johnson had a predilection for the
tactic of surprise.

But closer examination reveals other strategies.

An examination of the timing of Johnson's conferences shows five other
*®^Moyers, letter.
103Christian, interview, Aug. 19. 1971s *nd G.R. Berdes, Friendly
Adversaries: The press and Government (Marquette University: Center
for the Study of the American Press, 1969), PP« 35-36.
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chief determinants.

Johnson was strategic in timing his conferences

(1) to make important announcements, (2) to make immediate refutation
to criticisms of his administration, (3) to promote pending legislation
and to reach other objects of his persuasion, (4) to gain personal
publicity and political advantage, and (5) to provide explanations to
reporters on current technical matters.
The first strategy in timing was to make important announcements.
It was not infrequent for Johnson to begin a press conference, espe
cially a formal one, with the announcement of appointments and changes
in personnel in the cabinet, the military and on the Supreme Court.

For

example, in his conference of April 10, 1968, Johnson announced the
resignation of Larry O'Brien as Postmaster General and the appointment
of Marvin Watson as successor, the appointment of two new presidential
aides, the appointment of a new Commander in Chief of the Pacific, the
appointment of General Abrams to succeed Westmoreland as Commander of
forces in Vietnam, the appointment of a successor to Abrams as well as
the announcement of the passage of the President's civil rights bill.
In his conference of June 26, 1968, the President announced the resig
nation of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the nomination of Abe Fortas to
succeed Warren, and the nomination of Homer Thornberry to the Supreme
Court.

Announcements were also made to disclose new plans and develop

ments.

In a conference on August 3, 1967, Johnson announced a new tax

package and a build up of troops in Vietnam.

Other examples abound.

Another strategy of timing was to use the press conference for
refutation.

For example, on November 16 of 1967, the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee passed a series of resolutions on curtailing the
Vietnam war and urging the president to act in halting the war.

The

following day Johnson held a conference in which he attacked critics

of his policies In Vietnam.

On June 1, 1965, Johnson responded to criti

cisms of his use of troops in the Dominican Republic.

Johnson used his

conference of May 3, 196?, to refute rumors of a proposed troop increase
for Vietnam.
A further reason for scheduling conferences was to push congressional
legislation which was deadlocked and to reach other objects of persuasion.
On February 2, 1967, Johnson used a conference to urge the Senate to ap
prove a treaty with the U.S.S.R.

In November of 1967, Johnson went to a

press conference to press congress to act on pending tax legislation.

On

September 1 of the same year the President criticised the steel industry
for recent price increases.

Also, the same day (July 1, 1968) that Bethle

hem Steel announced price hikes, the President opened a news conference
with a lengthy criticism of Bethlehem’s actions.

In March of 1965, *

civil rights protest and march was held in Selma, Alabama.

Two days after

the death of one of the demonstrators, Johnson called a conference to urge
Governor Wallace to act in protecting the marchers (despite the fact that
he had met with Wallace personally that same morning, before the news
conference).
A fourth strategy in timing the conferences was to gain personal
and political advantage and attention.
was done.

During the campaign of 1969, this

After a formal press conference in September of that year,

Johnson called reporters back in to point out the results of a primary
election in Arizona.

Johnson held press conferences both before and

after his nomination by the Democratic Party on August 26, 1969.

Johnson

sometimes competed for attention by holding conferences at the same time
that others were.

On June 17, 1965, Johnson held an impromptu conference

lasting almost an hour and a half in his office at the same time that

P7

Senator Goldwater was holding a news conference,

Johnson used the same

tactic in 1965, when Charles deGaulle was holding one of his highly
Infrequent meetings with the press, and "many correspondents decided
that deGaulle had been undercut."*®^

Johnson held news conferences on

March 12, 1966, three different times to publicize results of a Gover
nor's Conference which included a resolution supporting Johnson's
policies in Vietnam,

Finally, Johnson used his November 3. 1966, con

ference to gain personal attention by announcing that he would soon
have surgery.
The final strategy in timing was to hold news conferences in order
to explain crucial technical matters.
Franklin Roosevelt,

This was a regular practice of

For example, on August 3, 1967, the President sent

a special message to congress on the budget.

At the same time he held

a press conference and explained in detail various aspects of the tax
message, using a blackboard.

A similar situation led to a news con

ference on March 9, 1967, the same day that another special message
was sent to congress.
Before concluding this section it is important to point out that
Johnson often failed to hold conferences at strategic times.
he made nationwide television announcements instead.
simply avoided public statements.

Sometimes

At other times, he

For example, between February 1 and

February 29 of 196^, no conferences were held.

During that period Cuba

cut off the water supply to the naval base at Guantanamo, a major civil
rights bill was in congress, problems had developed on the island of
Cyprus and the Kashmir question was before the United Nations.

In 1967,

the President did not hold a conference between March 21 and May 5, *
period of over six weeks.
10^Rivers, p. 172.

During those weeks U.N. Secretary-General

m
0 Thant made two peace proposals to the United States, the United States
was carrying on extensive bombing raids in North Vietnam, and a coup d»
etat took place in Greece, among other events.

On many other occasions

Johnson neglected to hold a press conference when it might have been to
his advantage and to the advantage of reporters as well as the public.
Other Details of Johnson's press Conferences
To round out the present consideration of Johnson's press conference
practices attention is given in this section to such matters as the
scheduling and locations of the conferences as well as other details.
Johnson was prone to schedule his conferences to suit his own con
venience.

During his first year, the Saturday conference, held about

noon, was most common.

Johnson rarely held news conferences in the

morning or late in the evening.
within an hour or two of noon.
afternoon, around five p.m.

About half of his conferences were held
The other favorite time was the late

Johnson's favorite days were Saturday,

Thursday, and Friday, in that order.

The televised conferences were

usually at noon or in the afternoon, on various days of the week.
Locations varied considerably, although Johnson preferred his own
office in the White House.

Other locations at the White House Included

the Fish Room, the Theatre, the East Room (for televised conferences),
the Cabinet Room, the Press Office, the Blue Room, the Rose Garden, and
the South Lawn.
torium.

On occasion Johnson used the State Department's audi

Thirty official press conferences took place outside Washington.

Many of those were held at the L.B.J. Ranch in Johnson City and in other
locations in Texas.

Johnson's travels provided other locations, including

the New York World's Fair, St. Louis, Missouri, and Guam.
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Johnson was fairly frequent, if not regular, in meeting the press.
From November 22 until the end of 1963, he had three conferences.

He held

thirty-two in 196^, seventeen in 1965. forty-one in 1966, twenty-two in

1967, nineteen in 1968, and one in January of 1 9 6 9 , his last month as
President.

Johnson's average was two conferences per month.

Attendance at the conferences varied.
twenty to forty reporters were present.

At the impromptu conferences

At the televised conferences,

over i*00 sometimes appeared.
Johnson sometimes used planted questions in his press conferences,
as had other presidents, to Insure that certain topics received atten
tion.^
Johnson occasionally spoke off the record at his official confer
ences, but not often.
After the end of each news conference, usually within an hour,
transcripts were provided by the White House Press Office.

Editing

was almost always limited to changes in grammar or syntax, when there
was editing of the transcripts.
edited.

On a few occasions vocabulary was

Substantive changes were extremely rare and were limited to

such matters as mistaken statistics.

l05Phillips, pp. 38-39.
*®^Moyers, letter.

10?Ibld.; and Christian, interview, Aug.

19, 1971.

CHAPTER III
THE CONTENT OF JOHNSON'S PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES

This chapter reports the findings of an analysis of the content
of Johnson's press conferences.

The guiding factors of the press con

ferences' content were, first. Johnson's opening statements. or
"voluntaries." and. second, the questions which reporters put to John
son.

Other characteristics of the content of the conferences such

as timing, frequency, and length, are described In the next chapter.
This chapter, then. Is made up of two major sections beginning with a
treatment of Johnson's use of the voluntary.

Johnson's Opening Statements

Since the President made extensive use of opening statements In
his news conferences, the voluntaries have been studied In detail
in terms of the topics and themes developed.

Primary attention is

given to the subject matter of the opening statements and the frequency
with which the various topics occurred.
Johnson began almost all of his conferences with various announce
ments and statements.

Each conference has been studied to determine

the themes and topics, explicit and Implicit, In the voluntaries.

In

analysing the conference, five main categories of subject matter emerge:
(1) executive matters, (2) domestic issues, (3) foreign affairs,
(U) personal concerns, and (5) miscellaneous items.
three areas, subtopics have been analysed.

Under the first

While the system of catego

rising the themes and topics is arbitrary. It provides useful insights
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for the purposes of this study.

A similar Method is used to examine

the questions reporters asked of the President.

Executive Matters
President Johnson used opening statements at his press conferences
to report and promote the activities of the Presidency more than for any
other purpose.

Voluntaries on executive affairs were of three types.

First were announcements regarding presidential appointments and other
staff changes directly related to the executive branch of government.
Seoondv Johnson often gave details of his executive plans, activities,
and decisions.

Third, Johnson made statements regarding the nature of

briefings and meetings which had recently been conoluded.
More than half of Johnson's voluntaries on executive affairs dealt
with presidential appointments and changes in personnel.

To some extent,

the press conference was Johnson's favorite format for announcing those
new appointments and resignations whloh are under direct presidential
control.

Included were the White House, the Cabinet, the Supreme Court,

the military, and others.

Over two hundred, or almost a third of all of

1
Johnson's opening statements, were of this nature.

Some examples follow.

In his conference of March 28, 196**, Johnson announced a number of
appointments, including an ambassadorship, an appointment to the Atomic
Energy Comnisslon, an appointment to the Export-Import Bank, three ap
pointments to a study commission on Puerto Rico, a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, and others.

1
All references to Johnson's press conferences are from the trans
cripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States:Iyndon B. Johnson, Iff vole.
(Washington, ri.U.: GPff, 196jj>^197bj.
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In hi* first oonfsrsnos of 1965, Johnson announced fonrtoon changes
in ths Whits House staff, including a new press secretary and other
important presidential asslstantships.
During one of his longer official press conferences, on June 18,

1966 , the voluntaries took up almost half of the conference's tine.
Johnson announced eleven resignations, appointments, and nominations.
Among the persons discussed were Ellsworth Bunker, Nicholas Johnson,
Richard Helms, and John Connelly,
Press conference voluntaries also Involved announcements such as
the appointment of Sargent Shriver as Ambassador to Prance, Wilbur
Cohen as H.E.W. Secretary, General William Westmoreland as Chief of
Staff of the Angr, Arthur Goldberg's resignation as Ambassador to the
United Nations, Chief Justice Earl Warren's resignation, and others.
A second type of opening statement related to executive affairs
embraced presidential plans, activities, and deoislons.

Voluntaries of

this type were used more frequently in Johnson's first year of office
than in any other.
Prom time to time Johnson used his introductory remarks to give
details of his activities prior to the press conference.

Among these

were meetings and briefings, receptions for dignitaries, telephone con
versations, and other daily business such as the preparation of major
addresses to congress.
Johnson also announced immediate and long range plans.

Occasionally

the president used the news conference to announce his travel plans.

Por

example, in the October 13, 1966, conference he gave details of his itin
erary for a trip to several Aslan countries as well as his intent to
attend the Manila Conference.

During the fall, 196**-, election campaign
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he advised reporters of his travel plans a week or two in advance, at
times.

Johnson also used tha oonfaranea format to annonnea Whit#

House schedules of meetings with Individuals and vith groups suoh as
dalagations of congressmen.
Asida from plans and activities, tha President sonatinas announoad
other important decisions, although he usually preferred going directly
to tha publio.

Anong such executive decisions was his Raw Tear's Day,

1968, voluntary describing an Executive Order to aneliorate the balance
of payments problem.

In a televised oonferenoe on March 20, 1965 ,

Johnson read a telegram whloh he had sent to Governor George Wallace
of Alabama, thereby announcing the president's deoision to provide
federal military assistance to protect civil rights marchers between
Selma and Montgomery* Alabama.

On a few occasions Johnson used his

opening remarks to present awards, suoh as military citations.
The third subcategory of opening statements related to the executive
affairs included remarks made by Johnson and other press oonferenoe guests
after meetings with the President.

This type of voluntary gained in

frequency of use during the last three years of Johnson's administration.
Now and then Johnson met with reporters for a briefing after cabi
net meetings,

Por example, in his conference of September 22, 1966,

Johnson took over half of the news oonferenoe time with a lengthy review
of items discussed in that morning's oablnet meeting.

On that and other

occasions, Johnson sometimes deferred detailed questions regarding the
cabinet meeting to his assistants or to others present at the cabinet
session.

Usually Johnson's remarks to the press after suoh meetings were

in the nature of a summary.
Johnson also met vith reporters after meetings with individual
cabinet members and other advisors.

The President utilised that
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technique in hi* fifth offioial pr*s* oonferenoe, January 25, 1964.

On that occasion, two-thirds of tha oonfaranoa was

spont by Johnson1*

opening statements, M i y of which dosoribod his Mating* with tha
Secretary of Dafansa and with othar administrative offlolals.
Other voluntaries wara used froa t i M to tine after naatings with
economic and Military advisors, ambassadors, special counsels, individual
nembers of oongress, and Whit* Rouse aides.
A more commonly usad voluntary of tha post M e t i n g variety con
sisted of Johnson1* having an Individual or two hold a joint press
oonfaranoa with hi* in order to allow participants in tha M a t i n g to
give their views and to answer queries of reporters.

An interesting

illustration of this followed a presidential briefing by Ambassador
Averell Harrlman, who had just returned frost a tour of Asian and
European countries following the Manila Oonferenoe (October, 1966).
In Johnson's November 11, 1966, news oonferenoe Harrlman reviewed his
trip for reporters and replied to five of the twelve questions asked
during the official press oonferenoe.
Following the Guam Oonferenoe in Maroh, 196?, Johnson used volun
taries to s u M a r l s e the M e t i n g in hi* press oonferenoe of Maroh 21.
After a few questions, the President's press oonferenoe ended, and
Ambassadors Lodge and Bunker met with reporters.

Later in that year,

on July 13, Johnson, McNamara, Westmoreland, and Wheeler held a joint
press oonferenoe to discuss their meetings with eaoh other.
participants made stateMnts and answered questions.

All four

A final exaaq>le

is the May 30, 1966, televised new* oonferenoe, in which opening state
Mnts

by Johnson, Prime Minister Gorton (Australia), and Westmoreland

took half of the press conference's allotted t i M .
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The last type of post nesting voluntary disoussed here was that
which followed Johnson's nestings with various governors and conferences
of governors.

On March 12. 1966. L.B.J. held three impromptu, official

press conferences in less than five hours, following sessions at the
Rational Governors' Conference in Washington. D.C.

Johnson and various

governors nade aimounoenents of the results of the sessions and answered
questions,

The President exeroised this kind of voluntary, or Joint

voluntaries, on other occasions.
Topias for opening statements regarding executive concerns were
generated by three general factors.

First were appointments, resigna

tions and other staff changes under Presidential control.

Second, the

activities, plans, and executive decisions of the President led to
various announcements and statements.

Third, Johnson's meetings with

leaders In governments provided toplos for many of Johnson's news con
ference voluntaries.

Domestic Issues
The second most common type of opening statement In Johnson's press
conferences dealt with the domestic affairs of the United States.

State

ments on the economy, on legislation, and congressional activity, and on
related Issues appeared.
Almost a third of Johnson's opening statements pertained to domestic
affairs.

As might be expected, voluntaries of this kind were most fre

quent during the first year of his presidency.

After 19^4, Johnson

displayed a tendency to use statements on Internal matters of the
United States less frequently.

That tendency also corresponded with

Johnson's decreasing use of voluntaries as a whole after his first year
as president.
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Opening statements related to the econosQr occurred.

Announcements

on matters such as the budget and employment were analysed

as well.

About a tenth of all of Johnson's voluntaries brought up domestic
economic natters.
During his first two years in office, it was conaon for the Presi
dent to begin a news conference with a discussion of the state of the
economy.

During this period, the theae was alaost always that of

frugality in government and a healthy situation in general.
nent was reassuring and positive.

The develop-

Johnson's second, third, and fourth

televised press conferences contained topics of an economic nature.

In

the oonferenoe of March 7, 196^. for example, the President discussed
public favor towards a tax cut. new figures on uneaployaent. increasing
business activity, and various prloe indices.

On April 16 of that year

he reported on the gross national product, increases in personal income
figures, labor statistics, and prices.

Then, on May 6 . Johnson addressed

the nation and an immediate audience of reporters, and wives and children
of reporters, gathered on the South Lawn of the White House.

In that

news oonferenoe Johnson presented information on the gross national
product again, on "higher productivity," on "taxes," on "prioe stability,"
on "business oorporate profits," and on other eoonomlo factors.
The pep talks on the domestic eoonoiy were not limited to the tele
vised press conferences.

For instance, in an impromptu news conference,

July 10, 196h, following passage of "all" of the 1965 appropriations bills
by the House, Johnson discussed the budget and "glowing reports on our
recent eoonomlo advances in employment, sales, profits, and income," to
use his words.

That oonferenoe was one of the best exaaqiles of Johnson's

use of the voluntary on the economy theme.

However, after the first part
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of 19^6, the transcripts lndloete that L.B. J . rarely introduced the
theee In an opening statement at his official s e e tings with corres
pondents, whether broadeast or not.
As Mentioned above, topics related to the theme of the domestic
economy Included employment and unemployment, the national budget,
taxes, wages, prices, the Gross National Product, corporate profits
and spending, general business activity, and frugality In the monetary
affairs of the federal government.

In sum, over a third of Johnson's

voluntaries on domestic affairs, and roughly ten pereent of all of his
official press oonferenoe voluntaries, treated domestio economic matters.
A second area of Interest among domestic affairs touched upon con
gressional activities and legislation.
voluntaries were of this kind.
In 1967 than In other years.

About one In ten of L.B.J.'s

Johnson used this theme more in 196^ and
He used the theme in about a fourth of his

official press conferences, all told.

Among the topics along these

lines were the President's messages to congress, vetoes, speolflo pieces
of legislation and treaties.
On January 7, 19&*-, the second session of the Eighty-eighth Congress
was convened.

The State of the Onion address oame the next day.

to that, Johnson held at least two unofficial press briefings.

Prior
Later, on

January 25, he had an impromptu press oonferenoe in which about twothirds of the time allocated was devoted to opening statements and announce
ments.

Among those were statements on various bills in progress, bills

passed and signed since he had taken office, and praise for congressional
action on legislation of Interest to the White House.

A t the time, a

major tax bill was pending, as were bills on education, civil rights, and
others.
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Johnson oontlnuod to promote legislation In his prsss oonfersnoss
that year.

For example, at the Juno 2, nows conference, hold In his

White House office, Johnson talked to reporters about the morning's
aeetlng with legislative whips.

He discussed the recent 1 no crate tax

reduction and pending fiscal bills.
On his fifty-fourth birthday, August 27, 1966, L.B.J. reviewed
various acts in his "Great Society Program."

He also commented upon

congressional efforts in behalf of his legislation, mentioning specific
bills and specific congressional leaders responsible for the "bipartisan
support" behind his legislative achievements.

Later that year, in a

televised news oonferenoe on October 13, Johnson used a voluntary to
praise and blame Republicans of the Eighty-ninth Congress for various
bills, including social security and medicare.

He ended the voluntary

session of the news conference by saying, "The 89 th Congress, my pre
diction is, historians will record as the great Congress."
Domestic Issues other than the economy and legislation came up in
voluntaries.

The topics here were mostly related to specific, current

events in the United States.

Among voluntaries of this type were those

related to the military, to the spaoe program, to strikes, to domestic
violence and disasters, and to the draft.

Fewer than ten per cent of

all of Johnson's opening statements had to do with these ourrent affairs.
Further, the President tended to talk less and less about such topios
in press conference voluntaries as his term in office progressed.
A few examples of topics on current affairs were noteworthy.

In

February and March of 1965, for instance, the president employed volun
taries in two televised news conferences to discuss the voter registra
tion drive in Alabama and, particularly, the racial violence in Selma
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at tha time.

In Johnson's tonth, and ona hand rod and tanth offloial

news conferences, ha usad voluntaries to axprass himself on tha 1964
Alaskan earthquake, in tha former, and tha affaets of "Hurricane
Beulah" on Taxaa «nd Mexico, in tha lattar (September, 196?).

Johnson

usad his July 10, 1964, press oonfaranoa to urge settlement of disputes
in tha auto industry which had lad to strikes.

In June of 1968, Bethlehem

Steal announced a five percent price increase.

A few hours after the

announcement, Johnson held an impromptu meeting with White House corres
pondents and reacted to Bethlehem's decision, in his first opening state
ment.
In sussiasy, Johnson used approximately two hundred announcements
and opening statements in his news conferences to discuss various
domestic affairs.
national budget.

He spoke on the eoono^y, employment, taxes, and the
He spoke on congressional affairs with attention to

the specific proposals and the general programs of his administration.
Finally, from time to time he spoke on various eurrent topics of impor
tance in the United States.

Foreign Affairs
President Johnson also employed opening statements and announce
ments to oommsnt on foreign affairs.

However, on the whole only about

one in ten of his press conference voluntaries considered topics of this
nature.

In the conferences from the beginning of his office until the

end of 1966, Johnson was more frequent in his use of the theme.

In his

last two years as president, he introduced the theme only in a half-dozen
offloial meetings with reporters.
Indochina was one concern.

Statements about Vietnam had topics on

troop increases, military efforts, peace negotiations and other attempts
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to settle tho war, and oonforonoas on Southaaat Asia.

Topics on

Vietnam appeared In fewer than a third of Johnson's news conferences,
although sone of the announoeMnts on the these were probably signifi
cant.

Sometimes voluntaries on Vietnam were dramatlo.
One of Johnson's first lengthy voluntaries on Vietnam oame in his

June 2, 1964, press conference.

On that ocoasion Johnson presented a

suraaary of U.S. policies In Vietnam which he had just reviewed in a
session with his legislative leaders.

Included In the statement was a

letter from President Eisenhower to president Diem, dated October 25.
1954, which supplied Ideas for Johnson's development.

Johnson went on

to M n t l o n the purpose of United States' involvement In Vietnam (". . .
to help build a stable peace."), to praise the military for its efforts,
to note the need for eoonomlo assistance programs, and to describe the
agenda for the Honolulu conference on Southeast Asia then in progress.
At the President's next press oonferenoe, June 23, Johnson announced
Henry Cabot Lodge's resignation as Ambassador to Vietnam, and the
nomination of General Maxwell Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson to succeed
Lodge,
ference.

L.B.J. went on to repeat points he had made in his June 2 con
In the June 23 meeting the President discussed Viet Cong

activities in Laos.
In a televised oonferenoe, March 20, 1965 , six months after his Johns
Hopkins speech on Vietnam, Johnson devoted a portion of his opening state-

Mnt

to the topic of the government's position on Southeast Asia.

On

June 1 of that year the President used a televised press conference
voluntary to announce a request to the Congress for an eighty-nine
million dollar appropriation bill for eoonomlo aid to Southeast Asia,

101

The June 18, 1966, broadcast oonfaranoa oontalnad a long volun
tary on Vietnam.

Johnson prasantad a six months' review of polloies,

military efforts, and Internal affairs.
of

Ha emphasised tha necessity

. . honor for all in naking peace," and said, "Let the killing

stop," in reply to critics of his policies.

The tone of the voluntary

suggested hope and a possibility of a peaceful end to the war.

Johnson

continued those lines of thought in his next conference, also televised,
on July 5, 1966.

There he developed the topic of social and economic

progress in Vietnam, based on a recent report to him by Robert Komsr,
(Johnson's aide in charge of social and economic development in Vietnam).
On November 5. of that year, Johnson used the press conference format
to permit Secretary McNamara to brief reporters at the L.B.J. Ranch on
military affairs in Vietnam.

McNamara expressed a belief that there

would be less U.S. military activity and that spending would not be
increased in the future.

The statement was lengthy and continued the

theme of optimism, or hope.
Johnson's final Important press conference announcement on Vietnam
was May 3. 19^8.
television.

The conference was broadcast "live," over radio and

The President announced that, "I was informed about 1 o'clock

this morning that Hanoi was prepared to meet in Paris on May 10th, or
several days thereafter."

That announcement followed Johnson's March 31

address to the nation in which he proposed plans to end the war, including
some cessation of bombing.

Johnson also announced his intention not to

run for re-election in the March 31 address.

Aside from the topics on Vietnam numerous voluntaries on a variety
of other foreign affairs, especially those of direct involvement by the
United States appeared.

From time to time Johnson used the press conference
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voluntary to desaribe suoh matters as American relations with Panama,
intervention in the Dominloan Republics, relations with the U.S.S.R.,
developments in the Middle East, the test ban treaty's progress,
foreign aid, and other matters of foreign diplomacy.

These topics,

as was the case with Vietnam, accounted for less than ten per cent of
press conference voluntaries.

Further, Johnson was found to be more

infrequent in his initiation of topics on foreign affairs after his
first year in office.
However, several of Johnson's announcements and statements of
this nature were of Importance.

A few examples have been selected for

presentation here.
Difficulties in U.S. relations with the Canal Zone and with
panama evolved early in Johnson's administration.

Johnson first

introduced the problem at a press conference on January 23, 1 9 ^ *
following Panama's January 10 break in diplomatic relations with the
United States.

In press conferences held March 23 and May 15, L.B.J.

continued to review the situation for reporters and the nation.

Later in the year, peaceful negotiations were developed.
At a televised press conference on Tuesday, April 27, 19^5.
Johnson made a brief statement on civil strife in the Dominican
Republic.

He announced the evacuation of American citlcens from the

danger in the area that day.

On Wednesday, the President announced

to the nation the intervention of United States troops in the Domini
can Republic.

Four days later. May 2, Johnson devoted a televised

address to the nation justifying the military involvement and recounting
the events which led to it.
the President in May.

The topic came up in other speeches of

On June 1, Johnson held his first press oonferenoe
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sine® his announcement of intervention in the Dominican Republic.

John

son used tha June 1 televised oonfaranoa to announce, publioly, with
drawal of U.S. troops.

The topic of American Involvement in the affairs

of tha Dominican Republic was found in press oonfaranoa voluntaries In
broadcast conferences in June and July, 196 6 .

On July 5# 19^6, Johnson

reported to the press that the situation was improved and promising.
In 1967. other press conferences provided the President an oppor
tunity to bring up international affairs.

Por instance on March 2,

the President told reporters of an exchange of letters with Chairman
Aleksei Kosygin which indicated progress in anas limitations.

On

September 1 of that year Johnson announced his authorisation to provide
increased wheat shipments as aid to India.
During his last year in offloe, the President eschewed voluntaries
on foreign affairs, save three on matters related to Vietnam.

Personal Concerns
Only on occasion did the President employ the offloial press oon
ferenoe to initiate matters related to his private life.

Suoh voluntaries

accounted for only a handful of all of his opening statements and were
more frequent during his first year of office than in ary other.

Topics

related to the area of personal affairs embraced Johnson's health, per
sonal finances, travel and recreation, politics, and family.

A few

specific instances are noted here.
On November 3, 1966 , an entire news oonferenoe was devoted to the
subject of an announcement b y the President that he would have abdominal
surgery.

The President announced more speolfio details at a press

conference later in the month, November 13.

At his fourth offloial

meeting with reporters, January 23. 1 9 ^ . Johnson responded to recent
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new* stories on his personal and family financial holdings.

He also

discussed the fact that, "The ^Bobbj^T Baker family gave us a stereo
set," a number of years before Johnson became president.

In the first

official press conference after the 1964 Democratic Rational Convention,
L.B.J. announced the forthcoming publication of his book, Ijjr Hope For
America.

In his August 26, 1965* conference Johnson briefed reporters

on his birthday plans of the morrow.

In the next to the last of his

official press conferences Johnson outlined his Christmas plans as well
as his personal projects following the end of his tenure as President.

Miscellaneous Topics
Opening statements with topics of a miscellaneous nature accounted
for only about five per cent of all of the news conference voluntaries.
These topics Included those derived from announcements regarding the
press and press conference policies, partisan political matters, cere
monial statements, and certain statements made by guests at some of
Johnson*s conferences.

Examples of such opening statements follcw.

On July 24, 1964, the President welcomed visiting correspondents
from South America to his news conference.

Johnson's last press con

ference, January 17, 1969* contained a humorous opening statement for
reporters assembled at the National Press Club in Washington.

On

occasions, especially during his first two years in office, Johnson
would comment upon his press relations and policies.

The outstanding

example of this was his March 20, 1965, statement on his press rela
tions, discussed in chapter two of this work.

An unusual example of

Johnson's use of the voluntary on a political topic was found in the
August 15, 1964, news oonferenoe.

A t that time Johnson responded to

statements made by Senator Goldwater, Republican candidate for the
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presidency, on the subject of the use of nuclear weapons fay the U.S.
Finally, opening statenants by guests at Johnson's press conferences
provided news conference topics.

For example, on Deoember 6, 19^5,

Joseph Swindler, C h a t m a n of the Federal Power Commission; Secretary
of the Treasury

Fowler; Wllllan Martin, Jr., of the Federal Reserve

Board; and Gardner Ackley, of the Council of Economic Advisers, made
statements to the press and were queried.
The first half of this chapter may be summarised at this point.
Johnson's opening statements and announcements in official press con
ferences played a significant role as a determinant of the content of
the conferences.

The President often began a news conference with one

or more voluntaries.

The extent to whloh voluntaries were used in

press conferences paralleled the number of press conferences Johnson
held each year.

However, after his first year In office, L.B.J. dis

played less frequency in his use of that device.
The topics initiated by Johnson in the voluntaries were of five
kinds.

First were statements regarding executive matters. Including

Presidential appointments, personnel changes within the President's
control; Presidential plans, activities and decisions; and statements
following briefings and other meetings with White House aides, cabinet
members, congressional leaders, governors, and others.

Seoond, many

voluntaries concerned the domestic Issues in the United States.

In

cluded were topics related to the national economy, current legisla
tion and the congressional affairs, and ourrent events in the country.
Third, Johnson used voluntaries to dlsouss foreign affairs.

Vietnam

and the war in Southeast Asia provided topics on a number of occasions.
American relations with other countries suoh as the U.S.S.R. and Latin
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America also figured In some of the opening statements end announcements.
Fourth, only a few voluntaries which treated the President's personal
(or private) and family concerns emerged in the analysis.

Fifth, several

opening statements of a miscellaneous nature emerged from time to time.

The Content Of The Questions
The second chief determinant of the content of the press con
ferences was the reporter's question.

An average of sixteen or seven

teen questions was asked at each Johnson conference.
This study analyses all of the questions in terms of content to
discover major topic areas and to discern specific subtopic categories.
The system of studying the questions has been similar to the classi
fication system used to study the voluntaries.

Findings of the analysis

of the questions are reported here under the four main topic areas
which emerged;

(1) the presidency, (2) domestic issues, (3) foreign

affairs, and (4) miscellaneous.

The following discussion treats each

of the four topic areas and reports on Important subtopics in eaoh.
In the next chapter, other characteristics and qualities of the ques
tions receive attention.

The Presidency
More than a fourth of the questions put to Johnson by correspondents
had to do with the President's public and private concerns.

While deter

mining the difference between a president's official affairs and his
personal business may be arbltrezy, the distinction proves useful in
analysing the questions.
First under the presidency were questions related to the official
plans and actions of the president.

Correspondents frequently asked
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Johnson about his administration*® goals, loadsrs, and activities.

Thoy

also quorlod Johnson on his Presidential alas, actions, deeisions, travel,
staff and other appointments, meetings, and reactions to various events.
Questions on the Presidency, and especially those on Johnson's official
activities were more numerous in the press conferences during his first
( 1963 * 196*0 # third (1966), and last (1968 - 1969 ) years in the White House
than in the other two years.
Questions on presidential activities were generated on occasion
by Johnson's speeches, public announcements, and other official state
ments.

Suoh questions occurred either in anticipation of, or soon

after, those public statements.

For exasple, on January 13, 1966, the

day after the "State of the Union Address,” an unsoheduled news oon
ferenoe provided questioners an opportunity to probe the President on
various ideas in the Address.

One of the reporters said, "Mr. President,

can you characterise the reaotlon to your speech last night?

Tou

talked about some 'con* telegrams, which we understand you said to be
in the minority.

How do you feel the reaction was?”

Later that year

on March 31# Johnson addressed the National Legislative Conference of
the National League of Cities.

A t a noon, impromptu press conference

on that date, reporters asked about some of the speech's statements.
News conference queries also resulted frost suoh addresses such as
Johnson's najor statements on Vietnam, Including the September 29, 1967*
"San Antonio formula” speech, also presented to the National Legislation
Conference.

Finally, after Johnson's Maroh 31* 1968, address to the

pub 11a on Vietnam, which included his announcing that he would not
stand for re-election, reporters asked about fifty questions on the
President'8 plans, official and private.
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Since Johnson was fond of using tho presidential press con
ference to announce staff changes In his administration, it is not
surprising that a number of questions had to do with appointments
and resignations.

For instance, in the conference of April 11, 196^, a

reporter asked, "Mr. President, sir, at what point in Mr. Lodge's
career will it become necessary for you to re-evaluate his role as
your ambassador?'1 Lodge resigned that position on June 19.
occasions the press asked about resignations.

On other

For example, in the

June 18, 1966, conference L.B.J. announced the retirement of William
Raborn as Director of the C.I.A.

One correspondent wanted to know

why Raborn had resigned, saying, ". . . Is it health or other affairs?"
Reporters occasionally questioned Johnson's oholces.

In the June 23,

196h, conference, Johnson said that General Maxwell Taylor would be
the new Ambassador to Vietnam.

One question in the conference was,

• why did you pick a military man for this post?"

A related

area of inquiry had to do with unfilled positions, as reporters
did ask from time to time about Johnson's intentions to fill vacancies.
Among other official activities which led to questions were
Presidential trips.

Reporters asked for details in advance of, during,

and after such trips as Johnson's 19&* tour of Appalachia.

Reporters

asked about the possibility of a Presidential visit to Detroit and
Newark after rioting in those cities in 1967.

In 1968 questions specu

lated on plans for a summit meeting in Moscow.
The President's press polloles were questioned in more than one
oonferenoe, especially early in Johnson's administration.

The first

question of this nature appeared in his first press conference.

In

Johnson's second official oonferenoe, December 18, 19^3, a reporter
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asked whether L.B.J* would continue to hold surprise neetings with
reporters.

A televised conference, March

13, 1965, yielded a question

on the timing of press conferences, since L.B.J. had waited six days
to hold one after civil rights protesters, according to Johnson, were
"attacked and some were brutally beaten" in Selma, Alabama.
Various other White House decisions cane under scrutiny in meetings
with reporters.
funeral in

Johnson's decision regarding who would attend Churchill's

1965 began in a press conference on January 16, more than a

week before Churchill died.

In Johnson's February ^ news conference,

a question was raised about why Vice President Humphrey was not selected
to attend, since the President himself could not attend.
sions were questioned over the years.

Other deci

For instance, in the meeting

of December 4, 1967, almost half of the questions related to official
actions of the President.

In that conference reporters asked about

Johnson's plans for the budget, his handling of McNamara's resigna
tion, a recent military appointment, a possible meeting with Prime
Minister Harold Wilson of Britain, possible Cabinet changes, the next
day's meeting with Cyrus Vance, what L.B.J* might do about a steel
price hike, and Johnson's plans for "an all-Asian summit meeting."
Matters related to Johnson's personal life aocounted for about
two questions in an average press conference, or more than one in
ten questions overall.

Questions related to Johnson's private life

were about as numerous as those on his official activities.

Interest

in L.B.J.'s private affairs was more acute in his first and last years
in office than in others, as might be expected.
Several subtopics emerged.

Reporters were interested in Johnson's

health, family, personal finances, polltios, and suoh items as his
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feelings about his own press relations,

A few examples of questions

related to Johnson's unofficial affairs are presented below,
Qjr far, politics was the key natter of inquiry when it cane to
L,B.J.'s private life.
question:

In the seoond Johnson press oonferenoe was this

"Assunlng that you are the Democratic nominee for president

in 196^# will you agree to debate your opponent?”

In Johnson's last

offloial press conference, at the National Press Club in Washington, a
correspondent wanted the president to say why the Demoorats had not
won the

1968 election.

The frequency of questions on Johnson's political alms and acti
vities was cyolioal and predictable.
about most political inquiries.

Election years, of eourse, brought

In 1 9 ^ , such questions became more

and more numerous as the Democratic Convention approached.

A similar

pattern emerged during 1966 , relative to Congressional and other elec
tions.

In 1967 and 1968 speculation as to when Johnson would announce

his desire for reelectlon led to a number of press conference queries
from time to time through the oonferenoe of March

30, 19&8.

In that

oonferenoe, a reporter asked if Johnson planned to talk about L.B.J.'s
"future role in this campaign, or oandldaoy” in a televised speeoh to
be given the next day.

(The response was "No.”

The next day, March 31*

Johnson announced he would not run for reelectlon.)
Other political topics generated by questions included primary
elections, political polls, press predictions, politioal figureheads
close to the administration, the choioe of a running mate, matters of
campaign ethics, issues, politioal debating, opposing candidates, and
opposition parties and their spokesmen.

An interesting example of a

press oonferenoe in which questions of a political nature predominated
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was ths televised meeting of July 2^, I96 U.

Johnson had met with Repub

lican nominee Barry Goldwater earlier in the day.

Reporters used state

ments which had been made by Goldwater to get L.B.J.'s reactions.

They

asked about his choice for Vioe President, about campaign Issues, about
Goldwater's ability to get votes, about George Wallace's withdrawal from
the presidential race, about how much campaigning Johnson planned to do,
and, again, whether Johnson would debate with Goldwater.
Other personal affairs also led to questions from time to time.
Johnson's health was a matter of Interest to reporters, especially when
he was ill, and before and after surgery.

In the November 3, 1966,

offloial press conference, for example, all of the

37 questions asked

were about a forthcoming abdominal operation, and Johnson's physicians
handled the replies.

At other times, questions of the "Row do you

feel?" -type occurred.
Johnson's personal finances were subjeots of queries in some of
his early press conferences.

Reporters asked about suoh things as

L.B.J.'s business Interests in Texas in more than one press conference.
Family matters emerged in a few conferences.

For Instance, on

August 9, 1966, reporters queried the President about his daughter's
seeking employment in New York City.
Another area of unofficial presidential concern of note in the
conferences was Johnson's reactions to criticism, especially press
criticism, and his attitudes toward and relationships with the press.
For example, in the July 13, 1965, televised conference, Johnson was
asked, "Hr. President, quite a bit has been written recently about
your relations with the press.
oritloal, to say the least, sir.
but you.

Some of these stories have been openly
We seem to have heard from everybody

I wonder if you could give us your views on the subject?"
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Finally, conferences held on special ocoaslons, suoh as L.B.J.1s
birthday, and just before Christmas, evoked several questions about
the President's private life.
The Presidency, then, was a major area of Inquiry in Johnson's
presidential press conferences.

Reporters asked questions on a

variety of topics related to both the President's offloial activities
and his private life.

Domestic Issues
The seoond area of questioning In the news conferences cantered
around events, ideas, and people of national Interest in the United
States.

Questions on domestic affairs acoounted for almost a third

of all questions asked from 1963 through 1969*

While the percentage

of these questions was basloally static over the years,

1965 and 1966

yielded higher percentages than did the other years of the Johnson
administration.
Questions on domestic matters dealt with the economy, legislation
and congress, and "other" Internal Issues.
In an average press conference one question on the U.S. economy
might appear.

Sometimes questions of this nature were stimulated by

Johnson's voluntaries.

On other oooaslons, current events related to

Inflation, the national budget, taxation, the stock market, and employ
ment figured in the questioning.

Cases In whloh the president's voluntaries or other official acts
and statements elicited questions on the economy were of note from
time to time.

The administration's budget and other money requests

of congress were common stimuli for inquiries.

For instance, in the

November 29, 1966, conference, L.B.J. opened with a lengthy statement
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on major "cat backs" in federal spending for fiscal years

1966 and 1967,

as well as other administration a t t e s t s to control inflation.
voluntary led to

The

a number of questions Including the effeots of the

budgetary cuts on federal employees' pay, on the spaoe program, on
money for building schools, and on the possibility of a tax reduction.
Of the fourteen questions related to the econony in that oonferenoe,
one reporter asked, "How are the cattle prices?
(The conference was held in Austin, Texas.)

Are they pretty good?"

On August

3, 1967, Johnson

held a press conference, using a blackboard, to prepare reporters on a
"Special Message to Congress" on budgetary and economio natters.

All

of the questions related to his economio report.
The other situation, in which Johnson made no initial oomnents on
the economy, led to an occasional inquiry on that subject.
in a televised oonferenoe, on August

For example

18, 196?, efforts by farmers to

raise their prices were brought up by a reporter.

Another reporter

asked for specific information on a statement which had been made during
the week by Charles Schultse, Director of the Budget.

In the May

21,

1966, meeting a reporter asked the President about "publlo dissatis
faction" with inflationary trends in the eoonony.

Other questions in

that conference treated the possibility of a tax increase, the national
debt, and Johnson's answer to the question on Inflation.
Other topics, such as employment figures, wage and price figures.
Wall Street, and the Gross National Product appeared in press conference
questions off and on during the Johnson administration.
A second area of questioning relative to domestic affairs dealt with
legislation and congressional activities.
question of this type might occur.

In an average conference one

Over the years, less than ten per cent
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of the questions broached the ares of legislation and oongress, except
for the aalendar year, 1967.

The appearance of questions on donestic

legislation was not always predlotable.

However, reporters tended to

query the President more often on tax legislation than any other type.
Reporters also seemed to ssk more questions about pending legislation
than about anticipated or passed legislation, except for money bills.
Further, questions on domestic legislation seemed to occur more fre
quently when a particular administration measure was stalled or In some
other difficulty than when Johnson*s proposals were doing well in
congress.

The last phenomenon seemed to be true of questions about

hearings on treaties and presidential nominations to federal offices.
Among the subjects related to this area were the success or failure
of the "Great Society's" programs, specific pieces of legislation,
committee hearings, treaties, and congressional action on Johnson's
nominees for executive and Supreme Court appointments.
An example of a question anticipating legislation was found early
In the Johnson administration.

Less than a month after Kennedy's death,

in Johnson's second official news conference, a reporter asked If the
new President planned "for any legislation In the area of Presidential
succession or disability. . .
On February 1, 1964, a reporter asked for Johnson's reaction to a
"dispute" between Robert McNamara and the Joint Atomio Committee "over
the atomic power plant for the carrier. . .

In the same conference,

another question dealt with Johnson's legislative priorities and what
he thought his chances of success were with planned civil rights and
tax legislation.

A later question In that conference had to do with

the development of the "war on poverty" and how Johnson thought it would
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be promulgated for congressional consideration.

(On March 16 of that

year Johnson presented his proposals on poverty in a "Special Message to
the Congress.")
Good examples of questions on economic legislation were asked in
press conferences vhioh followed important budget proposals and related
requests of the congress.

For example, in the oonferenoe of January 17.

1967. reporters based most of the queries on Johnson's "Budget" and
"Eoonomlo Messages" which included eighty-five specific proposals for
consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee,
In September of 1966, one of L.B.J.'s major financial proposals
and other legislation generated quite a few questions.

For example,

in the oonferenoe of September 21, one query had to do with whether
the financial proposals were to achieve "a balanoed budget."

Also, two

questions treated the administration's unsuccessful Civil Rights act
of 1966 (which had to do with housing).

On March 28, 1968, a reporter

asked for Johnson's feelings about the fact that "the Foreign Relations
Committee voted down funds for the Aslan Bank and deferred funds for

I.D.A. . . ."
An interesting illustration of questions on Senate hearings was
afforded by Johnson's nominations of Homer Thomberry as Associate
Justice and of Abe Fortas as Chief Justloe to the Supreme Court.

John

son announced the nominations in his June 26, 1968, press conference.
In the next official conference, July 31. the last question asked was
for a statement on the Senate Judiolary Committee's handling of the
nominations.
birthday.

The next news conference of the year was on L.B.J.'s

The Fortas nomination was in trouble and the Democratic

Convention was in progress.

No questions were asked about Fortas in
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that brief oonfaranoa.

In tha following M a t i n g , September 6, one

of Johnson's voluntaries discussed tha situation in tha Senate, where
a filibuster on Fortas* nomination was in the making.
tions were asked on that subject.

Again, no ques

The Senate filibuster began September 17.

On October 2, Johnson announced his withdrawal of the Fortas nomination,
thereby ending the filibuster.

The matter did not appear in a press con

ference again until the last one, January 17, 1969* when a reporter
asked, "Did you seriously consider naming Arthur Goldberg as Chief Jus
tice after the Fortas nomination was withdrawn?"
A final area of questioning on domestic affairs is miscellaneous
in nature and has many questions related to current
home.

happenings at

A n average press conference would have two questions on ourrent

events in the United States.

Overall, about one in fifteen of all the

questions asked was of this nature.

Interest in ourrent affairs as

revealed by the questions peaked In 1965 , a year of civil rights efforts,
riots, and other acts of civil violence In America.

After 1966, repor

ters asked fewer questions each year, proportionately speaking, on related
matters.
Among the topics considered here were urban affairs, civil disobe
dience and violence, civil rights, labor-management relations, the draft,
and disasters in the country.

Also included were consumer affairs, environ

mental problems, the "space race," elections and voting, protest move
ments, and business and industrial matters.

From 196^ through 1966 reporters often questioned Johnson about civil
rights and related protest movements and violence.

The first question in

the April 16, 196h, televised oonferenoe, for example, was "Mr. President,
how do you feel about civil disobedience as a tactic in the olvll rights
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struggle?"

Events In and around Selma, Alabama, led to questions In

conferences during the spring of 196 5 .
nade the news.

That s m s e r , rioting In Watts

On May 21, 1966, a press oonferenoe question was, "Mr.

President, have you any thoughts on what seems to be Indications of
noun ting racial tension in this country, suoh as In Watts and In sons
other areasT"
In a slnllar vein, protest marches and demonstrations related to
the war in Vietnam, poverty, and oanpus violence drew questions from
reporters later In the Johnson administration.

Por Instance, in March

of 1968, rioting In Memphis, Tennessee, led a reporter to ask in the
March 30 conference, " . . .

how do you feel about the proposed Poor

People's Maroh on Washington next month . . .?"
The military draft was another matter of concern in press con
ferences.

For Instance on July 5. 1966, after a recent study of the

Selective Service System had been commissioned by L.B.J., the president
was asked for his own attitudes toward the system.

On other occasions

reporters queried the White House on prospects for inoreased draft calls.
In the July 13, 1967, meeting, a reporter asked Secretary MoNamara, a
participant in the oonferenoe, about the possibility of inoreased "draft
calls" for Vietnam.
To conclude this section on questions relating to "other" domestic
affairs, here are examples from selected press conferences.

The Septem

ber 9 , 196^, press conference elicited several questions on civil disor
ders and government plans to solve the problems.

Questions emerged on

an F.B.I. Investigation of vlolenoe in Mississippi, on Johnson's request
for an F.B.I. study of rioting in such oltles as Philadelphia and in
Harlem, and about the possibility of "known Communists. . . among the
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agitators. . ." In the riots.

In the June 17. 1965* conference, was a

question on Pranklin D. Roosevelt Jr.. who apparently was considering
running for mayor.

Another question was ". .

oan tell us on the supersonic transport?"

. i s there anything

you

One reporter asked about the

"Denver flood disaster."

A televised press conference on July 20. 1966.

revealed other examples.

In that conference reporters asked about an

airline strike, the "black power" movement in the U.S., "professional
agitators" in the cities, the Virginia primary election, and the Presi
dent's attitudes toward freedom of the press.

The President's televised

conference of Maroh 9 , 1967 , also revealed a variety of questions on
ourrent domestic Interests.

Reporters asked about C.I. A. expenditures

for student organisations, the report of the study commission on the
Selective Service, the shipyards strike on

the west ooast, and the possi

bility of a manned lunar landing in 1970 .
On Maroh 30, 1968, questions dealt with the "Poor People's march on
Washington," national defense, racial trouble in M a t h i s , and a strike
in the copper industry.
Domestic affairs, then, proved to be an important area of inquiry
in Johnson's news oonferences.

Reporters raised questions about matters

of interest in the U.S., on issues related to the eoom m y , on congress
and legislation, and on various other toplos.
events in the country elioited queries.

More often than not, current

The next section describes the

most frequented area of questioning in the oonferences, foreign affairs.

Foreign Affairs

In general, questions on foreign affairs occurred more often than
those in the other three categories, given the number of questions asked
and the member of press conferences which took place in the Johnson
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this nature.

Specifically, ever a third of the questions were of

The percentage of Inquiries on foreign affairs aaoelerated

after Johnson's first year in office.

In 1965 and 1967 , for example,

about half of the news conference questions related to non-domestic
Issues.

Reasons for this and other trends ere suggested In the next

chapter.

A t this point, a report on the content of the questions on

foreign affairs is necessary.
The nost c o m o n question area In Johnson's conferences was on the
subject of Vietnam.

About two-thirds of all the questions on foreign

affairs related to U.S. involvement In Southeast Asia, to wit, war and
peaoe In Vietnam.

Comparatively speaking, little interest In Vietnam

was expressed during L.B.J.'s first year in office.

After 196^, however,

reporters lnoreased the proportion of questions on Vietnam.

Again, the

years 1965 and 19^7 were peak years for the topic.
Specific Items of inquiry on Vietnam included American military
support and activities, such as day to day operations, bombing, long
range alms and efforts, battle conditions, troop strength, and expan
sion of the war.

Reporters also asked about social and political develop

ments In Vietnam, as well as American eoonomia and other aid for the
region.

Other participants in the war, such as the Rational Liberation

Front, neighboring countries, and allies of the United States received
attention.

Prospects of and attempts st peaoe were also topics.

Critics

of the war, at home and elsewhere, provided the basis for many press
conference questions on Vietnam.
The first public statement by President Johnson on Vietnam was proba
bly made in his first news conference.

At the time, Johnson had requested

that McNamara go to Vietnam to "look over the situation out there" for him.
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In that December

7,

1963* Mating, on* question was asked about John

son's purpose In sending the Seoretazy.

The toplo did not appear again

in a press oonferenoe until Johnson's sixth M e t i n g with reporters,
February 1, 1964.

During that oonferenoe Johnson was asked questions

about the future of A M r l o a n involvement In Vietnam, about de Gaulle's
ideas on neutralisation of the country, and about Johnson's own atti
tudes regarding the best possible solution.

The next two oonferences

were televised and drew a dosen questions on Vietnan.

For example, on

February 29* a reporter asked whether the w a r would esoalate and,
". . . are we losing there?"

A question on the possibility of inter

vention by "Communist China" and the Soviet Union also appeared, as did
a question on Laos.

Another reporter asked about Johnson's previous

statements regarding a searoh for peaoe in Southeast Asia.

A week

later, on Maroh 7« questions pertained to the safety of non-military
personnel of the United States in Vietnam, to Republioan orltlclsm of
Johnson's handling of the problem, to secret oammunioatlons with de Gaulle
on Vietnam, and to the feasibility of withdrawing U.S. forces to allow
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to take over military activity on a
gradual basis.

These questions, taken from the first eight of Johnson's

one hundred and thirty-five offioial news conferences, set the tone for
most of the questions to be asked throughout his administration.
However, after the March 7 oonferenoe, reporters seldom asked more
than one question in a oonferenoe on Vietnam until conferences in late
July and early August.

On August 4, 1964, L.B.J. addressed the nation

on the Gulf of Tonkin hostilities.

August 5 brought a "Speolal Message

to Congress" whloh resulted in the August 7 resolution.

Half of the

press oonferenoe questions the day following that resolution were on
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•▼ants related to the Tonkin battles and the congressional resolution.
After the August 7 oonferenoe. Interest In the matter waned In press
conference questions.

Moreover, as the presidential campaign increased

in public attention reporters only occasionally queried the President
on Vietnam.
Early in 1965 renewed Interest in American involvement in Southeast
Asia led to more frequent questioning on various, related topics.

A

televised meeting with reporters on February U evoked a number of such
queries.

The first of these was for a general review of the situation.

Another reporter probed the chances of a settlement resulting from
secret talks in Paris.

One correspondent posed a question about the

views of Albert Gore and Prank Church on solving the conflict.

Other

questions were on Johnson's attitudes toward the reasons for U.S.
Involvement in Vietnam, hinting at what was to be called the "domino
theory" as a justification for oontlnued American activity.

A final

question on the topic had to do with United States attitudes tcward
the current political and governmental structure In South Vietnam.
An eighty-minute conference on June

17, 19&5. brought up Senator Joseph

Clark's statement on negotiating with the Viet Cong, about secret
negotiations with Hanoi, about a proposal for negotiation made

by Bri

tish Commonwealth Prime Ministers, about the general "chances for
improving International relations" because of American involvement in
Vietnam (and in the Dominican Republie), and about the need for Johnson
to request another Congressional resolution of support for his policies.
Later in the year, several press conferences were dominated b y questions
on Vietnam.

Among those questions were topics related to increased

troops and overall "escalation," various peace proposals, the effects
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of the war on tho economy of the United States, bombing of "missile
sites" In North Vietnam, efforts of allies of the United States, presi
dential war powers. United Nations attempts to deal with the problem,
Soviet support for the "enemy," and continuing negotiations.
Throughout the next two years reporters maintained constant ques
tioning on Vietnam.

During these years questions Increasingly reflected

criticisms of Johnson's goals, policies, and actions In Southeast Asia,
Also, the specific subject matter of many of the questions asked in pre
vious years came up again and again.

For example, on December 6, 1966,

Johnson held a joint press conference with Secretary MoNamara.
meeting, reporters asked twelve questions on Vietnam.

In that

In 1967, on

July 13, in a conference attended by Johnson, MoNamara, and General
Westmoreland, reporters asked all of their questions on Vietnam.

Other

press conferences In 1966 and 1967 reflected great Interest In the topic.
For example. In a televised meeting on November 17. 1967. correspondents
wanted to know about troop levels, public critics of the war, bonfclng
In North Vietnam, the Vletcong's attitudes toward negotiation, Johnson's
"present assessment of our progress and prospects," attitudes of North
Vietnamese leaders on American public opinion on the war, "confusion,
frustration, and difference of opinion" in the United States, and draft
evaders.
Most of the same questions oame up again during L.B.J.'s last year
as president.

During this year much of the questioning was sparked by

Johnson's final efforts to arrange formal negotiations with the leader
ship of North Vietnam.

Questions on the Paris peaoe discussions and

the handling of the efforts during the transition to the Nixon adminis
tration led to several questions in press conferences that year.

For
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•xaiplc, In the November 15, 1968, conference, rtportsrs asked about
the role of the coning executive leadership In foreign policy decisions
related to Vletnan.

They also asked about progress In getting South

Vietnamese participation in the Paris peace talks.

One question In

Johnson's last presidential press conference was “Mr. President, are
you sorry that more countries did not take a nore active part in the
effort to help South Vietnam?1*
It Is clear that Johnson's news conferences afforded many and varied
queries on the Issues surrounding this country's continued engagement in
the affairs of Southeast Asia.

The problem stimulated questions on

general goals; the causes of the war; military activity; social, economic,
and political problems faced by the participants in the conflict; effeots
of the war In the United States and elsewhere; and various proposals and
attempts to settle what may be the longest major war in American history.
It Is essential to note again that no other press oonferenoe topic
brought about such frequent and persistent questioning as did the subject
of Vietnam.
Other matters of International concern evolved.

Whereas an

average press conference would have four questions on Vietnam, It would
also have two questions on other foreign relations.

Over the years

these questions tended to anticipate and follow International develop
ments, as was the oase with other domestio affairs.

Further, no signifi

cant yearly trends appeared In the proportionate amount of questioning
on other foreign affairs, except for Johnson's first year in office in
which sueh items as the Panamanian crisis were Important.

It may be

Interesting to note that 1966, the year In whioh Johnson held the most
press conferences (forty-one), and in whioh more questions were asked

12**

than In any othar year, was tha jaar In whioh tha percentage of questlons on "other" foreign affair* waa lowaat.
Among tha topica of queatlona on othar foreign affair* ware Ameri
can relations with the U.S.S.R., Panama and tha Canal Zona, the Dominican
Republic, Cuba, and Germany.

Reporters also asked about India, problems

in the Middle East, other Latin American affairs and the Organisation of
American States, various European countries, Greece and Cyprus, Afrioa
and problems in the Congo, China, and the "Pueblo affair."

Examples of

press conference questions from various years are presented below.
In L.B.J.'s first year, one of tha most common subject matters
among questions on other foreign relations was the Soviet Union.

On

December 18, 1963. for example, a reporter asked the President about
the best way for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to improve their
relationships.

Other Issues emerged during tha 1963-6** period.

For

example, in Johnson*s January 25, 196**, meeting with the press corps,
a question on Soviet Union criticism of American violations of a "pledge
for nondissemination of Nuclear weapons" came up.

Another question in

that oonferenoe was, "What do you think about tha French Intention to
recognise Rad China?"

Reporters also asked about attempts to solve the

oonfliot in Panama, about British bus sales to Cuba, and about a recent
trip to Malaysia by the Attorney General,

Later in 196**, the Cuban situa

tion, the Panamanian crisis, trade with the U.S.S.R., Sino-Soviet relations,
Russian-German relations, American intervention in the Congo, and John
son* s oonmnioations with de Gaulle ware toplos of questions.
In 1965 White Rouse correspondents inquired about such natters as
the plan for a "multilateral force" in Europe, arrangements for a visit
to the United States by Russian officials, Amsrioan involvement in the
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Donlnioan Republio, efforts of the Organisation of Amerloan States, the
United Nations and difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia.
Although 1966 had fewer questions, proportionately speaking, the
variety of questions asked Is useful to note.

1966 brought up press

oonferenoe questions on toplos carried over from previous years and on
sone new problems In foreign dlploaacy.

Included In the queries that

year were American aid to India, renewed hostilities In the Dominican
Republic, United States foreign policy In general, and admission of
China to the United Nations.

Problems among North Atlantic Treaty Organi

sation participants. Including France's withdrawal of support, stimulated
several questions.

Difficulties between India and Pakistan were men

tioned, as well as the possibility of trade with China, American coopera
tion with the U.S.S.R., United States troops In Europe and the situation
in West Germany, plans for a Latin American "summit oonferenoe," and
"prospects for a treaty on outer space."

In November of 1966, North

Korean attaoks on an American patrol emerged In questioning for the first
time.

The president's trip to the Far East, and a forthcoming trip to

Europe, and tension in the Middle East also came up.

China's testing of

nuclear explosions was a topic In the December 31 press oonferenoe in
quiries.
In 1967 the two major topics of press conference questions were the
U.S.S.R. and the war in the Middle East.

In the spring of that year

correspondents Inquired about developments on a t t e s t s b y the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. toward a nonproliferation treaty.

No offiolal press con

ferences were held during the June, 1967. meetings between Soviet Premier
Kosygin and Johnson.

However, progress In other "Disarmament Conference"

meetings was a frequent issue.

In the summer and fall of 1967, war In
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the Middle East and suoh erenta ae the d o s i n g of the Sues Canal, Egypt's
severing diplomatic relations with the United States, and American aid
to Israel sparked a number of questions.

Among other toplos were United

States' relations with Czechoslovakia, new ideas on "world Communism"
by the Senate foreign Relations Committee, the possibility of another
"world war," American relations with China, and German Chancellor Kissin
ger's visit to this country.
Johnson's final year in the White House revealed few questions on
other foreign affairs.

The "Pueblo incident" and aotivlties of the Soviet

Union predominated in the questioning during 1968-69*
In January of 1968 the U.S.S. "Pueblo" was taken by North Korean
vessels and the Pueblo's crew was held captive through most of the year.
These events stimulated several press oonferenoe questions,

for exaaqjle,

on September 6, a reporter asked, "Mr. president, do we have ary informa
tion that would lead us to believe that the Pueblo will be released this
Sunday, or shortlyt"

Similar questions had been asked sinoe February,

and oontinued to be asked in the fall of 1968.
A second area of Interest during the year had to do with various
affairs of the Soviet Union relating to Berlin, to Czechoslovakia, and
to other Eastern European nations.

For example, in the June 26 oonferenoe,

one question was, "Mr. President, what do you think are the reasons for
the intensified Communist pressure on West Berlin at this time?" In the
September 6, oonferenoe, a reporter asked if Johnson was thinking about
providing "asylum for Czechoslovakian refugees." Also in that and other
oonferences were questions on the "Disarmament talks" and Senate action
on the "nonproliferation treaty."
The Middle East situation came up in press conferences in March
and October of 1968,

For exaqple, on October

2kt

a reporter asked, "Mr.
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President, are we having any diplomatlo oonaultatlona with tha Soviet
Union with roapoot to rising tensions In the Middle East?”
A view of the questions asked in Johnson's presidential press con
ferences showed that more questions on foreign affairs were asked than
on any other area related to the presidency.

Further, issues surrounding

the war in Vietnam emerged in questioning more so than any other single
aspect.
noted.

Questions on Vietnam covered a gamut of ideas and events, as was
Finally, other matters of United States Involvement In other

countries led to inquiry In the oonferenoes.

Questions on other foreign

affairs tended to cluster around current affairs and, occasionally, dealt
with foreign policy in general.

Miscellaneous Topics
Topics of a miscellaneous kind accounted for less than ten per cent
of the questions.

In other words, about one question in an average oon

ferenoe would be of this nature.

No significant trend was noted over the

years regarding the proportionate amount of inquiry classified as "mis
cellaneous” in nature.
The most Important topic area here included political matters which,
seemingly, were not essentially related to Johnson's personal interests.
Other miscellaneous questions pertained to suoh natters as immediate press
oonferenoe procedures and arrangements and the whereabouts and activities
of various persons formerly associated with the White House.

Statements

which reporters sometimes made to the president, although not questions,
fell here.
Correspondents sought L.B.J.'s reactions to current political events
In a number of news conferences.

Usually, these matters had an indirect

bearing upon the Presidency or on Johnson's political career, ostensibly.
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but ware, hcwever, of sone In tore at nationally or locally.

For example,

In a press oonferonoo on July 10. 19#*, a roportor askod for L.B.J.'s
comments on a statement made by Robert Kennedy concerning R.F.K. »s ohanoes
of being nominated for the Vice Presidency.

In the save year Johnson was

asked to consent on other political matters related to various campaigns
and elections.

Another election year, 1966, brought up some politically

oriented questions.

For example, on August 2**, Johnson was asked about

the prospects of the re-election of "those five freshmen Democrats you
got from Iowa."

On November 4 of that year Johnson was asked to speak

to the fact that, "Last week. Senator Barry Goldwater predicted that
Ronald Reagan would win the Governor's seat in California by either a
minor or a major landslide."

Two days later, another question put to

Johnson before the election was, "Could you give us your judgment on how
big a factor the backlash Is in the ca^paignT”
The 1968 elections provided other examples, but one instance should
suffioe here.

On October 24, L.B.J. was queried about the congressional

races, about the "law and order” Issue, and about Humphrey's desire to
debate Nixon and Wallace.
Other "miscellaneous" questions were procedural.

From time to

time reporters would ask whether Johnson's comments were "on the record,”
especially during his first year In the White House when he tended to go
"off the record" in official conferences.

Other questions might ask if

a particular statement was available in a White House release (or printed
In sosie form) at the time.
sosMtimes asked, as well.

Questions for technical clarification were
For example, reporters would sometimes ask the

spelling or pronunciation of names, especially w hen Johnson had announced
a new appointment of some kind.
peat a statistic, also.

Reporters sometimes asked L.B.J. to re
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Once in a while, reporters made requests and othar statements to
the President in press conferences.

These were rare and usually brief

points made to clarify a question Just asked, for example when Johnson
seemed not to understand the meaning of a question.

It was not at all

common for a correspondent to use the press oonferenoe directly to con
front the president on a matter.

But Johnson's televised conference of

July 20, 1966, revealed an example of that, when Richard Wightaan, of
the Fairchild publications chain, complained to the President and the
nation that "The White Rouse has withdrawn our press credentials to cover
the wedding" of Johnson's daughter.

The reporter went on to ask, "Don't

you think in light of this that it rather goes against your own philoso
phy of press freedom?"
Thus, the fourth and last question category, on miscellaneous
matters, contained Inquiries on current political events, and on tech
nical and procedural details of special Interest to reporters.

In sunaaiy of this section on the content of Johnson's press con
ferences, as generated by reporters questions, the following statements
may be made.
The first major topic area was the presidency, including official
activities and Johnson's private affairs.
over a fourth of the questions asked.

The presidency accounted for

Reporters questioned the Presi

dent on a variety of administrative alas, plans, and activities.

Repor

ters also asked about unofficial matters, especially Johnson's political
fortunes.
Domestic affairs accounted for many questions.

The national eoonosQr,

including employment, taxation, and governmental finance came up in cor
respondent's queries.

Congressional activities and domestic legislation
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provided many questions.

Among other lnterael matters were olvll rights,

public violence end riots, lebor relations, and natural disasters.
The third, and most popular area of questioning was foreign affairs.
Questions on Vietnam emerged more and more often as the war progressed
and as hopes for peace increased.

Questions on other international mat

ters treated specific events, chiefly.

United States activities In panama,

the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Europe were discussed.

Reporters

also questioned the affairs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
the United Nations, and activities of world powers suoh as the U.S.S.R.,
China, and Prance.

Situations like the Pueblo incident and continued

hostilities In the Middle East brought about many questions.
Fourth, soon miscellaneous Issues evoked questions from time to time.
Included here were questions on partisan political matters and teohnloal
and procedural items of Interest mainly to the press.
Finally, a profile of an average Johnson news oonferenoe would
reveal at least four questions on the presidency, five questions on domes
tic affairs, six questions on foreign affairs (including four on Vietnam),
and at least one question of a miscellaneous nature.
The next chapter explores some of the rhetorical aspeots of the
two determinants of the press conferences' content, the voluntaries and
the questions.

CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION OF JOHNSON'S PRESS CONFERENCES:
VOLUNTARIES AND QUESTIONS

The aim of this chapter Is to present an evaluation of President
Johnson's use of opening statements and announcements and the ques
tions asked in the press conferences.
Briefly, the plan of this chapter is as follows.

First, the

voluntaries are described in terms of Johnson's purposes in using
them, his methods of development, and his effectiveness with the
device.

Second, the questions are treated according to the corres

pondents' purposes, the characteristics of their questions, and the
effectiveness of the questions.

Johnson's Opening Statements
What Johnson wanted to achieve with his press conference
voluntaries, the techniques he used in developing the voluntaries,
and his effectiveness in employing voluntaries provide bases for
the evaluation presented in the first section of this chapter.

Purposes of the Voluntaries
Johnson's apparent aims in using the voluntary in a press con
ference were not unlike the general goals of the press conference
Itself, described in Chapter I, and Johnson's own press conference
goals, mentioned in Chapter II.

Historically speaking, the general

goals of any president using this particular method of communication

131

132

have been to Inform, to persuade, and to receive feedback.
Johnson's goals were pragmatic, purposive.

Moreover,

Johnson wanted to Influence

public opinion with Information and persuasion In his news conferences.
The general press conference goals, of disseminating Information
and persuading, fall to explain adequately why Johnson used volun
taries so extensively in his conferences.

More specifically, Johnson's

purposes were (1) to inform, (2) to publicise, (3) to promote, (4) to
defend, (5) to enhance his ethos, and (6) to control the press confer
ence Itself.

While Johnson may have used a particular announcement

or statement for more than one purpose In a given press conference.
It Is worth considering those purposes separately at this point.
To Inform. President Johnson not only used his announcement time
to present new information, but to clarify other and previous communi
cations with the press or the public.

Examples of Johnson's presenta

tion of new Information appear In quite a few conferences.

In such

conferences Johnson might announce a new presidential action, as he
did when he told of certain appointments and nominations.

Johnson

also used a few press conferences to explain other communications
which were given with other formats.

For example, before or at the

same time as the White House released a "Special Message to Congress,"
Johnson might use a voluntary to explain aspects of the "Message."
He did this on the day that an economic proposal was sent to Congress,
In his August 3, 1967, news conference.*

In that situation the

*A11 references to Johnson's press conferences are to the tran
scripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States; Lyndon B.Johnson. 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965-1970)7
Citations to other materials, such as speeches and press releases,
refer to the same source. Direct quotations from the transcripts, un
less elllptlcally quoted, are verbatim with the following exceptions.
Footnote numbers and footnotes in the texts are deleted. Also omitted
are headings and bracketed numbers, e.g.
J, which appear in order to
show changes In topics within a given conference.
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President wanted reporters to understand various phases of his pro
grams and he used half the press conference to talk about the proposals.
A similar aim of a few voluntaries was to clarify infonnatlon presented
at some time before a particular conference.

For Instance, the Panama

and Canal Zone hostilities led to official statements from the White
House on January 10, lh, and 16, 19#*.

On January 23, Johnson met with

reporters and summarized events and statements on the subject.

In the

main, Johnson's press conference voluntaries revealed that attempts
to explain were more common before or at the time of any Presidential
communication than afterwards.

Nevertheless, an important goal of many

of the voluntaries was to Inform reporters of Johnson's actions and
decisions.
To Publicise. President Johnson used the voluntary to get imme
diate attention and interest for specific Items related to his adminis
tration.

Johnson sought publicity for new developments.

He also used

voluntaries to maintain interest in and bring attention to previously
announced matters.

As was seen In the analysis of the content of

the voluntaries, the President was more likely to announce his deci
sions and other executive affairs than any other topics.

Further, the

announcement of staff changes was by far the most frequently used kind
of opening statement.

These announcements gained publicity for the

President as well as for the particular persons being nominated, ap
pointed, or relieved of service.
Johnson also used the press conference situation to build publi
city over a period of time.

"The Voting Rights Act of 1965" provides

an Interesting illustration.

First, here Is some background Informa

tion.

In Johnson's first "State of the Union Address," he argued

the need to provide legislation for "Increased opportunities" In,
among other areas, housing, employment, and voting.

The topic was

revived In campaign speaking during the summer of 196*1.

For example,

on June 17 Johnson told the Communication Workers of America, "We
have a program to give every American dtlsen an equal chance to hold
a Job, to vote . . . whatever his color or race."

Two days later

Johnson got Senate passage of his 196*4 "Civil Rights Bill."

On accept

ing the Democratic nomination In August, Johnson again mentioned the
voting Issue, but in a minor way, as he had In his "State of the Union.
In December of 196*4-, Johnson told the National Urban League that he
was anxious to deal with the problem.
The hints of 196*4 were asserted more overtly in 1965 *s Johnson
accelerated his efforts toward action on voting rights.

The "equal

opportunity" idea came up in the January *4, 1965, "State of the Union
Address," with brief mention of voting rights as a specific Issue.
The voter registration drive in Alabama, and Its consequences, spurred
Johnson to announce In his February *4 news conference that the 196*4
"Civil Rights Bill" would be used to find a legal solution.

On

March 9, Johnson released a statement that a special act was In prepa
ration.

Four days later, in his televised news conference, Johnson

spent close to half of the conference discussing the difficulties In
Alabama and his Intention to submit a bill to Congress.

On Monday,

March 15. Johnson addressed the Congress, Introducing the "Voting
Rights Bill."

In the next few days further aggravation In Alabama

brought about a confrontation between Governor George Wallace and
the President.

On March 18, Johnson read to White House correspon

dents a telegram from Wallace to the President.

Johnson followed the
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reading with a statement of his own.

On March 20. the President met

reporters at the L.B.J. Ranch for a news conference and once again
publicised a stimulus for requesting the voting rights measure.
Johnson did not Initiate press conference discussion on the bill
Itself as It proceeded through congress, although reporters did ask
the President for his reaction to the progress of the bill during
those four months.

On August 6, Johnson signed the act.

In his tele

vised press conference of August 25, he made a lengthy opening state
ment to publicise the successful application and enforcement of the
act In Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
To Promote. President Johnson wanted more than mere public
attention and interest or publicity; he wanted favorable public opinion.
In his quest for support from the press and from the people, Johnson
frequently made statements in press conferences to promote the goals,
plans, and successes of his administration.

While It was more usual

for him to speak on attainments of his efforts, L.B.J. sometimes used
voluntaries to elicit favorable attitudes toward his goals and his
plans to accomplish those goals.

Although Johnson preferred not to

go directly to the public or the press to discuss legislation of im
portance to his programs, he sometimes used the press conference to
pave the way for the introduction of specific bills.

To cite an exam

ple, on February 4, 1965, he began a broadcast news conference by
explaining a new "Message to Congress," which became law as the "Food
and Agriculture Act of 1965." The February h statement included remarks
on the Importance of the American farmer, on the value of food, and
on the need to aid farmers and to protect "our unparalleled harvest of
plenty."

Johnson continued by outlining the basic proposals of the
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special message and by saying that speolfle proposals would be announced In "the weeks and months ahead."

Johnson tried to get favora

ble attention for his goals as well as his plans.
Perhaps the most significant promotional voluntary was that
which detailed the successes of the "Great Society."

The President

often, apparently, was pleased to begin a press conference with good
news.

Sometimes the good news was a specific accomplishment; on other

occasions, a general review of progress was presented.

A rather odd

Instance of demonstrating success was found in two press conferences
in 1964.

On February 29 Johnson told reporters that the "A-ll" Jet

airplane was being tested.

He described the development of the craft

as well as related, "important technical achievements."

On April 11

Johnson announced that, "The world record for aircraft speed, cur
rently held by the Soviets, has been repeatedly broken in secrecy by
the United States aircraft A-ll."

L.B.J. then gave further details

of the accomplishment.
Among the most frequent of Johnson's success stories were volun
taries on the economy.

Most of these messages appeared In the first

two years of L.B.J.'s tenure.

But as late as March 9, 1967, in con

junction with the announcement of a request to Congress "to restore
the Investment credit and the use of accelerated depreciation for
buildings," the President sought to show the nation, In a televised
news conference, that his actions of the previous year had worked.
In that conference Johnson presented a number of details and statis
tics to prove the efficacy of his economic programs.
Preempting prime time television was a favorite means of telling
the American people of particularly dramatic accomplishments In the
early years of the Johnson administration.

But press conferences.
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especially broadcast ones, also provided appropriate means from time
to time.

Perhaps one of Johnson's most Important public statements

was made at the May 3, 1968, conference, on Hanoi's agreement to
meet for peace negotiations In Paris.
To Defend. The fourth specific goal of some of Johnson's volun
taries was related to the promotional aim.

At times Johnson used the

press conference to defend his administration, especially when Johnson
felt the heat of criticism for various policies and actions.

Some

examples follow.
Not long after his first few months in the White House, criti
cism of Johnson's press policies and relations appeared in the news
media.

Johnson responded in more than one of his press voluntaries.

For instance, in the televised conference of March 20, 1965* he gave
a lengthy review of his policies.
appears in Chapter Two.)

(A quotation from that statement

On June 17 of that year Johnson began his

conference with a brief statement on his long voluntaries, which also
had come under attack, and promised to allow "20 minutes for question
ing."

That conference lasted eighty minutes and at least half of the

conference was taken up by Johnson's opening remarks.
Another, and quite possibly more essential, area of sensitivity
was Johnson's handling of the war in Southeast Asia.

As the U.S.

showed Increased military and economic commitment to Vietnam, more and
more critics spoke and acted against L.B.J.'s policies.

The criticism

did not escape Johnson's attention since he used a variety of forums,
including the press conference, to defend his goals, policies, and
actions.

Instances of Johnson's presentation of his reactions to

critics of the Vietnam war were more common In his first two years
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in office.

For example, In L.B.J.'s Maroh 20. 1965. conference he

stated that he had explained U.S. policy in Vietnam "U? times.”
Johnson repeated the policy statement once more in that voluntary.
Critical assertions by politicians, such as Barry Goldwater in

196 **, also brought an occasional press conference voluntary in defense
of Johnson's leadership.
To Enhance His Ethos.

President Johnson sought to use some of

his press conference remarks to demonstrate his own leadership abili
ties, Including such personal qualities as integrity, decisiveness,
forcefulness, sincerity, and sagacity.

Johnson also sought to help

the public image of various menfoers of his staff.

Johnson's general

promotion of his administration, described above as his third aim, can
also be seen as evidence of his desire to win positive public opinion
for the Presidency.
Johnson tried to establish rapport with reporters In his con
ferences.

At first, his eagerness to w i n over the White House press

included serving coffee to correspondents in an Informal setting in
Johnson's office.

Perhaps even the habit of surprising reporters by

holding impromptu conferences was designed to win their favor.

But

Johnson also used his voluntaries to show his concern for their needs.
It can be argued that Johnson was attempting this by providing useful
and sometimes dramatic Information in his conferences, especially In
the conferences which were not broadcast "live,” that he was trying to
demonstrate his awareness of and willingness to cooperate with media
representatives.
Johnson also tried to enhance the ethos of various individuals
associated with his administration.

When nominating or appointing
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someone for a particular post, It vas not unlike the President to
present the person In a favorable light, especially, but not only,
If the person was relatively unknown to the press and the public.
For example, on July 13. 1965, Johnson announced five nominations in
his news conference.

He talked In some detail about his nominee to

the post of Solicitor General, Thurgood Marshall, and about Mrs.
Penelope Thunberg,

The two were there and Johnson presented them to

reporters and to the nation.
Further, Johnson often prepared opening statements to heighten
the image of some of his current staff, including military leaders
and cabinet members.

This sort of aim was apparent in joint press

conferences with men like Robert McNamara and General William West*
moreland.

The same type of voluntary aim appeared in conferences

held after meetings with presidential advisers or with Important lea
ders.
In the case of some of his voluntaries on persons associated
with his presidential leadership, Johnson may have been attempting
to support his own image at the same time as he praised other persons.
The content of Johnson's voluntaries seems to reveal that the
President was indeed Interested In establishing, maintaining, and at
times regaining a favorable image, not only of the Presidency, but
of Johnson himself.

Because the president must serve in various capa

cities and because the person who is president sometimes looks beyond
his immediate term in office, it is not difficult to understand that
one aim of Johnson's voluntaries was to enhance his ethos.
To Control the Press Conference Itself. Presidents can regulate
their conferences by the frequency, timing, and length given to meetings

with reporters.

Presidents oen slso Influence the oonferenoe with

such factors as location, degree of formality, the president's mood
or tone, as well as other conditions.
those forces.

Johnson probably used all of

He also, probably more than any other president, tried

to shape his conferences by what he said at the beginning of the
meetings.

His Intent apparently was to control the content, length,

and direction, as well as the effects, of most of his conferences.
Several factors were considered In evaluating Johnson's alms In
the use of opening statements and remarks In his conferences.

Such

factor's included the "national interest," presidential authority and
roles, the Immediate and long range needs of the press conference
participants, the availability of other ways of meeting the partici
pant* needs, and, perhaps, the extent to which the participants shared
or conflicted In their expectations of the conference.
To fault Johnson for using the voluntary to Inform, publicize,
promote, defend, and enhance the ethos of his administration would
probably run counter to many accepted theories of democratic govern
ment In the United States.

Such criticism probably would also violate

most recognized philosophies of communication.
Moreover, in terms of Johnson's particular presidential leader
ship goals, the powers of his office, and related factors, Johnson's
alms, alone, seem worthy.
Another question related to evaluating a president's voluntaries
(and other aspects of his conferences) has to do with the use of volun
taries during election campaigns.

If the president were campaigning

for himself or for his party's candidates, or both, the critic could
assert the existence of a political or selfish motivation behind the

use of press conference voluntaries.
this viewpoint.

Various factors run counter to

First, when does a political "campaign" begln7

Barry

Goldwater was seeking his party's nomination probably even before John
son took office.

Goldwater entered primaries early In 19^ and cam

paigned until nominated.

Knowing that a president Is a candidate does

not necessarily begin with a formal announcement of candidacy.

Nor

does the president become a candidate only after accepting his party's
nomination.

Johnson avoided formal announcement of his own candidacy

as long as possible In 19&*.
Furthermore, when Johnson spoke during election years, it was not
always clear whether he was wearing his official hat or a campaign hat
with "Vote Democratic" on It.

For example, Johnson refuted criticisms

of his administration made by Republican presidential candidate, Barry
Goldwater, on the day of Goldwater's nomination.

If it was chiefly for

political gain that Johnson rebuffed Goldwater, then the critic might
question Johnson's .motives.

However, the Issue was a matter of na

tional security, at least In the mind of the President, and one could
Just as easily argue that Johnson was merely explaining presidential
policy in his rebuttal.

Other aspects of Johnson's press conference

voluntaries during political campaigns raised similar problems.

For

example, why did L.B.J. hold a news conference the day before his
nomination?

His only voluntary concerned an explanation for his

being late to the conference and a statement that In two hours' time
he planned to announce the nomination of his running mate.

In his

next conference, September 9. 196^, Johnson announced that a book on
his "philosophy of government and . . . views on the Issues" was to
be published.

(The profits were to "be turned over to charity.")

Pour days later, Johnson lntroduood a press conference with one of his
reviews of the successes of the domestic economy.

In that conference,

Johnson began, "Confidence In our eoonomlc prosperity has been growing
as indicators continue to point up. . .
One of the most widely repeated criticisms of Johnson* s press
conference aims resulted from a conflict of the desires of the two
Immediate participants, the President and the press.

Johnson's primary

alms conflicted, to some degree, with the main objective of reporters,
as was noted In Chapter TWo.

Again, however, the leadership roles of

the presidency, as Johnson saw them, probably justified pursuing his
own alms, even over those of the press, on some occasions.

Analysis

does show that Johnson's sixth aim, control of the press conference,
was Important in his use of voluntaries.

This aim may have denied

reporters the opportunity to fulfill their own desires at times.

There

fore, Johnson's sixth aim may have merited the criticisms it elicited.
The Institution of the press conference is "extra-legal," or "extra
constitutional," and therefore Is automatically under presidential
control.

However, it was not always necessary, nor was it always fair

to reporters, that Johnson had the control of his conferences as one
of his chief aims in using the voluntary.

This criticism will be

seen as more justified In the discussion of Johnson's methods of devel
opment.
A final evaluative question regarding Johnson's alms In the volun
tary Involves the question of a third and Indirect participant In the
press conference.

Surely, Johnson saw his alms as meeting the needs

of the "national interest."

The question Is, were the aims of promo

tion, defense, and ethos enhancement, as well as press conference con
trol, really so important to the needs of the country (let alone the
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world) as they Apparently were to the President? While there Is no
way of knowing, the answer would not be an unequivocal "yes."

The

public at large probably would not have applauded all of Johnson's
alns.

A stronger

basis for this speculation, once more, may be seen

In the discussion regarding Johnson's pursuit of his press conference
alms.
Summary. Six specific aims appear in Johnson's use of voluntaries
in his press conferences.

His prepared statements were given in order

to inform, to publicize, to promote, and to defend the administration.
Johnson attempted to enhance the ethos of the Presidency and of per
sons associated with his leadership.

Johnson also aimed at controlling

the press conference situation by using voluntaries.
voluntary might have more than one specific aim.

Further, a given

Johnson sometimes

would, for example, try to provide Information, get publicity, and
enhance his ethos with one specific announcement or statement.
Generally, then, the six alms of Johnson’s press conference
voluntaries warrant approval to the extent that they were generated
by the national interest.

More specifically, those aims which best

served all the participants were probably the most valuable.

When the

needs and desires of the conference participants conflicted, the press
complained, and some of those complaints may have been justifiable.
Methods of Development in the Voluntaries
How Johnson went about developing the Ideas presented in his
prepared remarks, to accomplish the responses he sought with the six
specific alms just described, receive attention here,

Johnson used

materials traditionally associated with exposition, amplification,
and persuasion.

Other significant techniques were employed.

They are

m
discussed In the next section, on Johnson's audience adaptation and
effectiveness.

Given the faot that some voluntaries were designed to

achieve one aim and other voluntaries more than one aim, supporting
materials have been analysed from the standpoint of the purposes.
For Informing. Some of the President's voluntaries appeared to
be primarily for passing along lnfomatlon, although almost anything
a president says In a press conference is likely to be publicized
and Interpreted by journalists and others.

Johnson’s attempts to

present and explain Information ranged from short announcements to
commentaries and documentaries.
Brief announcements occurred from time to time.

These statements

usually regarded minor activities and plans of the president and
passing contents on such matters as press conference procedures.

For

the most part, Johnson developed those announcements with statements
of fact, specific details, and little else.

For example, on Septem

ber 20, 196^, L.B.J. announced "three appointments for the Comsat
Board— Communications Satellite."

He volunteered the names and cur

rent jobs held by the three, but not much more.

Johnson continued

in that conference by outlining an itinerary for the next two weeks.
The list of stops on the trips was specific for the most part, but
general at times.

For Instance, compare, "On Friday morning I will be

In £1 Paso to meet with President Ldpez Mateos," with his plans for
the following Monday:

"I would like to go to Hartford, Conn., at noon,

and make stops in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont before returning
to Washington."

For most of the stops, however, he Included a brief

explanation of purpose, like this one:

"On Thursday, the 8th, I will

be in Cleveland, Ohio, for a Democratic dinner, and there make a
Democratic campaign speech."

The day after his "Johns Hopkins

1^5

Address" on Vietnam, L.B.J. Mentioned (1) receipt of s letter from U
Thant, (2) an assignment to an adviser, Eugene Black, (3) a meeting
with the Secretary of Commerce,

(k) a

visit by United Nations Ambassa

dor Adlai Stevenson, and (5) the presence and immediate plans of Black.
The only important details were of Black’s assignment, and these were
brief, although Black was questioned for a few minutes.
Short statements of fact, or brief details, proved to be the
exception rather than the rule when Johnson made Informational announce
ments.

Brief remarks occurred, usually, only when the President saw

no need for expanding the points or, on occasion, when further Informa
tion was (or was to be) provided In some other manner.
Longer opening statements for the purpose of explaining appeared.
Included were remarks Johnson sometimes offered In conjunction with
the Introduction of legislative proposals to Congress.

Budgetary

requests occasionally went hand In hand with didactic remarks to
reporters.

An illustration, from the January 17, 1967, conference,

demonstrates the type of materials frequently used with this type of
voluntary.

Although the meeting was shared with the Budget Director,

Charles Schultse, Johnson did much of the briefing himself.

The

President prefaced his description of the "Budget Message" by saying
that it was scheduled for submission to Congress the next week and
that another briefing would be arranged at that time.

Next, Johnson

gave some "background" Information related to changes from "last
year's authorisations and appropriations."

Included in the review

were a number of details, especially statistics.
the "Message" were developed topically.

Various aspects of

Johnson talked about general

figures, "obligations for roads," and mortgage purchases by Congress.

Ih6
He also compared end contrasted several figures with statistics from
previous years.

As Mr. Sohultse explained other Items of the requests,

Johnson put In an explanatory remark here and there.

The Interjected

remarks were to amplify and clarify what Schultse said.

Johnson

treated some Items briefly and others at length.
Late that year, on August 3# Johnson sent his "Tax Messagedto
congress.

At about noon that day L.B.J. met with correspondents in

the Fish Room of the White House and devoted over half of his con
ference to explain the request which Included the "surcharge" for
"the Vietnam problem."

The explanation was technical.

L.B.J. pre

sented, in economic terms, the reasons for the tax increase, the
projected results of the request, an explanation of how the tax would
be effected, and a review of the general budgetary situation at the
time.

In that conference, Johnson used a number of supporting

materials.

The press had been given copies of the tax request.

Johnson attempted to review and explain the request with specific
details, many statistics, comparisons and contrasts, specific exam
ples, and the use of a chalkboard.

Upon closing the lecture, the

President said, " . . . That is all I know about It.
any questions I can.
Fowler."

I will answer

Then, you will get better answers from Mr.

(Henry Fowler was Secretary of the Treasury.)

The two illustrations show that when Johnson wanted to Inform
reporters on technical matters In his press conferences, he was able
to elaborate in detail with materials he thought appropriate for
comprehension.
For Publicising and Promoting. Most of Johnson's voluntaries
went beyond the mere transfer of information.

More commonly his

prepared remarks were to get publicity, or attention and Interest,
In the news media.

Announcements for publicity differed slightly

from those for promotion in methods of development.

Statements

designed to get immediate attention for new aspects of Johnson's
administrative actions and voluntaries to reinforce, increase, or
maintain attention for known programs played a major role in the press
conferences.

The fact that Johnson made the announcement himself,

rather than issuing a written release or having an aide give out the
data, often meant Johnson was pursuing these alms.

Frequently the

President announced specific plans, decisions, and activities.

As

has been seen, he especially favored announcing staff changes.
Examples of promotional statements on the economy are noteworthy.
Johnson's joint press conferences often contained similarly designed
preliminary remarks.

He liked to publicise and promote other aspects

of presidential action, also.
Johnson's comments on the goals, successes, and programs of
his administration were not limited to one type of press conference
nor to one topic area.

Some of the best examples of Johnson's at

tempts appeared in voluntaries which in content resemble remarks
Johnson was prone to make in campaign speaking, in major addresses
on domestic affairs, and in the preemptive televised announcements
of the early part of his administration.
The general area of presidential decision making provides
examples.

Johnson often liked to talk about what he was doing and

thinking and this was reflected in several of his announcements.

For

instance, on June 1, 1965, In a televised question and answer ses
sion, he reviewed some of the activities of the United States in the

148

Dominican Republic.
since April 27.

This was his first official press conference

In the April conference Johnson had mentioned the

evacuation of American citizens, saying, " . . .
have already been taken aboard ships. . . . "

1,000 Americans

On April 28 the Presi

dent announced to the nation that "400 Marines" had just entered the
Dominican Republic.
for the intervention.
and again on May 2.

He also gave some brief data about the reasons
Other "preempts" cane two days later, April 28,
The next major public statement of his actions

appeared In Johnson's first voluntary, June 1.
tion of events, he said:

After a short explana

"I am therefore, accordingly, ordering the

immediate withdrawal of one battalion landing team of United States
Marines, plus headquarters and supporting personnel.

This will total

approximately 2,000 people."
In the June 1 conference, L.B.J. declared that he was sending a
request to Congress.

He was asking for money for the "economic and

social development of Southeast Asia."

(During April and May Johnson

had pushed a resolution through Congress for increased military spend
ing In Vietnam; the request then was for 700 million dollars.)
The development of Johnson's two major announcements in that
conference was typical of other announcements.

In the first, on the

Dominican Republic, Johnson began by reviewing, briefly, the situation:
a "serious" problem existed.

Next, Johnson praised the Organization

of American States for its actions.

Then he related that his advisors

had suggested the possibility of "further withdrawal," and that the
Secretary General of the O.A.S. as well as the American ambassador to
the Dominican Republic approved.
as quoted above.

Finally, L.B.J. announced his action,

1^9

The second major voluntaiy that day was on allocations of money
for Vietnam.

While the pattern was somewhat different, the develop

ment was similar.

Johnson started by stating what he wanted.

The

statement was general, and read, "This afternoon I am sending to the
Congress a very special message requesting an additional appropria
tion to help in the peaceful economic and social development of
Southeast Asia,

This is another forward step toward carrying out

my proposal for a massive effort to improve the life of man in that
conflict-torn corner of the world."
statements of justification.

Then followed a few more general

Next, the President talked about the

efforts of his advisor, Eugene Black, still in general terms.
recounted various aspects of his goals in the country.

L.B.J.

There followed

specific details, mostly statistics, regarding the social and economic
conditions of the country's people.

He said, for example, "The 16

million people of South Vlet-Nam survive on an average income of $100
per year. . . . "

He gave figures on literacy, medical conditions, and

"life expectancy."

He compared those conditions in Vietnam, statistical

ly, with life in the United States.

Johnson then compared the social

and economic "enemies" in Vietnam with "the aggressor" in the war (pre
sumably, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam). "These enemies, too, we are
committed to help defeat," Johnson said, about the internal problems.
He did not specifically talk much more about other "economic and social"
conditions.

Having presented the problem, Johnson led into some de

tails about the spending of the funds he requested.

The money was to

go for "water and power resources," for "clinics and doctors," and for
"materials for their homes and their factories."

He commented that

support from the American Medical Association to "recruit surgeons and
specialists, approximately 50 of them," had been achieved already.
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Johnson concluded the voluntary, saying, "Now this Is just a part of
the beginning.

This appropriation today calls for only $89 million,

but In the future I will call upon our people to make further sacri
fices because this Is a good program, and the starts that we are making
are good starts.

This Is the only way that I know In which we can

really win not only the military battle against aggression, but the
wider war for the freedom and for progress of all men."
These and other voluntaries show that Johnson used a variety of
supporting materials to develop his publicity and promotional announce
ments.

He used specific details and statistics.

statements and statements of opinion.

He cited factual

He included the opinions of

advisors to the President and his own assertions.

He also made refer

ence to other authorities, comparisons, or analogies, and contrasts.
Johnson reviewed situations with brief narrations of events leading
to decisions and actions.

Explanations sometimes used description,

also.
The devices for development varied to suit the topics and the
amount of time allowed for any one voluntaxy.

The chief determinant

of development, of course, was probably the President's attitude at
the time a voluntary was prepared.
For Defending. Johnson's fourth kind of voluntary, In terms of
his alms, was that which he used to defend his goals, plans, and
actions.

Statements of this nature were similar to the promotional

ones, but were more akin to refutation In tone and development.

That

Is, on occasion, Johnson responded to criticisms of his efforts, again
with a variety of materials.
For the most part, the President defended his policies when the
critical stimulus was directed toward Johnson in particular.

The
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development of his defensive voluntaries was usually indirect in
approach.

That is, he did not often attack specific sources of

criticism or irritation.

Johnson was frequently criticised by poli

ticians, reporters, and others.

Criticism of his press relations,

for example, on such matters as "overexposure" of the President, led
to the long defense of his press policies in the March 20, 19&5
meeting with reporters.

L.B.J. responded directly to some of Gold-

water's assertions in a press conference voluntary on August 15, 196**.
Examples follow to demonstrate Johnson's development of the
defensive statements he initiated.
On June 18 of 1966 Johnson addressed the press, in front of film
cameras.

He articulated a rather long statement defending U.S. acti

vities in Vietnam.

A brief narrative covering "the past few weeks"

of fighting and of Johnson's observations of the situation led to
the assertion that "the national Interest requires that we persist
in our present policy . . . to bring to bear the ground, naval, and
air strength required to achieve our objective."

Next, he justified

not giving further details on possible future American involvement.
He said that "national interest" meant not revealing such information
"to those conducting aggression."
this country's goals.

He continued with a restatement of

This negation appeared:

"We are not fighting

to remain in South Vietnam, not to hold bases there, not to control
the affairs of that people."
a positive way.

Again, he summarised the objectives in

Johnson said, "What are our prospects?"

He answered

his question with statements directed toward the nation, and the world,
mentioning "political differences" of opinion.

Johnson reaffirmed

his general policy saying, "our course is resolute . . . our conviction
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is firm" in "doing what is necessary in the Nation's Interest and the
cause of freedom."

He asserted that the South Vietnamese were also

Just as "determined to fight" and to succeed with domestic improve
ments.

Then Johnson cited and compared mortality figures which showed

heavier casualties for the "aggressor."

Johnson claimed success for

the bombing program and briefly justified increased "air strength."
More comments on political and economic achievements in South Vietnam
were given, with a reference to Johnson’s special assistants for those
affairs, William Porter and Robert Komer.

Johnson advised that "steps

. . . to control inflation" in Vietnam would be announced later in the
day.

Johnson then turned to the theme of national support in the United

States, saying that the majority of the people were beh?nd his policies.
He supported the assertion of public backing by referring to recent
primary elections in the United States.

He implied that congressional

candidates would probably not be successful if they took a stand
against his war policies.

Johnson concluded with an appeal for "an

honorable peace at the earliest possible moment."

The appeal was

developed with a number of statements to demonstrate South Vietnam's
desire for peace, quoting parts of "The Declaration of Honolulu" (of
February 8, 1966). Johnson appealed for a revised analysis of the
problem and expressed his belief that "the wave of the future" was
away from "aggression."
The voluntary on Vietnam shows a development similar to other
statements of the President's defense of his Vietnam programs.

The

supporting materials were not organised or worded in the style of
direct refutation common to academic debate.

Although the purpose

of the voluntary was to defend a policy position which had been argued
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publicly In the United States, Johnson referred only obliquely to his
critics and to their counter proposals in this particular instance.
The basic themes were reaffirmation of (1) the value of present policy,
(2) progress toward success, and (3) hope.
The specific supporting materials were those often found in state
ments to amplify.

Johnson constantly repeated "our objectives," as

he had in other talks and official statements on Vietnam.
restated and summarised his beliefs.

He frequently

He also argued from authority

by quoting himself, quoting a passage from the Honolulu statement, and
referring to the opinions of "those who have not shared our views" as
against the reports of his advisors.

In the conclusion he used epi

grammatic statements ("There is honor for all in making peace.

Let

the killing stop."), allusive references to success in other countries
("Look at the new resolve in Indonesia. . . ."), and rhetorical
questions (on the future: "is it aggression?"). Other supporting
materials Included comparison and contrast, statistics, factual
details, and examples.

But in the main Johnson employed general

assertions of belief, most of which were merely restatements.
Later in 1966, as the Eighty-ninth Congress was coming to a close,
Johnson's activities included a televised press conference on the
afternoon of October 13.

The President began the meeting with Justi

fication for a trip to Southeast Asia and to the "Manila Conference."
This first voluntary was long.

Johnson alluded to the possible help

fulness of his trek to Australia and New Zealand, saying that he had
been there before as a representative of President Franklin Roosevelt.
Johnson then defended the need for going on to Asia.
description of the needs of Aslan countries.

He gave a general

He mentioned progress In
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the aree.

Referring to various facets of that progress, he said, "I

want to see for myself

as

much of their achievement as Is possible

for me to see in the limited time that we have allotted."

Next, he

afforded that it was "a good time for the Manila Conference," because,
after the Honolulu meeting, agreement was reached for a later one.
Then Johnson praised efforts of "The Government of Vietnam" in improv
ing economic and political conditions.

He casually referred to pre

vious doubts of his critics that "a free election" could be held.

He

did this to demonstrate the fulfillment of one of his aims which had
run counter to the predictions of some.

Johnson went into a compari

son of voter turnout in off-year elections in the United States and
the South Vietnamese election to show, again, the election's success.
Further, Johnson described efforts and achievements In "education,
health, agriculture, and . . . security. . . . "

Johnson mentioned

"defections from the enemy forces" and proceeded to discuss peace
efforts on his part.

Johnson blamed the "enemy" for refusing to

negotiate and said he wished "those who make very special pleas for
peace would" take their pleas

to "those two governments" (not speci

fied) instead of to him, because he already wanted peace.

Another

defense of Johnson's trip were the "pleas" of the leadership of South
Korea, of the Philippines, and of Thailand" to come and meet with
them."

Furthermore, Johnson asserted that he did not want to leave

while the current Congress was In session but that his going to New
Zealand and Australia later in the month might interfere with elections
in those two countries.

He concluded the Justification for the timing

of his trip by saying, "I have been criticised some for accepting.
only wonder what would have been said about me if I had said no, 1

I
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refuse to come and talk to our allies about our problems or our
program."
As might be seen, this Illustration refloots supporting materials
similar to those used in the June 18, 1966. voluntary.

Although the

arguments varied somewhat, the same devices for defense appeared.
Further, criticism seems to have motivated the voluntary.

But speci

fic critics were not mentioned by name nor were specific counter pro
posals to Johnson's policies specifically considered.
Thus, indirect rebuttal prevailed in both illustrations of volun
taries for defense.

This subtle approach appears to be characteristic

of many of Johnson's press conference voluntaries designed to reply
to criticism of his leadership.
For Enhancing an Image. The ways in which L.B.J. developed
announcements and opening statements for ethos enhancement are nota
ble.

The objects of his persuasion included the press, public opinion

at home, and world opinion.

"Target groups" depended upon the speci

fic occasion and other factors such as the topic of the voluntary.
As noted before, Johnson wanted to develop and demonstrate many aspects
of his image, including his general leadership capabilities.
Early in his administration the President sought to win rapport
with reporters.

While his press relations waned during various periods

of his presidency, many of Johnson's opening statements appeared to be
basically for the purpose of winning over reporters' attitudes toward
his person, as well as toward his administration of the Office.

Fur

ther, the use of the voluntary to gain rapport with this audience was
attempted with many devices. Including the news value of his remarks
and factors of timing, length, and frequency.

How the content of his
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opening remarks, In terms of exposition, amplification, and persua
sion, was effected, merits observation.
Johnson almost always made some verbalised reference to the report
ers and other media representatives as he opened the conference.
times he would go beyond a greeting.

Some

He used humor, references to

reporters' facilities or accommodations, procedural announcements to
aid in their work, references to their needs and interest, compliments,
and invitations to go for a walk with him.

Even in his press confer

ence statements on his press relations, the President was usually
careful to word his remarks so as not to offend his immediate audi
ence, especially the "regulars" of the White House press corps.

John

son occasionally referred to particular news stories or news agencies.
Once in a while he would illustrate a point by using a hypothetical
example involving a specific correspondent.

Johnson wanted to make it

known to reporters that he was interested in their work, that he could
speak their language, and that he followed their activities.
Johnson opened a conference in his White House office on April IS,
196^, with a statement to correct "a very inaccurate account" of his
foreign policy address for April 20.

Johnson showed his awareness of

press activities and stated the correction as if to protect reporters
from "second-or-third-hand1information, as well as to protect his own
interests.
In the May 6, 19<&, South Lawn press conference the President's
last voluntary went as follows:

". . . 1 have today accepted lifetime

membership in the Vanderburgh Humane Society of Evansville, Ind."
Newspapers and magazines had published pictures and articles on John
son's treatment of his pet dogs.
for humor.

The voluntary may have been added
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On August IS of the sens year Johnson offered a detailed list of
his

plans for the day and for the

next few days.He told reporters

that he was doing this for their benefit.

He said he had thought

of it earlier in the day and that Press Secretary George Reedy had
agreed that "The suggestion that I made to him earlier might be help
ful, if I carried it out."

Once more, Johnson wanted to show his

good will toward reporters by providing "information, guidance, and
background."
Johnson's final voluntary on April 27, 19^5* was a tribute to
Edward R. Murrow, who had died.

Johnson praised Murrow before re

porters, subscribing to the letter's ideals as a "newsman and as a
public official."

Johnson told reporters and the viewing public,

"We have all lost a friend."
Johnson also
large in the U.S.

sought to build

his ethos withthe

and elsewhere. An analysis of

public at

his public state

ments as a whole would probably reveal this aim in much the same way
that the present study shows attempts to achieve image enhancement
in the voluntaries.

Moreover, just as Johnson attempted to demon

strate his leadership in the televised preempts, he made forceful
and dramatic statements in many of his press conferences' opening
remarks.

Some selected examples show a few of the types of materials

L.B.J. used.
President Johnson seemed to show his decisiveness with announce
ments of appointees to executive positions in government.

When John

son gave specific details of a particular person's credentials and
other background information, he seemed to be saying to the public that
he had made the decision on the basis of careful thought and that by
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having such a person in government his administration would be more
effective.

He wanted to show, further, that those he selected were

among the best possible to choose from.

Two relatively minor appoint

ments announced in the April 1ft, 1964, conference illustrate his
development.

Johnson appointed Eugene Patterson to membership in

the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

Johnson said that the member being

replaced was a past president of the American Bar Association "and
Dean of Southern Methodist University Law School in Dallas," to show
the Importance of the position.

Johnson then talked of Patterson's

background, giving details such as his present position ("editor of
the Atlanta Constitution"). where and when Patterson was born, and
the man's academic work.

L.B.J. described Patterson's "extensive

newspaper career," his military achievements. Including "the Silver
Star and the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster," and his family.
Next was Harold Russell's appointment as "chairman of the President's
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped."

Johnson mentioned that

Russell replaced L.B.J.'s "old friend Mel Maas."

Johnson promised

to provide more data on Russell for reporters but gave a few details
then.

Those specifics Included a description of the appointee's

military accomplishments, the fact that the man had lost his hands
in military service, and that he had been honored by the national
Jaycees in 1950.
Johnson also probably wanted to demonstrate his skills with the
statements on the effects of his economic programs.

Those self-

promotlonal success stories seemed to show Johnson to be a man to be
trusted with the national purse, a man who was aware of and concerned
for the taxpayer's problems, a man of frugality, moderation, and of
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caution, a man who was an economist In his own right as wall as
one who listened to the advice of others on money matters.

Johnson

developed the impression of those skills with a variety of materials.
Specific details were manifested mainly through statistics.
often "barraged" his listeners with figures.

Johnson

Further, he compared

and contrasted present and past economic conditions.

Impressive

examples of economic progress In government, business, and Industry
appear.

Johnson related facts on employment, descriptions of the

effects of his administration's ability to prevent strikes, and warn
ings to labor and industry about the potential dangers of strikes
and price hikes.

He sometimes used a narration of the events which

led to a particular decision.

He occasionally referred to and quoted

his economic advisors to add weight to his own decisions.

He ex

plained the purpose of such monetary requests as tax Increases and
additional spending, to demonstrate that his view of "the national
interest* had guided his thinking.
Johnson displayed his leadership in other ways with the volun
taries.

He used the press conference to pit his own ethos as Presi

dent against those who confronted him, such as Barry Goldwater,
Governor George Wallace, Bethlehem Steel, critics of the war. Repub
lican and other opponents of his legislation, demonstrators, "the
aggressor" in Vietnam, and various members of the news media who
questioned his leadership.

Sometimes, as with the defensive volun

taries, Johnson's display of his own power and skill over his oppon
ents was direct.

On other occasions he referred to them more Indirect

ly, probably assuming that his audiences knew the object of his attacks.
Various developmental materials to c a n y out his aim appear and are
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similar to thoso used in the defensive voluntaries.

On occasion

Johnson compared and contrasted his views with those of his antago
nists.
briefly.

He described the actions and statements of the opposition
He then used longer statements to support and amplify

his own position.
Another type of voluntary for the development of ethos enhance
ment utilised the presence and remarks of others in the joint news
conferences.

For Instance, Johnson showed that he shared authority

in decision-making by having key figures in his administration appear
and talk to reporters along with him.

The statements made by such

figures as General Westmoreland, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
Budget Director Schultse, various governors, foreign dignitaries,
and others seem to have been designed to show important support
for the President's programs.

These testimonials backed up previous

and current goals, decisions, and successes of Johnson's administra
tion.
For Controlling the Press Conference. The last aim of Johnson's
voluntaries was to control or direct the press conference situation.
How Johnson exerted this control is not revealed by many overt state
ments and supporting materials.
manipulation.

The President was subtle in his

A few statements, however, do appear in some of the

conferences, although Johnson rarely expanded upon such remarks.
Johnson's directives to reporters had to do with such matters
as how long he would be available for questions, when and how Johnson
wanted information released, how he would like his statement to be
treated by the correspondents (for example, "off-the-record"), and
even what he wanted reporters to write.
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At his ranch, two daya after Christina In 19&3* Johnson Instruc
ted reporters, after a series of announcements, as follows:
You will have these releases and you do not need to
copy all of this material. I want to review them with you
briefly In case you have some question. I will try to refer
it or answer it.
. . . I do want to point out there is a mistake by
Pierre Salinger's girls that he brought down here from
the East Coast. They say "Office of the White House Secre
tary, LBJ Ranch, H-u-e, Texas." He didn't misspell Texas,
but he did misspell Rye. I don't want any of you to follow
the announcement literally. Correct all mistakes before
using, please.
Another observation I want to make is that I gave
Pierre that jacket he has on today because It Is too large
for me to wear— or too small.
With a touch of humor, Johnson tried to Instruct reporters on a minor
matter.

He also wanted to say how he felt the writers should handle

the voluntaries he read to them and how he wanted the conference
questioning to proceed.
Johnson clearly indicated to reporters how much time he wanted
for questions In the August 18, 19&t, session.

The conference started

at 11:^5 a.m., according to the "note" In the transcript.

L.B.J.

began by saying that he just had a few minutes before "a 12 o'clock
meeting."

He then spent two-thirds of the conference time giving

data orally.

Concluding his remarks, L.B.J. said he had not the time

for "detailed questions," but that he would take a walk with them and
with Iceland’s Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson.

The Prime Minister

was arriving for the meeting Johnson had mentioned.
On New Year's Day, 1968, Johnson explained the ideas of an "Execu
tive Order" he was having released.
ference around those Ideas.
out to the ranch that day:

Johnson wanted to center the con

He told reporters why he had asked them
to brief them on the "Executive Order."
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Ha concluded his review of the Ideas with procedural renarks such as,
"I will be glad to take some United questions from you on this or
other matters.11 He then told reporters that three of his assistants
were present for a nore "detailed backgrounding."

Johnson continued,

"While I don't want to cut off questioning, I am very anxious for this
very important story to go out, and I am very anxious for you to have
all the information you need In connection with it.
take a limited number of questions."

I'll be glad to

Johnson then Invited his three

assistants, Walt Rostov, Joseph Califano, and Ernest Goldstein to
Join him.

L.B.J. said, " . . . I will take questions on this or any

other subject matter for a period of a very few minutes, and then I'll
yield to them."

He stayed during the briefing and Interjected more

comments not only in response to questions put to his advisers but
to speed up getting the session finished.

For example, at one point

he said, "I wonder If you can wait until we talk to the Congress about
that. . . . "
When President Johnson announced that Hanoi was agreeing to meet
in Paris, he told the participants in a broadcast news conference that
he did not want a lot of questioning on the announcement.

He said,

"I have never felt it was useful for public officials to confuse deli
cate negotiations by detailing personal views or suggestions or elabo
rating positions in advance.

I know that all of you, therefore, will

understand that I shall not discuss this question further at this con
ference."

Furthermore, he changed the subject and Introduced Josd

Vlvanco and Ambassador Raymond Telles, "Chairman of the Mexican-United
States Border Commission between our two countries."
The illustrations of the President's statements to guide the flow
of questioning show that supporting material was rather restricted.
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Johnson sometimes amplified the announcements with repetition and
restatement.

He used statements of his own personal opinion and de

sire to develop the directive remarks.

Johnson also used explanation,

to some extent, to justify his guiding the conference.
Summary. Looked at generally, Johnson's news conference volun
taries were not exiguous in development.

Moreover, Johnson used a

variety of developmental materials to carry out the specific aims he
had for the meetings.

He employed the traditional forms of support

normally associated with informing, amplifying, and persuading.
read releases and extemporised on his own thoughts.

He

He provided news

items which were frequently developed with background Information.
It Is clear that Johnson often wanted his press corps to have de
tailed data, especially when the goal was to publicise and promote.
When Johnson seemed to be talking not only to get comprehension but
to win support for his administration, he was often expansive in his
use of diverse materials.

Some of those materials seem selected for

the particular topic, occasion, and audience.

Other times, especial

ly when the goal was to amplify, the support is reminiscent of pre
vious speeches and public statements on a particular theme.

That is,

many of the favorite arguments and proofs of previous communications
came up in particular press conference voluntaries.

How effective

President Johnson was in developing his ideas is the subject of the
next section of this chapter.
Situational Adjustment Techniques
Johnson's success is probably best measured in terms of his own
strategy and goals in the press conference as well as with a view of
the goals of the other participants.

Johnson's apparent strategy was
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to employ tho voluntary to got to public opinion.

Tho strategy genera,

ted six specific alms and subsequent development.

But what seems more

Important, to some extent, than Johnson's typical and traditional sup
porting materials, are some specific techniques the man took to the
situation In conjunction with the announcements.

An explanation and

assessment of these devices precede some general conclusions about the
voluntaries.
The devices Johnson used In conjunction with the Ideas and development are related to frequency, timing, length. Issue avoidance, antici
pation, Interjection, and guest participation In the news conference
voluntaries.

All of these factors were under the President's control,

as were most aspects of his press conferences.

Johnson's manipulation

of the seven factors seems calculated enough In many of the conferences
to warrant a discussion of each.
Timing and Frequency. The timing of and frequency with which L.B.J.
employed voluntaries paralleled, to a degree, the timing and frequency
of the press conferences.
prise" conferences.

He seemed to like the unscheduled, "sur

The same element of spontaneity Is noticeable In

the scheduling of announcements.
Some regularity did exist.

During the first two years, Johnson

was predictable in the sense that fifty of the fifty-one conferences
had at least one announcement of some kind.

During the last three

years, however, Johnson did not open approximately one In four of his
conferences with voluntaries.

What was not so predictable was the

extent to which voluntaries would appear.

Johnson's reply to a ques

tion In his second news conference, on the nature of his news confer
ence plans, turned out to be a keynote. He said, "We don't want to
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be too rigid.

We always want to be flexible.” The "we" probably

Meant that Johnson did not want a regular schedule.

Further, he

apparently wanted his questioners to agree that flexibility would
serve their Interests as well as his own alms.
President Johnson demonstrated variety In his timing and schedul
ing, not only with some diversity In the topics he brought up In a
given conference but also with the length and nature of the develop
ment of those topics.

In some conferences, all of the opening remarks

related to one area of concern.
showed up.

In many, however, a variety of Items

The length of a given announcement as well as the length

of the time devoted to announcements also varied.

The general pat

tern was for Johnson to devote between a fourth and a third of his
press conferences to his own statements.
from this norm Is Interesting.

But the number of deviations

During his first three years in office

Johnson often spent close to half of the allotted time to voluntaries.
During the last two years that trend was reversed for the most part,
as Johnson learned to abbreviate his opening remarks.
specific amount of time the President might spend on

So, for the
a

given announce

ment or in a particular topic area, the same sort of variance is seen
as with the frequency with which specific topics, such as the economy
or the war, appear over the years.

That is, similar to the way that

the topics of the domestic economic situation were frequently intro
duced In the early years of the Johnson administration, so, too, was
the amount of time spent on that Issue in a given voluntary more in
those two years.

Again, however, this was not always predictable.

The governing factor, of course, was the President's will or mood.
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Another aspect of Johnson's scheduling of events has to do with
how he coordinated various other activities.

The extent to which L.B.J.

coordinated all of the communications of the executive branch is not
known.

It is evident, however, that Johnson exerted a good measure

of control over official White House output.

Johnson's voluntaries

show that he wanted to be a direct participant In many of the activi
ties of the press office.

For example, Johnson often held his official

conferences at times when the White House Press Secretary normally met
reporters In the letter's twice-a-day conferences.
seemed to lead to unscheduled voluntaries.

Other activities

For Instance, Johnson

called In reporters Just before trips. Just after cabinet meetings,
before and after ceremonial functions such as receptions of dignitaries,
and even In between his dally schedule of appearances at governors'
conferences.

Usually Johnson met reporters on an Impromptu basis

when he had something he wanted to tell them.

Knowing that his dally

activities were being "covered," L.B.J. guaranteed himself an audience,
occasionally rewarding the White House press group, and others, with
some sort of press conference.
While Johnson seems to have been guided by an expressed desire
for "flexibility," by Involvement with the work of the White House
Press Office, and by his own daily and weekly activities in the schedul
ing and coordination of his voluntaries, another determining factor
appears.

Other external events also seem to have been a guiding force

in Johnson's decisions on timing, scheduling, and length.

National

and International "crises," apparently relevant to the Presidency,
generated a variety of decisions and communications.

For the most

part, Johnson vent to the public or the press, or both, only after a
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major decision had boon made.

How he communicated the decision varied.

Johnson's having almost sixty separate television appearances in his
first twenty-four months In office reveals one method.

Although among

Johnson's television appearances, major speeches, such as a "State of
the Union," can be found, the dramatic preempts and broadcast news
conference voluntaries also account for this type of communication.
That is, If Johnson had something he deemed Important to say to the
public, he was not often hesitant In taking the matter to the press
or the public, especially once the decision or action was done.

Illus

trations appear in Johnson's announcements of strike settlements, of
his decisions to act in civil disturbances, and of his expressions of
presidential will In difficult situations like that surrounding the
death of Martin Luther King.

Whether or not Johnson would preempt

broadcast time or raise the Issue In a news conference voluntary
seemed to hinge on more than one factor.
Length.

The logistic of length, as well as timing and frequency,

may be a manifestation of Johnson's determination to approach some
issues and avoid others.

The topic might be an old one, as involve

ment in Vietnam came to be, or a current one such as rioting In Watts,
California.
Issue Avoidance.

Overall, Johnson avoided introductory state

ments on his personal life and on foreign affairs more than on other
areas of discussion.

Most voluntaries were, then, on presidential

activities and domestic Issues.
topic areas evolved.

Further, patterns of avoidance in

The fact that Johnson held fewer conferences

each year, except for 1966, and that he had fewer voluntaries each
year, explain trends of Increased avoidance on some topics, but not
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•11.

Although L.B.J. was fairly consistent over the years in offering

announcements of his nominations and appointments, he tended to shy
away from Introducing material on his own activities except for plans,
decisions, and actions related to various meetings and conferences.
An Increased reluctance to discuss foreign affairs was another trend.
In this connection, although Johnson Introduced the topic of Vietnam
more in 1965 than in any other year, the pattern was generally to
•void the topic; in 1967 he did not bring it up at all in press con
ferences.

On domestic matters, the President gradually came to avoid

most issues, save, perhaps, the area of legislation and the Congress,
but especially the country's econony.
Aside from the general patterns of avoidance, specific, current
Issues were eschewed In voluntaries.
several ways.

Such Issues were avoided In

First, at times, as during the Dominican Republic up

heaval, the President simply did not hold press conferences until he
was ready to discuss the matter.

Of course, Johnson avoided a few

events and specific current Issues completely In public statements
on occasion.

This was especially true during some periods of communi

cation between the United States and Russia, and between the United
States and foreign dignitaries who were attempting to bring about
peace in Vietnam.

Second, with some topics the President went directly

to the public or used other forums to Introduce such problems as the
bombing of Vietnam.

Third, when Johnson wanted to avoid bringing up

a current event, he was prone either to have no introductory state
ments at all or to Introduce unrelated Issues, as he did at times
when some of his major pieces of legislation were in trouble with
congress.
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The factor of Issue avoidance Is understood to sone extent by
a fifth determinant of Johnson's voluntaries, anticipation.

As

L.B.J.'s press secretaries have said, the President was well aware
of what was on the minds of national news media representatives.

He

read, listened to, and watched, on a dally basis, what they were
saying to the public.

Moreover, the President and his staff ap

parently felt confident that they could guess which questions would
come up In almost any conference.

The extent to which and how the

device of anticipation probably was used is worth consideration.
Anticipation. First, many of Johnson's opening statements did
relate to quite specific events and Issues of Interest to the press.
In some of these voluntaries Johnson told reporters, both directly
and indirectly, that he knew what they wanted to find out.

For

Instance, on January 23, 196^, L.B.J. met briefly with reporters
in the Fish Room of the White House to talk about "our position on
Panama and the Canal Zone."

The only executive comments prior to

that voluntary had been three White House news releases (January 10,
I4*, and 16), following Panama's severance of diplomatic relations.
In the same conference, Johnson advised reporters that he knew
that they also had asked about "an insurance policy" and about Bobby
Baker's "gift of a stereo set."

Johnson responded to those antici

pated questions.
Another type of anticipation seen in the voluntaries was generated
by questions which, going beyond specific events, had to do with
trends.

Reporters frequently asked the President for his opinions

or "reactions" to a series of related events or issues.

Some of the

voluntaries reflect Johnson's awareness that this type of question

might cone up.

For example, the defensive voluntaries on L.B.J.’s

press policies and on Vietnam manifested, to a degree, that the
President not only was aware of growing or continued criticism, but
also that correspondents were likely to bring up inquiry on such
subjects.

It may be that by answering questions before they were

asked, Johnson felt the matter would be taken care of in a given
press conference, or, perhaps, Johnson may have wanted to handle
certain topics from the offensive, rather than from the defensive
posture in which a given question might have seemed to place him.
Interjection.

Johnson was somewhat unusual In that he occa

sionally presented his voluntaries In the middle or at the end of
his conferences.

Some conferences, in fact, have voluntaries at

first. Interspersed with questions, and at the close.

Other combi

nations exist, also, although most of the time the voluntaries were
placed in the traditional position.

One reason for interjecting a

voluntary may be that at times the President simply forgot to pre
sent the material early in the conference.

It Is also plausible that

In some conferences L.B.J. added voluntaries because reporters failed
to ask a particular question for which he had prepared and which he
wanted to discuss.

Perhaps, for example, a few of the "planted"

questions did not get asked In some of his conferences.

Interjecting

announcements in the middle of a conference also night have been done
to change the tone or subject of the questions which had been asked.
Adding voluntaries at the end of the conference may have been useful
In the same way.

Final voluntaries

might, if Important enough, shift

the emphasis reporters placed on the questions and answers to Informa
tion which might be even more useful In preparing news stories on the
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content of the proas oonferonoo.

Another factor which led to Inter

jected remarks were the answers given by others in the joint, confer
ences.

At times such answers seamed to stimulate the President to

defend or explain an administrative position.

On such occasions

the President seemed dissatisfied with the answers given by his guests.
Other times, Johnson just seemed to want to talk a bit more and what
he said does not seem to have been prepared at all.

For example,

Johnson reminisced for a minute or two in a conference at his ranch
on his fifty-fourth birthday.
Guest Participation. A final Important factor related to the
voluntaries was the result of Johnson's having news conferences with
guests.

In these Joint conferences, the guests were selected to

serve the President's aims as well as the needs of newsmen, on occa
sion.

Johnson held these conferences to inform, to show unity among

Democrats, to show support for his programs and policies, to display
shared responsibility and decision making, and to establish a situa
tion in which the guests and the President might enhance each other's
ethos.

Because guests appeared in more than one in five of the con

ferences, how the guest figured, especially in the voluntaries, bears
attention.
Sometimes the guests were simply present and did not speak during
the President’s conference.

This was the case when Johnson announced

his nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, June 13, 1967.
In this situation, and in others when the guests answered a few ques
tions, the appearance of guests seems to have been more ceremonial
than functional, as when Mrs, Johnson answered a few questions at a
news conference on one of L.B.J.'s birthdays.

On the other hand.

172
the presence of particular persons nay have been useful in establishing
a mood or tone In a given meeting.
Guest appearances seem more important In those conferences when
the visitors spoke.
merely to Inform.

Some conference guests seem to have been asked
For example, the Budget Director helped Johnson brief

reporters on detailed matters.

With Johnson taking the lead In the

conference, the Budget Director was able to support and expand upon
what L.B.J. said.
sought.

More than the transfer of Information may have been

Added credence for the President as the nation's economic

leader may have been an aim.
Another dramatic and unusual example of shared conference appears
on November 3» 1966.

Johnson walked Into the Cabinet Room of the

White House and announced that he was to have an operation.
duced a team of his doctors to the reporters.

He Intro

Johnson then left the

meeting, allowing Press Secretary Bill Moyers and three physicians
to provide details In a voluntary by George Burkley, M.D. (and with
over thirty-five questions and answers).
the medical team's members.

Moyers gave Information on

Burkley, Johnson's personal physician,

followed with an opening statement.

The doctor said. In closing his

remarks, "There is no Indication of any serious problem . . . and his
general health continues to be excellent."

It seems obvious here that

Johnson wanted the press and the public to have more than his own word
on the subject.

Again, not only was specific Information available,

but the presence and remarks of others may have been calculated to make
the general message appear highly Important and credible.
Some of the shared conferences seemed designed to display national
unity and support for Johnson's administration.

Once more, it appears

that Johnson wanted to enhance the ethos of his leadership.
held six official news conferences with governors.

Johnson

Three of these

took place on March 12, 1966, the last day of the National Governor's
Conference that year.

The first of the three occurred at about noon,

and Governor John Reed was asked by Johnson to make a few remarks.
Reed was extremely complimentary and gracious.
"...

He said, for example,

I know I speak for my fellow Governors when I say that we are

relieved, we are encouraged for the prospects of closer liaison be
tween Federal and State governments."
Johnson and Reed followed.

An exchange of thanks between

About an hour later, following another

meeting, nine other governors were called on by Johnson to tell the
press of their reactions to the meeting.

Again, an impressive "bi

partisan" display of support for an aspect of Johnson's "Great Society"
was effected through those statements.

In the last news conference,

about 5 p.m. that day, Johnson assembled another group of governors to
meet the press.

Governor Reed, the Chairman, talked at some length

about the President's "generous" involvement in the affairs of the
Conference and L.B.J.'s actions in behalf of the states.

Not only

that, the Governor then read a statement which quoted "a resolution
that was adopted unanimously at the session this afternoon."
resolution had endorsed Johnson's Vietnam policies.

The

Reed concluded

with an expression of national support for Johnson's aims and programs
in Southeast Asia.

Reed asserted that the peace "demonstrations" in

the United States did not represent the majority will.

He said, "The

American people are wholeheartedly behind the President," in the
governors' view.

Later in 1966 and again in 196? Johnson held press

conferences with other governors.

For exaig>le, on December 21, 1966,
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after a meeting of Democratic governors, Harold Hughes and the Presi
dent each talked to news correspondents.
On April 8, 1965, Johnson Initiated the practice of having
various presidential advisors Join him for news conferences on the
Vietnam problem.

April 8 was the day after L.B.J.'s speech at Johns

Hopkins University, "Peace Without Conquest."

The President had ap

pointed Eugene Black to meet with U Thant to discuss ideas for ending
the war.

Black was present and stood for questions in the conference.

Later, in 1966, Johnson shared two conferences with Robert McNamara,
one with Averell Harriman, and another with the Prime Minister of
Laos.

In 196? Henry Cabot Lodge talked to reporters with the Presi

dent as the Guam meeting on Southeast Asia ended.

On July 13, 1967,

a press conference featured Robert McNamara, General Earle Wheeler,
and General William Westmoreland.

On May 30, 1963, General Westmore

land and Australia's Prime Minister met the press with Johnson.
The statements by these guests upheld Johnson's goals and poli
cies in Vietnam.

In turn, Johnson praised his guests for their abili

ties and for their efforts.

But the main effect sought seems to have

been to demonstrate unity among the advisors and reinforcement for
the administration's position and practices.

Along with the presence

of such important persons as Harriman and Lodge were useful and per
suasive messages made by those guests.

Johnson's having others report

directly to the press, rather than summarizing what he had been told,
allowed the President to focus attention on those guests.

Perhaps,

further, L.B.J. thought that having someone else available to help
explain such matters as troop Increases and prolonged military activity
might prove that these decisions and actions were not Johnson's alone.
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By having these guests at press conferences, Johnson was also able to
defer some of the questioning in the conference.
Audience Adaptations. The description of Johnson's specific aims,
methods of development, and the special techniques employed in volun
taries supplies bases for some evaluative remarks.

This assessment

takes into account the three basic conference participants, the Presi
dent, the press, and the public.
It is not difficult to see why so many correspondents complained
about Johnson's press policies.

Johnson's voluntaries alone appear

highly self-serving if one chiefly does not identify or equate "the
national interest" with the interests of a particular president.

Not

withstanding national needs and the goals of reporters, an evaluation
in terms of Johnson's alms is possible, especially to the degree that
presidential power is seen to be important.

What is more important

for this study, however, is the general criterion of audience adapta
tion.

That is, how effective Johnson was in communicating with the

press and the public provides, probably, a significant question for
measuring the press conference voluntaries.
The public is an indirect participant in a presidential news
conference.

Public remoteness probably is increased when a confer

ence is not broadcast.

Therefore, the needs of the public's "repre

sentatives," the correspondents, should be specified.

Saying that

reporters attend press conferences "to get news" indicates a major
goal.

let that generalization is not sufficient for careful analysis.

The press participates in the meetings to get material for immediate
news stories and to enable themselves to write Interpretative, specu
lative, and feature articles.

Further, the conpetitlve nature of
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American journalism probably causes reporters to feel the need to "sell"
their writing to their editors and publishers.

In turn, editors and

publishers want to reach various segments of the public and to sell
newspapers, magasines, and broadcast programs.

In the case of broad

cast journalism, networks and stations are also dependent upon another
economic factor, advertising, possibly more than the print media, since
most news programs have commercial "sponsors."

Broadcast media com

pete for public attention with news programs in order to sell adver
tising time because advertising defrays the production costs.

There

fore, the broadcast media must meet public and private (business)
Interests to be successful.

In this way journalism may be seen as

an industry or business in which news is a commodity.

To a degree,

then, correspondents must serve themselves and the media they repre
sent*

They must get salable materials.
A secondary goal also related to a need for self preservation.

The press not only preserves itself with what It gets in the press
conference but with how it performs In maintaining the environment
which provides for it.

To some extent, correspondents must estab

lish and maintain a relationship with the Chief Executive which will
promote the fulfillment of their own needs.

Also, they must protect

the Institution of the press conference by their demeanor if they
find that institution efficacious from their own point of view.
Another function of reporters, also of secondary importance,
perhaps, stems from the "fourth estate" theory.
that reporters represent the public.

The theory posits

These representatives meet

with the President to get information, to communicate public atti
tudes, and to exert a measure of control on the executive branch of
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government.
talk.

In the press conference, reporters observe, question, and

The questions and statements of reporters may be Interpreted

as public communication to the president, according to the theory.
Sufficient evidence is not available to demonstrate how corres
pondents, either individually or collectively, subscribe to the goals
of maintaining the press conference as an institution and serving as
a "fourth branch" of government.

Reporters at Johnson's conferences

probably were most interested in getting materials for their stories,
although they probably had other goals, too.
Applications of this understanding of the purposes of the press
in the conferences appear in the following conclusions and in the
treatments of the questions and answers.
President Johnson's voluntaries show that he was aware of corres
pondents' desires, even if he did not always seem to appreciate them.
In some ways the voluntaries met those needs quite well.

On the other

hand, the way Johnson handled the announcements in some conferences
was not apparently for the benefit of his immediate audience.
To fulfill reporters' need for materials the President often
provided new information.

For example, correspondents seemed interes

ted in presidential decisions and activities.

Johnson responded to

that interest by announcing a number of important nominations and
appointments as well by presenting data which were not available else
where.
Aside from occasional vital and dramatic announcements, Johnson
often supplied useful background information for reporters.

For

example, giving biographical details of appointees may have saved
time for those newsmen facing immediate deadlines.

L.B.J. often was
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not reluctant to supply a suffiolent array of details for the kind of
writing mai\y of his questioners did.

And when he did not give out

the details orally, he often had written "handouts" prepared, such
as copies of messages to congress and other White House releases.
At times, the voluntaries seem planned to aid those journalists
who were writing interpretative stories.

For instance, the long ex

planations of tax and other economic, legislative requests may have
been given to help media representatives comprehend and interpret
the specific measures entailed in such requests.

Even some of the

lengthy commentaries on foreign policy, when they were not simply
restatements, may be seen as useful materials for the interpretative
type of communication.
The voluntaries appear less designed to provide for the specu
lative interests of correspondents.

When a major decision was pending.

If Johnson mentioned it at all, he was prone to say, "We will let you
know as soon as we decide."
In many ways Johnson's announcements seem to have been more
adapted to his own interests than to the needs of his press corps.
The pursuit of his own aims as revealed by the topics, supporting
materials, and other devices demonstrates little concern for the
press at times.

Johnson quite often used voluntaries to publicize

and promote more than to Inform.

Many of the promotional statements

seem Inappropriate for the Immediate audience.

The voluntaries which

seem mainly planned for ethos enhancement were probably wasted on
reporters much of the time.
Johnson's supporting materials appear more useful for direct
public addresses than for many of his press conference statements.
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This is especially true of the restatements of policy relative to
Vietnam, in which persuasion and amplification led to the use of
proofs more appropriate for the general public than for the press.
It is doubtful that Johnson's heavy use of repetition and restate
ment was of great value to correspondents.

The difficulty lies not

so much in the quality of the materials L.B.J. used but In the exces
sive attempts to achieve propaganda aims which prompted those materi
als.

Johnson probably used the press conference format to give argu

mentative speeches too often, in terms of the goals of the press.

In

fact. In both broadcast and non-broadcast conferences, Johnson some
times used reporters as a sort of captive audience to rehash policy,
react to his critics, and convince the nation of the successes of
his programs.

The news conference gave the President a convenient

speaking situation.

But his occasional and time consuming talks on

the national well-being may not have been of great interest to the
press.
While it is natural that the president and the press do not
always have common causes, Johnson's aims and the development of his
ideas seem to leave much to be desired, at least from the standpoint
of audience adjustment.
Even less adaptive were other techniques L.B.J. used in conjunc
tion with his voluntaries.

The frequency with which announcements

appear probably presented no difficulties for most correspondents.
The occasional surprise statements probably yielded good news materials
for reporters, although the surprises may have deterred some questioners
from asking questions on other subjects.

Further, reporters could not

easily predict if Johnson would have an Important statement to make.
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if ha would have nothing to introduce, or if he would talk at length.
Irregularities in the frequency and timing of voluntaries may have dis
couraged some reporters from careful preparation before a given confer
ence, whether the conference was impromptu or not.

On mapy occasions

reporters had little opportunity to offer many questions which were
not generated by the voluntaries.
ration was lost to an extent.

Thus, incentive for adequate prepa

In fact, many reporters, especially

among the White House "regulars," may have come to depend upon the
President to provide topics for questions at times.
A related factor, also unpredictable to a degree, was the amount
of time Johnson might usurp with his remarks.
tary period was often excessive.

The length of the volun

In the majority of the conferences

the President spent from a fourth to over half of the conference time
with his own prepared statements, frequently leaving little time for
questioning.

While Johnson may have felt he was simply providing use

ful material for reporters to pass on to the nation, the correspon
dents may have been frustrated frequently in not having time enough
to ask questions on other topics or to ask "follow-up" questions.
Once more, Johnson's spending so much time on his own remarks may have
led to a dependency for some correspondents.

That is, a few reporters

probably calculated that L.B.J, would often talk at some length, thus
restricting the time available for inquiry.

Therefore, some reporters

may have been reluctant to do research and to make extensive prepara
tion of questions.

A press conference with a long period of announce

ments followed by many questions related to the voluntaries was not
unusual.

But this type of conference may not have been in the best

Interests of all of the media representatives present, especially those
who had important questions on other topics.

1B1
Johnson's capabilities at anticipating questions cannot be criti
cised except when that anticipation affected what happened in the
press conference.

Many of Johnson's voluntaries seem designed to

answer questions before they could be asked.

This not only gave the

President the initiative with a particular topic but frequently led
him to expect that his opening remarks would be the only discussion
necessary.

Indeed, on occasion Johnson indicated that he wanted no

questions on certain topics.

Further, he often talked so long on a

particular subject that more questions on the topic would have denied
inquiry into other matters.

If Johnson did know what questions would

be asked, he might have waited for the questions so as to provide more
of a question and answer atmosphere in his press conferences.

Allow

ing reporters to ask even those questions which he anticipated might
have stimulated better questioning simply because the questioners would
have had the privilege of initiating inquiry as opposed to passively
listening to the President.
A further measure of control Johnson exerted over the press confer
ences with his voluntaries was the interjection of announcements during
the question period.

Interspersed statements may have thrown corres

pondents off balance and may have unnecessarily postponed or eliminated
a line of questioning, especially if the interjected remarks were stimu
lating enough to generate a new direction of inquiry.
The "planned spontaneity" of some of those announcements may have
interrupted a flow of follow-up questions on vital topics.

If the

interjected remarks were important enough to make in a news conference,
Johnson probably would have served reporters better by placing them in
the traditional position, especially in those conferences which allowed
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only a few minutes for questioning anyway.

Further, it may have

seemed unfair to reporters that L.B.J. made some of his announce
ments after the question period was finished.

It is possible that

correspondents were denied the opportunity on some occasions to in
quire about announcements made in Johnson’s closing remarks.
The device of the shared news conferences presents another diffi
culty.

Even if they occasionally were warned that a particular guest

or guests would appear, correspondents probably did not know to what
extent they might be able to question a guest.

The questioning of

guests also limited the time available for questioning the President.
The time Johnson spent introducing his visitors and what he had to
say about them was often superfluous.

At times his own reactions to

guests' voluntaries turned some conferences into ceremonies of mutual
congratulation rather than opportunities to query important govern
mental leaders.

The voluntaries of guests, while often affording

newsmen with useful materials, were also sometimes propagandists
in nature.

That is, persons speaking at Johnson's conferences fre

quently presented brief talks to support Johnson's administration.
Of course, supporting remarks were appropriate in the presence of the
Chief Executive.

But statements which merely amplified known informa

tion probably did little to meet the needs of many media men.

Most of

those who met reporters with the President probably held or could
have held their own press conferences which might have been more advan
tageous to the press as a whole on occasions.
One essential factor related to the press conference voluntaries
has to do with the importance of the material presented.

This cri

terion involves adaptations to the press and to the public.

Many of

1*3

Johnson's opening statements Just as easily could have been released
by a White House press aide or some other public Information person
In another part of the government.

That Is, a number of Johnson's

informational announcements were relatively minor in importance; there
was no need for the President to make them.

This seems true of some

announcements about technological, military developments, about minor
staff changes, and about routine activities of the President.

In

terms of public interest, the press conference was not necessarily
the best possible channel of communicating much of the relatively
unimportant matters which appear in the voluntaries.

Even when it

was in the "national interest" to provide certain information to the
public, the press conference was only one of many available ways to
reach the larger audience.
How Johnson's voluntaries met another need of newsmen merits
some consideration.

The extent to which the press felt they repre

sented the public is not so important as the fact that the press
conference situation does provide an opportunity for some such repre
sentation.

Assuming that correspondents could ask questions reflecting

public needs, attitudes, and interests, it is difficult to see at
times how Johnson's voluntaries encouraged such representational in
quiry,
ask.

First, the more the President spoke, the less reporters could
What Johnson said often determined what reporters queried.

Drama

tic announcements could easily forestall questions on other important
matters of public concern.

Further, attempted exhaustion of a parti

cular issue in a voluntary seems to have been calculated to inhibit
inquiry on rather vital matters.

On occasion, Johnson seemed to say,

"Here is all you need on this matter.

Let's go on to other items."
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This appears true of policy statements, such as those on the war, in
some of the conferences.

hVen the lengthy reports showing achieve

ments in numerous facets of the domestic econouy might make follow up
questions seem unnecessary or unwarranted considering the Importance
of other matters and the time available to ask about a variety of
national concerns.

Johnson apparently attempted to avoid certain

areas of questioning either by not mentioning a particular issue or
by attempting to dismiss an Issue with his introductory remarks.

These

tactics probably did little to stimulate reporters who wanted to
channel public feedback to the White House.
An extension of the theory which holds that the press can serve
as a "check" on the executive branch leads to another question.

That

is, to what extent did Johnson's use of voluntaries promote an environ
ment in which the press could function as a control over the President?
The question is worth brief consideration because some members of the
press corps, or their editors and publishers, may have subscribed to
the theory.

Johnson probably did not.

Johnson's introductory remarks

Indicate a view of reporters not only as competitors for news but
also as his own agents.

Johnson certainly did not appear to invite

questions on national policy.

The avoidance of statements about impor

tant decisions and negotiations which were in progress as well as the
President's expressed wishes not to receive inquiry on such matters
are probably manifestations of an attitude which ran counter to the
"fourth estate" idea of some of the press.

What Johnson did choose to

say in his voluntaries and the amount of time apparently devoted to
publicity and promotional aims gives the same impression.

Beyond the

content of the topics and the developmental materials as the devices

1*5

Johnson usod to control the conferences with his voluntaries.

Had

L.B.J. thought of the press as extra governmental force to influence
decision making in the White House, he might have exhibited less con
trol over the conferences.

Although President Johnson may have under

stood the desire of some of the press to influence government, his
voluntaries do not reveal that he adapted to the need.
A final and even more difficult measure of the audience adapta
tions in Johnson's voluntaries draws in the larger, ultimate audience,
the public.

While L.B.J. certainly aimed to influence or win over the

press, he also wanted to maintain his leadership with the aid of public
support.

Moreover he had a duty to serve the "national interest" in

what he said at press conferences.

Various components of the public,

even as Indirect participants, probably had some basic needs.
public goals were probably among these four.

The

First, many citizens

may have wanted recent information and opinions from the President on
currently important affairs.

That is, for many readers and listeners,

the conference could provide information upon which to base intelli
gent opinions.

Informed citizens may be able to relate better to

their representatives in government.

If public opinion is to influence

government, it should be based upon knowledge and the President is in
a position to determine the extent to which certain data reach the
public.

Second, many persons in the country may have felt a desire

to affect Presidential decisions through the confrontation situation
of the news conference.

In other words, feedback to the president

may be afforded through the questions reporters ask, to the extent
that reporters are willing and able to reflect public opinions.

Third,

the press conference may allow the public to observe and evaluate an
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aspect of presidential leadership.

Some citizens may feel that

seeing the president's Interaction with reporters can help gauge
the general effectiveness of his service as well as his abilities to
handle specific Issues.

The fourth possible goal of citizens, not

unrelated to the other goals, may have been to participate vicari
ously in press conferences.

By identifying with the direct partici

pants In the meetings, some persons may feel more a part of the af
fairs of state.

The feeling of involvement may satisfy basic needs

of people who are interested in the presidency or the press, or both.
What Johnson did to meet the needs of the public in his volun
taries is a perplexing problem because the president is privileged
to use his view of "national interest" to determine what and how he
communicates.

It is difficult to question a president's judgment

when a president argues that what he does or does not do, including
what he chooses to say, is based upon the best interests of society.
In retrospect, however, some comments can be made about Johnson's
adaptations to his public audience in the press conference voluntaries.
In some ways, Johnson's aims appear to conflict with public
needs.

To some extent the public does need to be assured that its

President is providing the leadership needed to accomplish the nation’s
goals.

On the other hand, the press conference voluntary is not the

only way of demonstrating effectiveness.

The degree to which Johnson

tried to achieve his promotional and publicity aims may have inter
fered with the public need for useful information.

Naturally, Johnson

rarely brought up matters which would reflect failure on the part of
his leadership.
success.

But he also tended to present one-sided pictures of

Johnson did not often initiate discussion on problems facing
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the nation unless he wanted to express his own will.

Perhaps Johnson

so strongly identified his own aims and programs with what he felt the
public wanted that he saw no need to go much beyond announcing deci
sions and achievements.
A more difficult complication is President Johnson's apparent
avoidance of statements on the progress of decision making.
not like to make public the alternatives he was weighing.

He did
Perhaps

he did not want public discussion on his decisions until they were
made.

But his secrecy may be seen as a denial of the needs of many

persons to know what was happening in a very powerful branch of gov
ernment.

Moreover, the reluctance to announce progress on decisions

may have inhibited the feedback function of public opinion.

It is

difficult for a president to maintain strong leadership if he appears
indecisive, but it may be even more difficult to lead if surprise
decisions do not satisfy the public.

Perhaps one area in which Presi

dent Johnson may have communicated with more candor was the Vietnam
problem, which came to dominate reporters' minds if not the atten
tions of most of the public.

As noted, Johnson's statements on Viet

nam, as well as on other foreign policy matters, tended to repeat
arguments and proofs presented previously by the President.

The

press conference voluntaries show that L.B.J. did not often relate
important, new, factual data to the public.

He was more likely to

argue and defend policy rather than explain details of American
involvement in Southeast Asia.

Making the news conference a forum

to express his hopes for peace seems to have prohibited the presenta
tion of a balanced report on the prospects of attaining that peace.
Johnson sometimes gave the impression that the possibilities for peace
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ware good.

And although he warned that the United States'

might be costly, his warnings were so

commitment

general, and his expressions of

hope and his pleas for continued support so earnest, that the public
did not get much in the way of specific information on that particular
subject.

The press conference voluntary was not, probably, the place

for detailed reports on Vietnam and other important and complicated
matters, such as the econony.

By the same measure neither was the

voluntary the best place for passionate pleas for public support.
Johnson met frequently enough with the press to provide useful and
frank progress reports to the populace and such voluntaries might
not have conflicted with the public need or "right to know" what was
happening with regard to a major difficulty.
The possible lack of adaptation to the public need for informa
tion during the formation of policies and decisions and on matters
affecting national welfare relates to

another area of alms

which

may have been in disaccord.

for citizens to talk

back to

The need

the White House may have been discouraged by the voluntaries In the
same way that the President's initial statements seem to have Inhibi
ted reporters' asking questions which reflected national interests.
The voluntaries were adaptive, to a degree, to those citizens
who wanted to observe and evaluate presidential leadership.

The

voluntaries were frequent and lengthy enough, but they did more to
exhibit what the President wanted to say than his abilities to tackle
unresolved difficulties.

For those who already agreed with Johnson's

policies, the voluntaries provided ample display of forcefulness and
decisiveness.

For those who questioned various policies, the propagan

dists nature of mary of L.B.J.'s announcements and his avoidance of
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particular Issues may have been unrewarding.

Johnson's alms and

efforts to defend his policies and actions probably left much to be
desired for some.
of his critics.

Johnson rarely attacked the specific proposals
He usually dismissed his detractors with reaffirma

tions of his own position.

Failure to deal with specific points may

have diminished the apparent importance of counter proposals to his
programs but this tactic probably did not provide an adequate basis
for understanding the President's defensive replies or for evaluating
his abilities to give fair consideration to the Ideas of his opposi
tion.
Two aspects of L.B.J.'s opening statements contrasted with
Kennedy's style.

First, Johnson differed in the way he attempted to

build his own image.

Second, Johnson probably showed the public a

stronger, more direct measure of attempted control over the press
than had J.F.K.

The contrasts may have kept some citizens from

Identifying with L.B.J. as a participant in the conferences.

Al

though Johnson did not have to attempt emulation of any previous
president's style, his own efforts may have been too abrupt a change
to satisfy this particular public need.

Johnson might have done more,

however, to curtail the length and the somewhat obvious self-congratu
latory nature of many of his announcements, especially in the televised
conferences.

In fact, some indirect participants in the conferences

may have come to feel an identity with the press because of the frus
trations felt and expressed by many correspondents in getting oppor
tunities to question as well as in eliciting responsive replies.

The

public need to feel a part of the press conference situation is rela
tively minor, but not totally inconsequential considering the fact
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that public identification with its national leadership nay provide
the president with the kind of support that is sometimes advantageous
to effective action in dealing with oongress, critics, and foreign
powers.
Summary. Studying President Johnson's press conference volun
taries reveals some definite attempts at audience adaptations.

John

son apparently adjusted to his immediate audience, the press, by
giving them important "news" on several occasions.

He also appears

to have tried to adapt to his ultimate audience, the public, with
both information and persuasion.
President Johnson's own purposes and the manifestation of his aims
in the content and related governing factors seems to run contrary to
the needs of the press and the public in many ways.

L.B.J.'s promo

tional seal appears to have overtaken the chances of his satisfying
some important wants of the other participants in his conference.

This

is not to say that he was unaware of those needs or that his goals
were calculated to circumvent satisying the press and the public.
Johnson's use of opening statements does show, however, that he proba
bly was not effective in audience adjustment as often as might have
been desirable.
Aside from audience adjustment, external evidence of Johnson's
overall effectiveness in achieving his own purposes in the voluntaries
exists to a degree.

Because L.B.J.'s alms in answering questions were

essentially the same as those of his voluntaries, a general assessment
of his effectiveness is better understood after considering other com
ponents of the press conference, the questions and answers.
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The Quest!one
In most of President Johnson's news conferenoes press inquiry
provided stimuli for much of what was said.

Reporters' questions

bear consideration not only as antecedents to answers but also from
the standpoint of the press' goals and the characteristics of the
queries.

An evaluation of the questions is also presented, briefly,

to enlarge an understanding of the context of Johnson's replies.
Understanding the purposes of the press is essential.

To recapitu

late what was said in preceding parts of this study, newsmen who attend
ed the presidential press conference appear to have had one major aim:
to get materials for publishing or broadcasting.

While most corres

pondents may have been interested in writing reports of what the Presi
dent said, others attended the conferences to write interpretative,
speculative, feature, and editorial commentaries.

To write their

stories reporters had to get various kinds of replies from the Presi
dent.

Some writers desired specific pieces of information or factual

data which evidently was not immediately available elsewhere.

Other

correspondents wanted opinions, reactions, and projections from the
Chief Executive.
The press had two minor goals beyond getting news.

One was de

rived from some correspondents' interests in playing a role in govern
mental affairs, including those who felt able to represent the public
as well as those who wanted to influence the White House in other
ways.

Another aim of the press was to maintain a direct line with the

President.

This meant maintaining the institution of the news con

ference, too, because the press cannot always determine whether or
when a president will meet with them, let alone under what conditions.
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The questions in the news conferences were chiefly expressions
of the needs of the press.
for public Interests.
dent's purposes.

Some queries did reflect consideration

Others seemed responsive to some of the Presi

The alms of all of the participants provide a stand

point from which to evaluate the effectiveness of the content and
style of the press conference queries.
Among the qualities of the questions' content are timeliness.
Importance, situational appropriateness, and responsiveness.

The

meaning and application of each of these characteristics is found In
the discussion which evaluates the content of the questions.
The style of the questions Is assessed with regard to question
types and In terms of the qualities of clarity, tone, conciseness,
and appropriateness.

This evaluation follows the treatment of aspects

of question's content.
Content
A major measure of press conference Inquiry is timeliness.

A

timely question might anticipate events, might come up during events,
or might follow some occurrence.

Of course, the sooner a question Is

asked (and answered), the more valuable It Is to reporters who com
pete for news and have publishing or broadcast deadlines.

Questions

may be well timed, also, when they relate to less Immediate, con
tinuing phenomena.
Johnson's press corps apparently excelled in asking questions
related to current events.

Even though the President did not seem to

like questions which anticipated his decisions or actions, reporters
continued, over the years, to ask such questions.
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President Johnson held his first official news conference at
noon on his first day as occupant of the White House, December 7,
1963.

The opening question was, "Will you be here today?"

Other

inquiries in that conference treated the possibility of L.B.J.'s
planning to meet with Charles De Gaulle, future plans for holding
press conferences, prospects for programs to reduce unemployment,
and Johnson's plans for weekends and Christmas.

Another reporter

sought to find out what would be done with an F.B.I. report on John
Kennedy's assassination.

From the first conference through the last.

Interest in future events rarely waned.
Interrogatories during the progress of particular affairs
were common, although the President, again, often showed a predilec
tion to wait until an affair was ending before he responded in a
press conference.

For instance, a series of happenings in the

Middle East during the summer of 196? elicited a number of queries,
especially during periods of involvement in the conflict, and during
rumored or real presidential activity related to the problem.
Questions put to the President after events account for some
of the news conference inquiries.

After the fact questioning usual

ly resulted from a hiatus in public statements or presidential press
conferences during crucial times.

For example, during the American

military intervention in the Dominican Republic, and during the
196^ Gulf of Tonkin affair, reporters had to wait until after presi
dential action to ask.

Such questions were opportune because they

were raised as soon as possible.
The typical timeliness of correspondents' queries to the Presi
dent probably shows that the reporters served themselves and the
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public in seeking immediate responses on current Issues.

The ques

tions which anticipated events may have been useful in demonstrating
press and public interest in the future to the person who had much
responsibility for those events.

An example of such a question ap

pears in Johnson’s sixth press conference, February 1, 1964.

A news

man asked, "Mr. President, you spoke of viewing these foreign prob
lems in the perspective of history rather than today's headlines.
Looking at the problem of \flet-Nam that way, how do you look, what do
you see down the road?
military way?

Is this a situation that can be settled in a

Do you rule out any neutralisation such as General

deGaulle suggests, or what is your general perspective on Viet-Nam?"
In some ways, perhaps, too much of the questioning was generated
by the proximity of specific matters.

Reporters did not regularly

reflect or request retrospection or reflection while querying the
President.

Such questions might have raised discussion to more of a

philosophical plane than is traditional for the conferences.

On the

other hand, continued requests for Johnson's analyses of critical
matters may have promoted more effective, thoughtful, and important
answers.

A number of factors vitiated against the achievement of

such an ideal.
questions.

Reporters were not often rewarded for asking analytic

Johnson's rapport with the press in general was not

great and he apparently did not see the potential value of those
writers who can provide insightful interpretations of contemporary
issues.

The competitive striving for "hard" news to get quick publi

cation and broadcast, the apparently intense interest in what the
President was doing at the time, and the probable lack of emphasis
on contemplative stories found in most American news publications and
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broadcasts also may havs suppressed the appearance of questions which
do not, on the surface, appear to be timely.

Other factors, such as

the number of questioners present, the amount of time available, the
apparent need for follow-up questions, the impromptu nature of so
many of the press conferences, Johnson's predilection for propaganda,
and even the abilities of many newsmen may have forestalled frequent
appearance of less timely queries.
A quality of the questions related to timeliness Is importance.
By Importance is meant the value of knowing what the questions appa
rently sought.

From the standpoint of the chief aim of correspon

dents, enough of the questions do appear to seek responses from John
son which would help.
sity and desire.

In many cases the same holds for public neces

Because Johnson was aggressive in many of his

leadership roles, and because he wielded influence and power which
affected the public daily, it was important for the press and the
public to keep up with his policies and activities.
Highly significant questions on the war and on domestic diffi
culties appear in the question and answer sessions.

During periods

of civil violence, reporters asked about presidential plans to solve
the problems.

When Johnson talked about the economy, newsmen asked

about the effects of specific programs on the "taxpayer" and on the
inflation issue.

As the military and economic involvement in South

east Asia increased, so did the quality of questioning on that
matter.
Overall, much of the questioning appears not to have been of
more than immediate Importance, however.

Reporters usually asked

about what was happening at the time and about the imminent effects
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of events.

Whet may be seld about the short-sighted nature of sane

of the inquiry has already been treated with regard to the possible
problems of having questions which were "timely" in an immediate
sense.

Newsmen rarely asked about the long range consequences of

many Issues such as ecology, population, and international coopera
tion.

And for many of the same reasons that apply to the diminution

of questions seeking reflective or analytic responses, justification
may be seen for the temporal quality of a lot of the inquiries.
Beyond the questions which seem Important in various ways are
those which seem rather limited in value.

Many press conferences

contain inquiry which appears to be almost inconsequential, especi
ally in terms of the public's needs.

Personal and political questions

were often of short lived, if any, value.

The continued probing on

Johnson's political plans for 196^, for example, appears to be more
useful to writers than to the national interest.
July, 196^, Illustrate this point.

TWo conferences in

On July 2*4-, in a televised

conferences, over half of the questions were on politics, mostly
on Johnson's campaign plans.

Six days later, seventeen of the nine

teen questions pressed Johnson on the same issue.

This trend con

tinued in the questioning at press conferences through August and
September.

A number of questions on miscellaneous matters, such as

those of chief concern to the press, took away some time from more
vital concerns.

For example, on August 9» 1966, three successive

questions were asked on Lynda Bird Johnson's "job hunting."
Another quality pertaining to questions may be called "situa
tional appropriateness."

This criterion asks if questions were best

asked to the President and if they were best asked in presidential
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news conferences.
appropriate.

The bulk of the inquiry appears to have been quite

A factor which confounds general assessment, however,

is knowing the availability and adequacy of other sources like the
White House press office, cabinet members, and military leaders.

Fur

ther, Johnson met the press unofficially, almost daily, and the results
of those meetings are not generally known.
Most of the questions do seem designed just for Johnson, whether
to get Information or a "reaction."

A few questions do not seem

suited to a press conference, at least In terms of Importance to
the citizenry.

Again inquiries on personal affairs of the President,

on immediate needs of correspondents, and on politics might have been
channeled elsewhere or later.

Consider the following exchange in the

June 13, 1967 meeting:
Q. Mr. President, yesterday Mrs. Johnson said
you have been a protestor all of your life.
The President. She has reminded me of that a
good many times before yesterday.
Q. You agree with the statement, then?
The President. Yes.
Finally, a general quality of the content, responsiveness, calls
into question correspondent's tendencies and abilities in meeting
the needs of the conference participants.

How reporters responded to

their own needs and those of the public has been discussed to some
extent in the preceding treatment.
dential needs in some ways.

The press also responded to presi

For example, in many of the hastily called

conferences reporters tended to follow Johnson's leads by asking a
number of questions about his voluntaries.

Such questions not only

fulfilled correspondents' urges to get details but gave the President
an opportunity to reinforce his messages.

In other ways, however,

the content of the questions appears less responsive to L.B.J.'s
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favorite topics, especially as his most frequent areas of approach
and avoidance contrast with what the press apparently wanted to
know about.

In some cases, what Johnson usually avoided bringing

up himself, reporters were prone to ask.

The reverse was true, too.

Johnson's avoidance of announcements on personal matters was compen
sated for by newsmen's queries.

His reluctance to introduce informa

tion was balanced in the question period.

One of Johnson's favorite

topics in his first year, the domestic economy, was one of little
interest to reporters that year.

This apparent state was maintained

by a fairly equal amount of emphasis between voluntaries and questions
on two topics, the presidency in general and domestic Issues other
than the economy.

The fact that the press tended to pursue those

issues which the President did not seem so Interested in initiating
was probably useful for all the participants.

Keeping the President

aware of the desires of the press by pressing Issues which L.B.J.
tended to eschew may also have helped the nation and reporters to
find out vital information at times.
As a rule, the press acquitted Itself well in Johnson's news
conferences by responding to events and issues of potential Importance
and interest to American citizens. Newsmen were at their best, often,
when they asked about specific current happenings.

Moreover, they

occasionally responded to trends of events and to significant, general
issues.

The press served the public by apparently being sensitive to

a need for more information on certain topics.

For example, after

important statements by Johnson, such as a "State of the Union" address,
writers were not hesitant to ask for a better understanding of parti
cular statements.
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In terms of content, then, the questions probably reflected
the Immediate needs of newsmen to report and Interpret specific
events.

Next, newsmen were quick to respond to some of the Presi

dent's manifest alms by following most of his announcements with
Inquiry.

Further, the public was served by most of the news con

ference inquiry which probably reflected many aspects of public
Interest in and attitudes toward the country's leadership.

The

content of the questions, then, seems quite appropriate in terms
of varying specific stimuli and pressures affecting the press during
Johnson's administration.

XZP6.
8.
The style of the press conference questions Is worth noting
since various aspects of style may have had as much effect in the
conferences as the content of the inquiry.

The type of questions

asked and the clarity, tone, conciseness, and appropriateness with
which correspondents worded their interrogatives are scrutinized
briefly.
Question types are possibly best looked at from the standpoint
of the objectives of the questioner.
were four:

The chief types of questions

data seeking, opinion seeking, reaction seeking and

follow-up.
Questions for data Included those which sought specific bits of
information or general expositions of factual detail.

Such questions

probably represent the most common kind of questioning in the confer
ences.

Concrete information, especially if it is as yet unheard of,

can become valuable to writers.

Since Johnson was a major news source

so often during his administration, it is no wonder that more often
than not questions wanting specific data appear in the conferences.
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A second type of inquiry sought Johnson's opinions.

More

specifically, statements on policy, on prophecy, and on Johnson's
analysis of situations were requested frequently by the press.

Be

yond knowing exactly what the President was doing, reporters wanted
to know such things as Johnson's rationale for action, his philosophi
cal viewpoint, the structure of his attitudes on issues, his vision
of the future, and how he interpreted the course of various events.
Such questions were less directive and more probative in nature.

They

tended to appear seasonally, especially at the first of the year, on
Johnson's birthday, and at the end of the year.

For instance on

January 16, 19&5. » writer asked, "Mr. President, on the eve of your
inauguration could you sum up or characterise for us your view of the
general world condition, or the leadership job that you see ahead
for us?"

Although that reporter may have sought the content of L.B.J.'s

"Inaugural Address," it was not an uncommon request,
Johnson's fifty-fourth birthday (August
sion for a conference at the "L.B.J. Ranch."

27,

1966) was the occa

In that meeting, al

though one question was, "Mrs. Johnson, what are you going to have
for dinner tonight?"

Other queries, to the President, were broader.

One reporter asked Johnson to "lay down a basic philosophy for what
might be called the next chapter ahead In world affairs."

Another

correspondent asked about the "prospect" for improved relations
between the United States and Russia.
Questions to elicit the President's reactions were not uncommon.
With such questions reporters wanted to gauge Johnson's feelings on
various issues rather than to get specific data or statements of
policy.

Inquiry for expressive behavior dealt with criticisms and
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topics which wsra ssnsltlvs to Johnson.

In those queries newsmen

expressed or alluded to critical evaluations of Johnson's perform
ance and programs.

Sometimes they gave arguments confronting the

White House from other souroes.

Writers occasionally simply seemed

to be talking to the President, expressing their own feelings, per
haps hoping to Influence Johnson more than Just to get a passing
observation or reaction.
Reaction seeking questions were sometimes general, or open ended
in nature.

For example, the transcript of the July 28, 19^5* broad

cast conference shows Nancy Dickerson asking, "Mr. President, after
the week of deliberations on Vlet-Nam, how do you feel— in the context
of your Office? We always hear It Is the loneliest in the world."
An example of a more specific question appears In the same conference:
Mr. President, . . . last night one of the leading
Governors of the Republicans said some rather strong
things. Governor Hatfield of Oregon said that recent
escalation of action In Vlet-Nam is moving all the
people of the world close to world war III, and we
have no moral right to commit the world and especially
our own people to world war III unilaterally or by
the decision of a few experts.
This seems to Imply rather strong criticism of
present policies. Do you care to express any reaction?
A frequent bent of some correspondents seems to have been to eli
cit L.B.J.'s response to political Issues.

As the elections of 1966

came near a close, Johnson held a televised meeting with reporters,
October 6.

Several questions in that conference seemed to want the

President's reactions to political Issues.

One reporter asked about

Johnson's feelings about Democrats running for southern governor
ships "who are avowed segregationists."

Another writer asked what

Johnson thought about campaign Issues from his point of view and in
terms of the opposition party's positions.

The next question wondered
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about "the rather steady decline of the
months."

£~stoc\TJ market

in recent

Another questioner pointed up Republican criticism of

Johnson's "preoccupation with and spending for Vietnam."

These and

several other questions In the conference seemed obviously designed
to get quick reactions from Johnson especially In his role as head
of the Democratic Party.
Some reporters, especially in Johnson's first year of office,
apparently wanted to spar with the President.

Such bickering and

baiting usually related to press and political matters.

On February 1,

1964, Johnson assembled newsmen in the White House Theatre.

One of

the first questions asked was, "Mr. President, many of us are won
dering why you would hold a news conference in a cramped little room
such as this, limited to about 90 newsmen, when you have facilities
available to accommodate all newsmen, such as the State Department?"
The embarrassment caused by the activities of two of Johnson's
advisors, Bobby Baker and Walter Jenkins, produced some press con
ference Inquiry.

Correspondents asked about Bobby Baker In at least

three conferences in 1964.

February 1, 1964, a week after a question

on Bobby Baker had appeared, another question was, "Mr. President, do
you feel that Mr. Walter Jenkins should go up to the Capitol and
testify under oath to clear up the conflicts that are appearing in
the testimony?"
On April 11, 1964, a reporter wanted Johnson's reaction to the
"Light Bulb Johnson" appellation.

That question Immediately led to

some apparently useless banter concerning who Invented the term.
Another newsman In that conference requested Johnson's opinion on
negotiations for a cable television arrangement in Austin, Texas,
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where L.B.J.'s family had financial interests in a broadcasting
corporation.
A last type of question is the "follow-up."

Over half of all

the inquiry put to Johnson in an average official conference seems
immediately derived from either his voluntaries or other questions
asked, or both.

That amounts to eight or nine of the sixteen to

seventeen questions normally asked.

Among the follow-ups, those

related to previously asked questions were slightly more frequent
that those stemming from announcements.

On an annual basis, this

kind of questioning is, in frequency, proportionately the same as all
questioning.

In quite a few individual press conferences, however,

most if not all of the questions were generated by the President's
opening remarks.

In most question and answer sessions are at least

a few follow-ups to voluntaries.

Questions which may have been

brought about by related, prior inquiry in a given conference are
perhaps even more common.

Furthermore, correspondents occasionally

used the press conference to follow up on statements made by Johnson
in other speaking situations.
Reporters asked follow-up questions for the same reasons that
they asked the other types of questions, basically.

Newsmen asked

more follow-ups in order to get more material than evidently was pro
vided in the voluntaries and the answers.

On the whole, the follow-

up inquiries appear quite appropriate by any measure.

In some con

ferences, however, it appears that follow-up questions were asked for
lack of Impetus to bring up other and perhaps fresher Issues.
President Johnson announced to reporters on March 2, 1967, that
an exchange of letters with the Soviet Premier, Aleksei Kosygin,
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might result In talks for "limiting the arms race In offensive and
defensive nuclear missiles."

All but three of the conference's

seventeen questions were on that brief announcement.

This was the

first public announcement of the correspondence, and the news seems
dramatic in light of the attempt to curb production of "defensive"
or "antimissile" weaponry.

Writers searched for the meaning of the

forthcoming discussions, specific details leading up to the talks,
and data on arrangements for the meetings.

They also asked about

immediate and potential effects of the proposed conference.
Later in 1967, on July 13» Johnson and several military advi
sors met the press.

Appropriately, all of the questions, which were

directed to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, General William West
moreland, and the President, were on Vietnam.
In September of 1967 Johnson presented his "San Antonio formula"
for ending the war.

The day after that policy statement, September 30,

newsmen asked only question related to Johnson's voluntaries on staff
changes In the Department of Justice.

They did ask questions about

Vietnam with specific references to the speech of the night before.
At times, questioners seemed completely uninterested in Johnson's
announcements.

For instance, on September 6, 1965, L.B.J. took a third

of the conference time to announce a number of items such as a meeting
with Senate leaders that morning.

The transcript of the conference

reveals no questions generated by the voluntaries and only three ques
tions following up on answers to previously asked queries.
In sum, a variety of factors seems to have determined the nature
and frequency of follow-ups.

Included are Johnson's voluntaries, the

presence of guests at the conferences, the apparent Importance of
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external events at tha time of a conference, and even the kind of
conference held (impromptu, advance notice, televised) and where It
was held.

In any event, the follow-up questions generally appear

responsive to the needs of the Immediate participants In the news
conferences.
Stylistic Qualities
An Important quality of questioning Is clarity.

While the

Inquirer probably need not reveal or emphasize his own purposes In
asking, he should word the question so that the respondent knows
exactly what sort of response Is sought.

That Is, the asker does

not have to say what he Is going to do with an answer, but he must
make sure that the responder knows what kind of answer Is requested.
Johnson's apparently high interest and direct involvement with media
representatives probably made it fairly easy for him to understand
most Inquiry.

On the other hand, Johnson's habit of anticipating

questions, his sensitivity to particular areas of questioning like
the war and his personal life, his apparent dislike of questions on
policy and pending decisions, his habits of secrecy and surprise,
and his general attitudes toward the media and the press conference
format probably did not Insure that he would comprehend every question.
In the judgment of this critic, L.B.J.'s inquisitors performed
well in asking clearly worded questions, generally speaking.

This is

not surprising since many of the correspondents assigned to the White
House were probably experienced and knowledgeable.

Competition for an

opportunity to query the President may have added incentive for good
inquiry.

Lapses In any aspect of the quality of questioning was proba

bly a function of general and specific preparation.

Although it might
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be expected that impromptu news conferences would yield less thought
ful asking* this was not always the case* nor is there evidence at
present to show that general relationship.
tions* however* did affect clarity.

Some factors of the ques

Reporters sometimes failed to

Indicate when they were changing topics when they addressed the Presi
dent.

They sometimes asked multiple questions which may have led to

confusion.

Further* some of the general queries were perhaps unneces

sarily general* although framing such open ended questions as "How do
you feel?" or "What are the prospects of a tax increase?" may have been
deliberately general and not at all vague in terms of Johnson's percep
tion.
If Johnson's responses to questions are an Indicator of clarity,
the questions appear to be very clear.
pretation of a query.

L.B.J.

rarely asked for inter

Hie only time he asked about one, usually,

was to discover a specific source quoted or alluded to in the state
ment of the question.

Whether, in such a case* the particular newsman

wanted to reveal his source cannot be determined easily.

Of course,

Johnson could not well have afforded appearing not to understand many
questions, especially those on Important matters.

By the same token,

as noted before, newsmen could ill afford abstruseness.
Finally, reporters did not seem unmindful of the needs of other
participants.

The questions were probably clear to other correspon

dents in most cases.

In the broadcast conferences, most newsmen seemed

to take time to put their queries into a context which would be under
standable for the public.
Perhaps a more important quality of the news conferences is the
tone of the inquiries.

The demeanor of reporters, as reflected in their
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questions, probably affected the quality of the answers to a degree.
This applies to individual questions and to the general tone of
inquiry in a given conference, if not to the whole trend of inquiry
facing the President over the years.

Of course, L.B.J.'s voluntaries,

his answers, environmental conditions, timing, and other factors influ
enced the mood of the questions, also.

Of chief importance, perhaps,

was the general feeling of friendliness, expressed by reporters, be
cause imparting that feeling may improve rapport and therefore may
enhance the quality and responsiveness of the answers.
On paper, much of the inquiry in Johnson*s news conferences seems
rather neutral, or not expressing any particular feelings toward the
speaker other than a common formality of address, "Mr. President . . ."
Some questions appeared quite friendly, even complimentary.

Amicable

questions seem more common In conferences held on short notice, on
holidays and on special occasions such as Johnson's birthday, and In
conferences at the L.B.J. Ranch or in Austin.

Hostile, unfriendly,

and sarcastically worded questions are more frequent In broadcast
conferences, but are not limited to that format.

Further, a trend

toward more blunt and less hospitable inquiry appears after Johnson's
first few months in office.

This trend continued, with a few excep

tions, even after the President announced his intention to retire from
political life.
In a sort of "non-conference," on January 23. 1 9 ^ * Johnson's
fourth official meeting with newsmen, the only question asked was,

" . . . how do you think things are going up on the Hill?"

This was

on one of Johnson's favorite topics and the reply imparted good news.
Johnson had held the conference in answer to a request for a policy
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statement on Panama and to reply to some stories being circulated about
L.B.J.'s financial affairs.

The question which was articulated may have

eased tension momentarily.
One of several questions on the possibilities of Johnson and Goldwater debating in 196k appears In a news conference of July 10.

A

correspondent said, "Mr. President, a couple of months ago your ora
torical propensities were officially recognized by the National Foren
sic Society /National Forensic League^.

Will this in any way influ

ence your decision to debate your opponent in the upcoming election?"
Instead of asking, "Why won't you debate Goldwater?" or even a less
tactfully worded question, this particular inquiry may be seen as com
plimentary and encouraging In Its wording.
on other conferences.

Similar questions came up

For Instance, on July 1, 1967, a writer told

Johnson, "When we, the National Negro Publishers Association met with
you In 19&+, you said you were going to be President for all the peo
ple of the United States.
doubt,

That you have shown beyond a reasonable

I wonder if your honesty, integrity, and humility will rub

off on many of the Governors throughout the United States as the years
go along."

(Johnson had just concluded a meeting with a group of

governors in St. Louis, Missouri.)
A rather helpful question appears in a conference at the Ranch,
August 29, 1965.

An announcement of an end to strikes by dock workers

had been made by the President.

Onewriter, who may have been cogni

zant of Johnson's desire to keep strikes at a minimum, asked, "Mr.
President, what would the steel strike to do the national economy?"
This allowed Johnson the opportunity to speak against the strike, and
the argument of harm to the economy was supplied by the questioner.
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About a year later, In the s u m location, anon* L.B.J.'s birthday
gifts ware

b o m

sociable questions like, "How do you feel on your

birthday, Mr. President? How Is your health?

Have you gained or

lost weight since the first of the year, and that sort of thing?"
At tines, reporters were kind enough to ask leave to state a
question, especially on particular topics.

For example, two days

before the November 8, 1966, elections, a newsman said, "Mr. President
. . . I hope you won't mind a question about the campaign," before
asking Johnson's judgment on the "factor of the backlash."

In the

same question period other queries began, "Mr. President, sir . . . "
(Johnson cut in on one, saying, "That 'air' kind of disarms me.
ahead.
Is."

I hope It's a friendly question."

Go

The reporter replied, "It

And It was.)
Overtly hospitable questions were less common than those which

seem less cordial in tone.

Sons of the questions designed to get

Johnson's reactions, especially his response to criticism, often
reflected In content and mood a degree of unfriendliness.
On July 31* 1967, a number of press conference questions con
fronted the President with Ideas contrary to or critical of his own.
Among those were Governor George Romney's complaint concerning federal
troops during riots in Detroit, Michigan; a Gallup poll showing pub
lic dissatisfaction with Johnson's war policies; requests by several
Democrats for Johnson to retire; a question on why no "advocates of
black power" were appointed to the "Commission on Civil Disorders;"
and references to the rioting In the United States as related to the
costly attention being given to Vietnam at the same time.

Sometimes reporters were not subtle.
appears In the November 29, 1966, meeting:

The following exchange
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Q. Did you sand congratulations to Harold Holt
^Australia's newly alsotad Prime Minister^?
The President: We sand wires to the heads of
govemsent and to Prime Ministers who have elections
and are successful. We even send them to members of
the opposition party, sometimes. In this country.
Q. Well, In this case, this opposition leader
says It Is meddling In their elections.
The President. We Just send the wires.
On December 31 of that year some hard-hitting questions were asked.
One question was, " . . . do you think It was a mistake not to ask
for a tax increase this year?"

Another reporter brought up the

bombing of "two light Industries" in North Vietnam, saying, "I
don't believe that these Industries fall within the target objec
tives previously announced by the Defense Department. . . . "

A

newsman brought up the question of money spent on Vietnam by the
United States.

A further question was, "Mr. President, there has

been a great deal of talk lately about your Image.
discuss what they call a credibility gap.

Some writers

The Harris and Gallup

polls have Indicated performance ratings at the lowest point since
you became President.

And there has been some unrest In the Demo

cratic Party among the Governors."
One factor of the style of the questions worthy of note is con
ciseness.

This quality is mainly Important in so far as It affects

the amount of time available for questioning and the clarity of the
Individual questions.

Since Johnson's voluntaries and answers did

more to determine the time available, questions which might be con
sidered verbose in any way probably had little effect on time.

The

average press conference question appears to have taken around fif
teen or twenty seconds to present.

Questions taking less time than

that seem to appear somewhat more frequently than those going beyond
a quarter of a minute.
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Taltrlaad question And uicmr ••aslons apparently had

ior«

longer

questions than many of the non-broadcast and laproeptu conferences.
Long questions seen to hare been a function of careful preparation,
of caution, of a desire to be clear to all participants, and sometimes
of a need to make statements to the President.

The more carefully

worded questions tended to be prepared with background Information,
or with rationales for asking certain questions.
were long without being wordy.

Often, questions

For example, some writers would phrase

more than one Inquiry In one statement, perhaps because the President
might not call upon most reporters more than once in a given con
ference.
Further, most of the questions do not seem too conoise for com
prehension, at least for Johnson's understanding.

Nor did many of

the Inquiries seem so protracted as to obfuscate meaning.

Given the

rapid give and take In the conferences, as well as other Influences
such as the newsmen's probable awareness of the time limit, a possible
desire of reporters to share the time available with each other, the
urgency of some of the questioners to get a number of details or to
explore a variety of topics, Johnson's proclivity to take up much
time with his own materials, and the unpredictable timing and fre
quency of the conferences probably led most correspondents to be fair
ly succinct.
In general, then, Johnson's press corps, with some exceptions,
seems to have been concise In the wording and length of their Inquiries.
A final measure of style applied to the questions Is appropriate
ness.

The language of the questions appears felicitous.

What was said

about the clarity and conciseness of the queries applies to this
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generalisation.

Johnson seldom asked, "What do you nean?"

He seemed

quite familiar with the terminology and occasional jargon employed by
the press.

Reporters often used terns most easily comprehended by

those In the national government.

They frequently employed acronyms

like "S.B.A.T.O." (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) and "D.M.Z."
(the "demilitarised sone" separating North and South Vietnam).

Such

terms as "The Kennedy Round" (of negotiations for International tar
iff considerations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
began before the Johnson administration.

Again, reporters In the

broadcast conferences appear to have been considerate of the public
by asking questions with generally understandable language.

In fact,

the President was more apt to use technical terms at times than was
the press.
A general evaluation of the style of the questions reveals good
inquiry.

Correspondents were usually clear, concise, and appropriate

in their use of language.

They used the kinds of questions best

suited to their needs but did not appear to have violated the main
needs of the public or the President with the types of questions they
asked.

Follow-up inquiry was especially good In many conferences.

While possibly reflecting Johnson's own mood at times, the tone of the
questions was generally polite, if not often very friendly.

Not shy

ing away from unpleasant subjects, the press appeared to be usually
candid, frequently blunt, and sometimes even antagonistic in their
queried.

Reporters were probably respectful of the needs of all of

the conferences' participants, for the most part.
How well President Johnson responded to the questions is the
subject of the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER V
AN EVALUATION OF JOHNSON'S ANSWERS
This chapter explores President Johnson's abilities in answering
the press conferences' questions.

Investigation of President John

son's responses to the 2,000 and more news conference inquiries
reveals how Johnson Interacted with the press as well as how he per
formed in meeting various demands of this speaking format.

An outline

of the President's goals, a study of his methods, and an assessment of
the answers afford a fuller view of Johnson's presidential press con
ferences.
Johnson's Alms
Johnson's general press conference purposes and the specific
goals of his voluntaries, it will be recalled, were to provide
Information, to publicize, to promote, and to defend his administra
tion, to better his image, and to control the press conference.
Johnson's alms in answering the questions appear akin to the
goals of the voluntaries.

A few particular purposes, however, may

be found in the answers.
To Control
The special purposes were, basically, matters of control.

That

is, the President wanted to regulate the flow of questioning, especi
ally in terms of the content.

On some occasions, often after an

Important announcement to open the conference, he seemed to want
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questions on the particular voluntary snd he apparently wanted to
avoid other areas of Inquiry.

At tines, the President apparently

did not really want any questioning.

For example, on August 18, 196*4-,

a few minutes before a reception for a visiting diplomat, L.B.J.
held a brief conference to announce some aspects of his plans for
the week, some of his recent activities, and some data on unemploy
ment.^

Johnson ended his remarks with an invitation for questions

on "this schedule, or these points."
brief.

His replies to the queries were

At one point, after a question related to his voluntary on

employment, Johnson said, "I don't want to get Into a general press
conference.

I Just said that.

This man /"Iceland's Prime Minister/7

is on his way here. . . ."In order to keep the Inquiry on the topics
of his other announcements.

The next question was on whether the

topic of "politics" had come up In L.B.J.'s recent meeting with state
and city leaders.

Johnson said, "Yes."

Pursuing the question, a

reporter asked, "Can you tell us about that?"

Johnson replied that

it was not the right occasion to discuss the matter.

The President

did answer a few other questions pertaining to his plans for the
coming days.

Other methods to keep reporters on one track are ex

plained later in this chapter.
*-All references to Johnson's press conferences are to the trans
cripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson. 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965-1970).
Citations to other materials, such as speeches and press releases,
refer to the same source. Direct quotations from the transcripts,
unless elliptically quoted, are verbatim with the following excep
tions. Footnote numbers and footnotes in the texts are_deleted.
Also omitted are headings and bracketed numbers, e.g. / 8/7 which
appear in order to show changes in topics within a given conference.
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Another special purpose was to control what newsnen did with his
replies.

Just as L.B.J. often met with the press on an off-the-record

basis, he sometimes Invoked that category of answering which previous
presidents had employed.

It Is notable that Instead of using the four

categories of reply which Franklin Roosevelt, for example, employed in
conferences, Johnson's habit was to answer for the "record" in his
official press conferences and give other kinds of responses in other
meetings with the media.

The off-the-record reply, then was infre

quent in the press conferences and was, further, more commonly used
during his first two years in office.
On January 16, 1965. in a conference at the L.B.J. Ranch, John
son spoke off the record three times.

The first time was during a

voluntary on White House personnel changes.

Next, after some persis

tent inquiry as to his travel plans, Johnson decided to handle the
difficulty privately for a few minutes.

Toward the end of the meet

ing is the following give and take:
Q. Mr. President, on the eve of your inauguration could
you sum up or characterise for us your view of the world
condition, or the leadership job that you see ahead for us?
The President. I prefer to do that off the record
for you. I don't want to create any more problems than
we already have. If you want to do it on that basis I
will be glad to.
Q. Could that be for our guidance?
The President. I assume it would guide you.
Q. I mean can we use it?
The President. No, you can say White House sources said
or the President said or somebody close to the President
said or anything. I will just give you my view off the
record and if it has apy influence on your view, well, all
right. You can entertain your own.
The transcript indicates that Johnson concluded the conference on an
off-the-record basis.

216
In general the President was just as purposive in his answers as
he was in holding conferences and in his use of voluntaries.

The

specific aims of the answers were not unlike those of his announce
ments.

Specific instances of answers which seem directed toward the

fulfillment of each of those are presented here.
To Inform
One specific aim was to provide the press and the public with
concrete information.

Johnson wanted his audience to understand,

remember, and attend to certain data.

Answers to provide informa

tive materials were most common in those conferences called so the
President could brief the press on matters such as a forthcoming
budget request.

Johnson also liked to respond to questions probing

his voluntaries, especially those on the presidency, when a writer
wanted more details, or even background Information.
The nomination of Clark Clifford for the post of Secretary of
Defense generated a conference on January 19. 1968.
ing the nomination, Johnson stayed for questions.
was for background information:
to Mr. Clifford?"

After announc
The first question

"What were the factors that pointed

Johnson answered at length with biographical de

tails, saying he had just that day made the decision, although Clark
Clifford had been "under consideration" for months.

Another writer

wanted to know how long Clifford's "term" would be and if that had been
arranged.

L.B.J. replied that he and Clifford had not discussed the

matter.
Later in 1968, on May 29. Johnson gave a commencement speech at
Texas Christian University in Fort Worth.

In the conclusion of his

talk, the President advocated granting eighteen-year-olds suffrage.
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He laid out no plan nor did he imply apy program to achieve that end.
In his news conference the next day, a correspondent asked if Johnson
did have a proposal in mind.

Johnson replied, "Over the weekend, we

will be working on a very special message to Congress.
tional amendment will be required.

A constitu

The President will send the message

to Congress, I hope, next week, making his recommendation."

To Promote
More frequently President Johnson's replies appear to have been
designed to publicize and promote his administration.

L.B.J. was so

eager to accomplish this aim that he occasionally had questions planted.
He probably prepared some answers.

In a few conferences, he even read

replies.
For Instance, on April 8 , 1965# one query was, "Mr. President . . .
what do you think of the House passing the medical bill?"
gan his reply, saying, "I just happen to have it here."

Johnson be
He went on

to praise the House and to urge the Senate to "convert this monumental
bill to the final reality of an enacted law."
President Johnson frequently used his answers to promote pending
or proposed legislation, whether the replies were prepared or impromptu.

A conference held on August 9» 1966, yielded a question on "riot
ing in the streets" and what the central government might do about
that and other urban affairs.

L.B.J. took the opportunity to list "a

good many" efforts on his part to solve such problems.

He put in plugs

for the Teacher Corps, for a "rent supplements" program, and a "Demon
stration Cities bill."

He also mentioned that he was working on the

coming year's budget with special consideration for the three specific
programs.
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President Johnson was not Immune to promoting himself and his
party.

In a meeting with the press on April 4, 1964, a reporter asked

if L.B.J. knew "of any instance where a President has failed of elec
tion in a prosperous period.''

Johnson took the cue to praise his

party, predict prosperity, and promote the implication of his election.
Questions on the congressional elections of 1966 often came up
in L.B.J.'s news conference.

On August 24, of that year, for example,

Johnson was asked to guess the chances of Republican gains in the elec
tions.

He replied at some length, urging the press to be wary of

polls.

He warned against paying attention to "people who try to cre

ate psychological situations and bandwagon approaches, and try to
repeat a thing so many times that finally, folks begin to believe it."
He concluded his answer with optimistic statements regarding the
success of his own party.
Other instances of political propaganda appeared in press con
ferences held during Johnson's participation in meetings of governors.
A question on cohesion among members of the Democratic Party came up
following the close of the Democratic Governors Conference, July 1,

1967 .

L.B.J. answered by saying that "divergent opinions" were not

necessarily harmful to Democrats.

He concluded, "I think, generally

speaking, the w o rst Democrat is better for the country than the best
Republican."

To Defend
Extensive criticisms of many of President Johnson's programs came
up throughout his administration.

These criticisms appeared in all

kinds of publication, in public speaking, and the news media.
ally vocal were detractors on the war issue.

Especi

The complaints and
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suggestions of critics often emerged In the questions put to the Presi
dent in his news conferences.

So, one of Johnson's goals frequently

was to defend his leadership in responding to inquiry.
A two-part query on the w ar and on inflation came up in the
M ay 21, 1966, question period.
reply.

Johnson spent over five minutes in

He was apparently prepared for the query because he produced

a chart comparing prices in the United States with prices in other
countries.

He went on to say that the White House was making efforts

to curb inflation, and he predicted that economic conditions would
improve.

On the war issue, Johnson asserted that no one was more

concerned about the need to find peace than was he.

He reviewed in

detail his administration's attempts to settle the war.

The stimulus

question had mentioned "recent polls that show considerable public
dissatisfaction."
question.

L.B.J. ended his question by alluding to the

He said that "those who approve of what we are doing are

almost twice" the number of those who did not subscribe to his poli
cies in Southeast Asia for one reason or another.
Aggressive inquisition on the w a r policies emerged in most of
Johnson's news conferences in 1966 and 1967.

In most cases L.B.J.

had ready and lengthy defensive remarks apparently designed to refute
the general nature of the criticism so often inherent in those q u e s 
tions.

His replies usually tended to enumerate his own initiatives

and blame the enemy for refusing to negotiate for an end to the hostili
ties.

To Improve An Image
Another specific aim of the answers was to improve the image of
the President and his leadership.

While few newsmen probably would
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have asked questions Just to satisfy this presidential aim, Johnson
was not reluctant to turn an answer into an image building attempt.
On almost any issue Johnson might present a happy picture of his suc
cesses, give lengthy details of various work in progress, or express
optimism and hope for the prospects of his resolving a current con
flict.

He often showed sympathy for the needs of his countrymen.

displayed vigor, forcefulness, and action.

He

He liked to associate his

decisions with the ideas of persons admired by the public, such as
Kennedy, Truman, and Eisenhower.
One of the most damaging attacks on President Johnson's image
came about through press rumblings on his believability.

So sensi

tive was Johnson to the "credibility gap" charge that he sometimes
even referred to the term in answering questions.
to w ant to disprove the charge directly.

At times he seemed

In the May 21, 1966, meeting,

Johnson referred to two specific areas of sensitivity relating to his
reputation.

After a statement on the war, Johnson said, " . . .

I

think I have said about all that I can on that general subject
/ V i e t n a m ^ today."
other matters."

He then opened the question period for "any

After three inquiries, a reporter asked if Johnson

had said that only questions on topics other than those on Vietnam
were in order.

Johnson replied, "I don't want to be charged with

barring you from asking anything you want.

..."

Later in the meet

ing, in response to a question on the cost of living, L.B.J. discussed
probable government spending figures.
difficult to predict."

Johnson warned that "It is

He continued, "I don't want to have our

credibility questioned if we are off a half percent out of 100. . . . "
He expressed hope that his projections would be accurate, explaining
the difficulties he faced in making them.
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This view of President Johnson's specific purposes paves the
way for an exploration of how Johnson answered the questions.

Methods of Development
In order to discuss Johnson's way of answering questions the
following distinction is made.

An •'answer" is a direct and respon

sive reply with some ideational content.

That Is, those responses

other than "answers" Include a simple "yes" or "no," a "no comment,"
or some device to pass over a particular point without actually
saying anything about the topic.

Indeed, replies and responses

which reflect an intent completely to avoid development are fre
quent and important in studying the conferences.

At this point,

however, only those responses which contain some sort of exposi
tion, amplification, or proof receive attention.
The following generalizations may be made about the development
of Johnson's answers.

That Johnson's methods in developing his

voluntaries seemed similar to the content of some of his speeches
was noted in the preceding chapter.

Many of his answers appeared,

in content, like other kinds of utterances Johnson made.
Second, a variety of types or forms of development was found in
the answers as a whole and in many specific replies.
Third, as with some of the voluntaries, specific types of
development depended upon what the correspondent wanted, what John
son's purpose was in replying, or the topic of the question.

Once

more, however, patterns of answers in terms of methods of development
varied.

An answer on a particular topic, stimulated by a particular

kind of question, might show almost any type of development.
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Fourth, the extent to which L.B.J. developed an idee varied.

Pre

dictably, he usually answered questions on his favorite topics (the
presidency, legislation— especially successful projects, politics,
and the state of the econovy) with more than a general statement.

In

other words, when Johnson had good news, he liked to talk about it.
On the other hand, Johnson was unoredictable when it came to other
topics, especially Southeast Asia.

Sometimes he would develop a

reply on that problem at length; on other occasions he would dismiss
the issue altogether.

The specific nature or tone of the question

apparently was not a determinant of the content of such inquiry,
either.
Fifth, the general quality of the answers was very irregular.
In some conferences it seemed that little was gained by the press,
the public, and even the President.

In others, plenty of the answers

were useful enough to serve all participants adequately.

In still

other meetings a strange mixture of excellence and mediocrity
existed.
Since President Johnson was often responsive in his answers
and did show an interesting variety of methods of support, some
illustrations of his answers which went beyond a few words merit
consideration.

Special attention is given to some of L.B.J.'s

favorite methods of development.

Statistics
President Johnson's fondness for statistics has been noted in
connection with his opening statements on the economy, including
employment.
as well.

The use of numbers appeared in replies on other topics

Johnson kept quantitative evidence on a number of his
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activities and statements*

On January 17, 1967, L.B.J. and Budget

Director Charles L. Schultze briefed reporters on upcoming monetary
legislation.

The introductory explanation of a "tax surcharge1* led

to some inquiry.

One reporter wanted more information on the mone

tary need for the taxation proposal.

L.B.J. used a number of figures

to explain and promote the proposal.

To show how the "surcharge"

and other aspects of his bills would affect the public, he said,
We will ask married people with two children who earn
over $5,000 to make some modest contribution. I believe
the schedule showed yesterday, if you have two children
and make $10,000, you would pay $67 a year. That is about
$5 a month with a $10,000 income.
With a $15,000 Income, it is $10 or $20 a month. It
is a very nominal amount.
As to a corporation, I had better not get into corpo
ration figures, but I saw one schedule where I believe
with $500,000 it is $1^,000. So we think it is a very
small part of what has already been rebated.
We think it is fiscally desirable so we don't have
to pay Interest on this amount of money, to try to raise
at least a part of it, or $^ billion, or $5 billion, or
$6 billion. We think we can do it.
We hope with social security we will pay out to the
lower groups in the neighborhood of $4 billion plus. We
would expect to take from those making above $10,000 and
up a little over $*♦• billion. So it kind of balances
off. . . .
The answer appears to have used helpful details in the form of sta
tistics.

The material may have been concrete enough to explain or

amplify what Johnson had said in his announcement and previous
answers on the subject.
The President could, also let loose with numerical data on other
topics, whether the figures were requested or not.

For Instance,

on March 20, 19&5* in a broadcast conference, Johnson was asked
about the number of "National Guardsmen" being called up and "how
many police" were on hand in Alabama during a period of marching
and violence in the state.

The President replied with a half dozen
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specific, exact* and approximate figures.

To another question on the

number of marchers and the nature of "Federal service available . . .
for medical care or that sort of thing," he responded to the second
part of the query.

He said, "We have a 75-bed hospital with 5 doctors

and 5 ambulances, 43 aircraft, helicopters (5-ambulstory patient, 2
litters with corpsmen) . . . in Selma.

At Maxwell Field we have a

250-bed hospital, 50 doctors, 5 ambulances, 4 H-43 aircraft. . . ."
The data in both answers seem impressive, although Johnson failed to
support an assertion that he had "reasonably accurate estimates" of
the number of marchers to expect.

An example of unsolicited statis

tical data appeared in the same conference.

The stimulus reads, "Mr.

President, do you feel that the debate in the Congress concerning
Viet-Nam, and especially those who have been urging quick negotiations,
has weakened your position or this country's position?"

Johnson

used the question to digress on the topic of freedom of speech and
his ability to communicate freely on the war issue.

He said, in

part, "I have met with 520, I believe. Congressmen and Senators for
over 2 hours for over 11 nights, and each one of them could ask any
question he wanted to.

The Secretary of State gave them a thorough

briefing— the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Vice Presi
dent,

And as I stated, you have raised the question with me 47 times.

So maybe the Senators and Congressmen have some speeches left in or
der to be even with us."

In this and in similar cases Johnson used

figures to inform, amplify, and prove the points he was making.
Testimony
The President sometimes employed testimony or quotations in
answering reporter's inquiries.

This method is found in various
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answers*

In news conferences Johnson most frequently quoted his own

statements, but he also Invoked

the words of others, such as previous

government leaders and his contemporary advisors.

Whether he specifi

cally referred to his source or whether he quoted directly or indi
rectly varied.
The habit of quoting himself appeared early in Johnson's presi
dency.

In his first televised meeting with the press, February 29,

1965, he repeated parts of a telephone conversation he had recently
had with the President of Panama.

In answer to a question on Viet

nam, Johnson recalled some of the points he had made in a talk at
the University of California at Los Angeles the week before this
conference.

Some of the exact wording of the California speech ap

peared in the February 29 press conference answer.
It is interesting that Johnson probably quoted himself on the
issue of Vietnam more than on any other single issue in press
conferences throughout much of his administration.
He apparently wanted consistency and was cautious in his replies.
He also exhibited some concern for what other members of his adminis
tration said.

In one conference, February 2, 196B, a reporter in

quired about a statement by Clark Clifford.
fying before a senate committee which
for Secretary of Defense,

Clifford had been testi

was considering

his

nomination

Johnson answered the question, saying,

" . . . Mr. Clifford said what I have said, what Mr. Rusk has said,
what everybody has said, so far as the San Antonio formula is con
cerned.

The country should know once

Mr. Clifford said just what I said at

and for all this morning that
San Antonio."
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Johnson's April 25.
Harry Truman.

I9&b» conference

was with foraer President

A question In the meeting asked what L.B.J. said to

the leadership of labor and management In a "railroad dispute."
Johnson answered with three types of testimony.

First, he indirectly

repeated what, In general, he had told the disputants.

Next, he

quoted a statement which Sam Rayburn had once made on another topic.
Finally, Johnson used a direct quotation from what he had said on the
contract negotiation problem Involving rail workers.
That Johnson used quotations from statements of Elsenhower and
Kennedy In voluntaries was noted In the previous chapter.

The same

pattern, but to a lesser extent at times, appear In answers.

In 1965.

L.B.J. referred to or quoted remarks of former President Elsenhower
In twelve of his press conferences.

In eight of those meetings the

references or direct quotations appeared In answers,

Johnson's stra

tegy was to add the authoritative weight of former presidents to his
own policies, especially those on the war In Southeast Asia.

On

April 8, the day after a major speech at Johns Hopkins University,
L.B.J. presented his new advisor on Vietnam, Eugene Black.

After an

answer by Black to a reporter’s question, Johnson mentioned to repor
ters that he had talked with Elsenhower about selecting Black for
the post.

With reference to the former chief executive, Johnson said,

" . . . I talked to him and he said that he had listened to the speech
last evening with great interest.

And he commended my approval of—

my selection of Mr. Black and the general statement I made with regard
to his work, and he sent his good wishes to Mr. Black. . . . "
The President also offered the testimony of others to support
points he made in his answers.

The 1968 "Report of the National
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Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders" and Johnson's response to it
was questioned by a newsman on March 22 of that year.

In a lengthy

answer Johnson explained what he and the executive branch had done
with the report.

To prove that his reactions to the recommendations

of the committee, expressed in directives to cabinet officials, had
been carried out, he read aloud one report from the Department of Com
merce.
Narration
President Johnson used narration from time to time.

He some

times liked to give details on the progression of events leading up
to certain decisions, actions, or statements.

For example, in the

last three conferences on March 12, 1966, held In connection with
the National Governors' Conference, Johnson was asked about "the
unanimous support given . . . by the Governors on . . . Vietnam
policy."

Johnson expressed his pleasure and recounted specific

events, including the moving, seconding, and voting on the resolu
tion which approved L.B.J.'s Vietnam war philosophy.
Comparison
The President sometimes used analogies or comparisons in develop
ing his replies.

In Johnson's conference of September 8, 1966, is the

following exchange:
Q. Mr. President, is there any way that you can give us
an idea of the specifics of what this action will take out of
the economy in the way of dollars or percentages of increase?
The President. That would depend entirely on the individ
ual. Some fellows that are building a big plant will go on
building it anyway. Others will say, "Well, if I can postpone
it a year I can get 7 percent, and I will wait."
We know only this: that we will not be providing a bonus
to someone to build something we don't want built.

228
In the seme conference. In answer to a query on the economy, Johnson
employed a common

comparison.

He said. In part, "When the accelerator

Is down you want to get up to the limit of 60.
you got up to 60.It is now 70 and on the
take the foot off

You were going ^0, and

way to 80.

So we said 'Let's

the acceleratoruntil it gets back down to 60 and

we will look at It there . . ."'
Anecdotes
Once in a while, L.B.J. employed a type of support which seemed
characteristic of some of his Informal speaking on certain occasions.
Anecdotes, stories, and remlnlscenses of his own experiences (and
those of others) appeared in answers from time to time.
After President Johnson's 1966 "Columbus Day Trip" he returned
to Washington, D.C.

and held a televised conference on October 13*

Near the close of the question period L.B.J. was asked for his reflec
tions.

He expressed pleasure for what he had seen and heard during

his travel.

Johnson Indicated that his reception in the places he

had visited contrasted with the criticisms he had been reading back
in the nation's capitol.
know.

He said, "I might be like Uncle Ezra, you

The doctor told him he had to quit drinking If he would improve

his hearing.
drinking?'

When he went back, the doctor said, 'Well, are you still
He said, 'Yes.'

The doctor said, 'I told you you would

have to quit it to improve your hearing.'

He said, 'Well, Doctor,

I like what I drink so much better than what I hear that I just didn't
take your prescription!'"

L.B.J. ended the conference, saying, " . . .

when -I get out and see the people . . . I like what I see and hear so
much better than what I read that it may reflect itself."
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Conferences on occasions of personal Importance, such as birth
days, sometimes led to reminiscing.

On August 27, 1966, Johnson

interacted with newsmen at his Texas ranch.
of his childhood and early political life.

He recounted "memories*1
At one point he recalled

that David Dubinsky had influenced him In the 1930's.
pride in his own accomplishments over the years.

He expressed

Later on, he said,

" . . . when I get home and Mrs. Davis, who runs the ranch for us,
tells me that her little Negro daughter is a runner-up in the Stone
wall School, I get great satisfaction to see the progress that has
been made."

In the same "answer," which ran about twenty minutes,

he went on to mention other experiences.

For instance he talked

about his recent trip to Denver and progress in providing housing
for "Negroes."

He mentioned conversations he had had with Senator

Everett Dirksen and with a publisher in Denver.

Still on the sub

ject of minority housing, Johnson said, "My father supported Jim
Ferguson for Governor in 191^.

He was running for office on building

more red schoolhouses, building better roads to our market places
and to our cities, and having a tenant purchase program where a
tenant could go and buy his home. . . . "

Johnson continued by citing

experiences he had had with various political leaders such as Senators
Jacob Javlts and John Aiken, Attorneys General Robert Kennedy and
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Presidents Eisenhower and Franklin Roosevelt.
Johnson also recounted recent experiences on occasion.

In the

brief conference of January 19, 1968, the announcement of Clark Clif
ford's nomination was made and a few questions came up.

In response

to one question on why Clifford was selected, Johnson wanted to show
that he had just that day made the decision.

Toward the end of his
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reply, L.B.J. said, "I saw some squib that some speculative reporter
wrote that indicated he £ciifford_37 might be under consideration
for this assignment.

I commented to him at a social affair one

evening, *1 understand you are a candidate for the Secretary of De
fense. 1 He flushed a little bit and said he was not a candidate;
he was not."
Of course, Johnson used other types or methods of support in
his answers.

He used details, specific examples, explanations,

literal comparisons and contrasts, and even visual supports from
time to time.
But the development of his answers (when Johnson did develop
points made in his replies) was enough like the development Johnson
used in his press conference voluntaries that further attention to
this aspect is probably not necessary here.

What seems more interest

ing and important is a treatment of the responses from another view
point.

Various techniques which are rather unlike traditional

supporting materials or methods of development appeared so fre
quently in Johnson's replies that they merit separate consideration.
Johnson's Responsiveness
Lyndon Johnson responded to questions in different ways in terms
of style and content.

To varying degrees he was able to answer ques

tions and thereby satisfy the needs of the public and the press.
and to what extent he avoided questions fluctuated, too.

How

Many of

Johnson's replies were more of the nature of comments to reporters
rather than statements on the Issues the correspondents raised in
their inquiry.

That is, in talking to reporters, mapy of his replies

seem to have been designed either to control or to spar with the press.
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The nature of Johnson's replies, then, may be discussed In terms of
his attempts at (1) controlling and (2) fencing with reporters, and
(3) approaching and (*») avoiding questions.
types of replying Is discussed below.

Each of these four general

Attention to more specific

maneuvers associated with each type and examples are also given.
This approach to press conference answers permits a description
as well as evaluation in terms of audience adaptation and with regard
for the purposes of the press, the president, and the public.
Controlling
That Johnson wanted to exert control In his press conferences,
including what he said In his voluntaries and answers, has been
established,

lhe President wanted to regulate the news conference

In different ways.

He determined scheduling and length.

were used to control content and emphasis.

Voluntaries

L.B.J.'s answers frequently

functioned to Influence what newsmen asked, how they asked, and what
they did with the answers.

The two main forms of controlling responses

may be called "anticipatory" and "directive."

Anticipatory responses

reflected the President's planning and preparation.

Directive respon

ses were those aimed at the reporters themselves rather than at con
tent of the questions.

Further explanation and illustration follow.

President Johnson's replies often reveal planning.

He anticipated

answering certain questions by preparing statements, reading remarks
aloud, interjecting answers, interrupting, and cutting off questions.
Some of the answers seem to have been carefully prepared.

The

questions on Clark Clifford's nomination (January 19# 1968) elicited
biographical details which were extremely specific in an answer
which was rather long.

The preparation probably was fruitful.

It
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has bean aeen hew handily L.B.J. could recite statistics.

He probab

ly briefed himself so that he could provide these data In the flow of
his answers.

Preparation helped Insure that certain Information would

get to the news media.

Such preparation can be desirable for all

conference participants.

It can provide accurate information for the

public and the press, and may even convey a good impression of the
president.
At times planning was even more obvious.

The President read

parts of some of his replies and recited quotations.

In one impromp

tu meeting with the press, February 27, 1967, L.B.J. read a long quo
tation by former War Secretary Henry Stlmson and recited a statement
by Lincoln in two separate answers on Vietnam.

It appears that John

son had planned these replies, even though the conference was without
advance notice.

The occasional reading and reciting of replies may

have helped Johnson forward something he had prepared.
added to the content.

Variety was

But whether all of what he read or recited was

of value to the press or the public is in doubt.
Another type of anticipatory response was interjection.

When

Johnson was not asked a question for which he had prepared an answer,
he sometimes simply interjected the statement.

He did this on

January 23, 196^, on the subject of his personal finances.

He

seemed to be saying that since he knew that the press was interested
In the topic, but for some reason had not asked, he would go ahead
and supply the reply.

Once in a while, if Johnson did not seem to

like the implication of a question he might cut in and make a state
ment.

For Instance, in a conference on June 17, 1965. one reporter

began, "Mr. President, since you made a recent speech, you expressed
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a willingness end acceptance of the fact that your foreign policy was
very subject to public discussion and such open remarks as this— 11
Johnson Interjected, "I have always believed that," as if to say the
reporter was implying that L.B.J.'s "willingness" to grant "public
discussion" was something new.

A more formal kind of interjection

has been considered in the previous chapter in which it was noted
that sometimes Johnson put announcements and statements during or at
the end of press conferences.

Interjected voluntaries may have re

sulted from having no stimulus questions at times.

Again, inter

jecting unrequested answers may have allowed Johnson to satisfy his
own needs but not necessarily the needs of the press or public.
Johnson did interject does not seem

important

What

enough to warrant an

interruption of a speaker or the flow of questioning.

In fact, the

device may have irritated reporters unnecessarily.
Anticipatory interruption appeared in several conferences for
another reason.

That is, the President occasionally interrupted a

reporter because he apparently felt he knew what the reporter wanted
to know and that there was little to be gained by hearing the com
pleted inquiry.

Whether he was anxious to tackle or reject the issue,

or whether he felt sure he knew what the question would be, Johnson
cut in and replied.
May 21,

1966, in

An instance appears in the transcript for

which a correspondent asked about "diplomatic ef

forts" to reach peace.

During the question, Johnson interrupted and

said " . . . We are working on it every day.
President.

We will as long as I am

I think that answers the only way I can now.

your next one will be to please tell what is going on."

I assume
Apparently

knowing what the follow-up question would be, he then answered that.

2Jh
On occasion the interruption was used to stop or disallow an
lnquixy.

In the July

JO, 19^»

meeting Helen Thomas began, "I just

wanted to know if you thought elective office was sort of a— "
Johnson stopped her, saying, "I don't think 1 want to get into that.
You might place the wrong construction on something like that.
doing

vtybest

to keep you all active."

I am

The topic had been the quali

ties L.B.J. expected in a vice presidential candidate.

Johnson

seemed not to want further discussion on the issue.
Most such interruptions appeared in non-broadcast conference,
but not exclusively.

For instance, on June 1, 1965t

following

Instance from a televised meeting occurred:
Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you two questions
about the Dominican rebellion, one dealing with its origin
and one dealing with the possible future. Do you think that
it would have been helpful if Juan Bosch had returned; and do
you think he might have exercised a restraining influence on
some of the left-wing extremists, or Communists, who are in
there? And secondly—
The President. I will answer your first one. I don't
want to get into personalities. Go ahead.
The habit of interrupting newsmen was probably not a contribu
tion to good give and take.

The device may have aided Johnson in

some way, but it also may have revealed excessive anxiety about con
trolling the questioning, if not the questioner.

In fact, Johnson

may have missed the intent of particular queries because his mind
seemed set to expect a specific question and because he did not per
mit a correspondent to complete an idea expressed interrogatively.
The anticipatory devices of preparing, reading, interjecting,
and interrupting were used to control the questioning and to permit
the President to disseminate material he was eager to release in
press conferences.

Most of those devices probably did little to
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■eat the needs

of the press and the public, although they have helped

Johnson on occasion.
A second type of control was more directive in nature.

In a

number of conferences the President tried to influence the press
through less subtle means.

He Instructed, requested, and appealed

to newsmen on various matters in order to guide the questioning and
the reporting which followed the conferences.
Sometimes President Johnson was didactic in his answers directed
toward the press.

That is, he told them what he wanted or expected

them to do.
The President responded to some questions by saying that report
ers should go to other sources, apparently in order to avoid answering
in a press conference.

On September 21, 1966, * newsman wanted to know

"how much the war in Vietnam is costing and how much it has been cost
ing from day to day," saying that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara
and other ’’U.S. Officials” had been unable t.o provide the data.

John

son told the reporter to read the appropriate congressional reports,
saying ” . . . I would commend to you some homework.

Go read the hear

ings.”
In a number of Johnson's impromptu conferences the President direc
ted reporters to what kind of questions (in terms of topics) were de
sirable.

He might say,

as he did August 18, 196^+,"I don't want to

get into a general press conference.”
In other conferences L.B.J. tried to explain to reporters how to
interpret his remarks to

the public.

For instance, on November 1, 1967,

a questioner wanted to know if his understanding of what L.B.J. had
said in a prior answer was "fair to say.” Johnson replied, "No, 1 am

2#
not saying that.
It.

If you don't know what I said, I hope you will read

I didn't say that at all.

Hy Job, as I have said to my press

friends so many times, is to prevent a fight, not to provoke one.
have a different responsibility.
ter.

You

I respect your position on the mat

I recognise It and I feel It."

(lhe "fight" Johnson referred

to was Implied by the questioner's interpretation which implied that
the President was blaming congress for a slump in the stock market.)
Since the President does control most aspects of his news con
ferences, most of the instructive remarks seem harmless.
might have been more tactful on occasion.

Perhaps he

To avoid confusion, he

might have been more forceful In his announcement period on outlining
what kind of questions were appropriate on occasions when he limited
the scope of the questioning.

Telling reporters how to report or in

terpret what he said may have been self-serving, but may also have been
clarifying for the press.
Another approach to directing the press was less didactic and
more suggestive In style.
ers.

Johnson sometimes made requests of report

For example. Instead of denying reporters the chance to ask

questions on a particular topic, he might ask for postponement.

L.B.J.

did this on the topic of Vietnam In response to a question In the
July 19, 1966, conference.

He said, in part, "I would like to get

in the war picture and Vietnam tomorrow, if I could."

Indeed, he

held a conference the next day and responded to several questions on
the topic.
Perhaps a more important kind of request to reporters was one
for clarification.

An occurrence of this appeared in the September 2,

1967, meeting in which Johnson interjected a lengthy announcement on
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a now authorisation to ship wheat to India.

One newsman asked about

the effect of the "closing of the Sues Canal" on the shipment.
asked, " . . .

I am not sure what you mean by interference.'

mean delay or something?"

("Delay" was meant.)

Johnson
Do you

This sort of request,

while rare in appearance, could be very valuable to the President and
to the press since the wording of answers on important matters like
foreign affairs can easily be misconstrued or misunderstood.
In some of his conferences L.B.J. seemed to be appealing to the
press.

For example, he might invite reporters to continue a certain

line of questioning, as he did on February 27, 1967, in an impromptu
conference.
up question.

He had been talking about Vietnam in response to a followAt the close of his response, Johnson said, "Do you

want to follow through on that?" When the correspondent said "no,"
L.B.J. said, "I don't think we have to be limited in this conference.
One of the things I think about an exchange of questions like this,
if you ask a question you can follow through, which you don't always
get to do on TV."

The reporter then explained to the President that

he did not want to "follow through" because Johnson's answer had suf
ficed.

Other times the President seemed to appeal for a certain em

phasis to be placed on his remarks as they were to be reported.

In a

conference on March 22, during the 1966 election campaigns, Johnson
seemed eager to get across a point on his relations with congress.
A reporter asked if L.B.J. would campaign and "explain" those attitudes.
The President replied, "I am explaining my attitude now, and that is
why I want you to help me.
to develop the point.

My attitude is good. . . . "

He went on
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A final, and rather minor, form of directive remark which showed
up In some conferences was made to Indicate a sequence of questioners
when it appeared that some reporters were anxious to get in a ques
tion yet, perhaps, feared they would be denied the opportunity.

On

occasion Johnson would Indicate that he understood the difficulty
and promised to allow a given newsman or two a chance in a particular
order.

This was generally done in a brief, tactful remark and proba

bly helped the press and the President.
Most of Johnson's directive controls were probably innocuous.
The didactic statements in answers usually were not highly valuable.
The best directives were probably those which requested clarification
from the questioner.

The unsubtle appeals for press aid, while proba

bly spontaneous and honest, seem to have been unnecessary, at best.
Fencing
As Press Secretary George Christian noted (see Chapter Two),
President Johnson enjoyed sparring with reporters.

The press con

ference seemed to draw out a debating approach to the situation.

Many

of Johnson’s press conference replies, whether eventually responsive
to the topics brought up, seem to have been directed at the questioner.
Johnson's fencing Included interrupting, demanding sources, brow
beating, humoring, kidding and joking, being personal, arguing, counter
questioning, correcting^ and attacking questions or questioners.
devices came up more frequently in the non-broadcast meetings.
also appeared often and throughout Johnson's administration.

These
They

More

over, they were too frequent and probably did little to better L.B.J.'s
press or public relations.

Johnson sometimes appeared abrupt and

sarcastic, sometimes caustic and relentless, if not rather defensive
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and Insecure in his jousting.

When he used tact and humor, however,

the effect was probably honorific for all participants.
Fencing responses account for portions of particular replies or
consist in all of what was said in answer to given questions.

Below

are examples of the various ways Johnson sparred with the press.
One method Johnson used was interrupting the questioner to find
out the source(s) behind an idea.

An illustration from the January 13»

1966, conference is typical, and went as follows.
Q. Mr. President, in connection with the appointments
in the Housing and Urban Development Department, there have
been reports that a task force headed by Dr. Wood recom
mended—
The President. What reports? I want to know who reports
what so I can see if it is—
Q. There have been published reports in the newspapers.
The President. Whose?
Q. There have been published reports in newspapers.
The President. Who published it? That's what I want
to know. I don't want to comment on something that-Q. Well, I saw something in the Washington Post.
The President. All right, go ahead. The Washington
Post. Now, what did the Washington Post say?
Q. That a task force headed by Professor Wood had
recommended the transfer of the Community Action Program
from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the new Depart
ment, and there have been subsequent reports that you have
decided against this. Can you make any comment on that?
The President, X would say that so far as the report
that I have made a decision on the matter, I would say it
is more propaganda than accurate. I have made no decision.
I have not been called upon to make any decision. We will,
in the days ahead, consider a good many reorganization
proposals, but the best authority for a Presidential deci
sion is the President or the President's Press Secretary,
and you can always get guidance on that, if you have the
time or the disposition to obtain it.
Q. That's why I asked you.
The President. Well, you got it. /Laughter^/ That's
why I told you!
A bit later in that meeting L.B.J. explained that he was "sensitive
sometimes" when he ran across statements and decisions falsely attri
buted to him in the news media.

So, often, when a reporter mentioned
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* source In a general or vague way, Johnson was not reluctant to seek
out the source.
Questioning sources gave Johnson, on occasion, an opportunity
to avoid questions with an apparent lack of factual basis.

For exam

ple, at noon on the Saturday before Johnson's announcement not to
seek reelection, a newsman raised an inquiry based upon "a story a
week ago" which predicted that L.B.J. would not announce his politi
cal plans "until the August convention in Chicago."

Johnson got the

questioner to admit that the source was a "dope story."

The President

said he would not discuss such reports.
Interrupting and probing correspondents for sources may have been
useful to the President, considering his own goals.

Again, however,

more tact might have helped him get along with even hostile reporters.
Since Johnson was not known to react too tactlessly in broadcast con
ferences, his image with the public probably was not directly affected.
The interruptions may have inhibited those reporters who did not like
to mention their sources.

Such reporters may have felt reluctant to

confront the President with certain kinds of information, perhaps
important data, because of the possibility of being challenged.
Another fencing device was sarcasm.

It usually appeared in the

way Johnson responded, rather than as an answer alone.

For instance,

on April 25, 1968, a reporter asked L.B.J. to reveal what he had said
to a group of congressional aides in a speech earlier in the day.
The President replied that his meeting had been "off the record."
Ending the reply, he said, "I didn't tell them anything you haven't
already known for a long, long time— so don't feel sorry for your
selves ."
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Another Instance came up In the February 11* 1966, conference.
The press pushed Johnson for the title of Bill Moyers, asking exactly
who should be considered "Press Secretary."

After six questions to

get Johnson's answer, L.B.J. finally said that Moyer's title was "Spe
cial Assistant to the President."
that.

He continued, "It has always been

You can call him Press Secretary, though,

thrill."

if it gives you any

Still pressing the issue was the next question, "Mr. Presi

dent, I would like to know your preference."

Johnson finally con

ceded that he had understood the problem and that he really did not
"object" to naming Moyers "Press Secretary."

Although the entire

exchange took only three or four minutes, it was probably wasted time.
Further, Johnson's phrase, such as "nursing the press," seems tact
less.
Johnson's sarcasm more frequently prevailed in non-broadcast
conferences.

In any event, it probably added little to presidential

relations with the press generally or with a good question and answer
period in a specific meeting.
At times Johnson's sparring with the press resembled debating.
In a number of conferences Johnson seemed to "turn the tables" on
his questioner, attack the question or the questioner in some way,
or label the question in order to dismiss it.
Sometimes President Johnson became defensive.

In a broadcast

conference on March 13, 1965, he was asked why he had waited almost
a week to meet reporters and discuss problems in Selma, Alabama.
Johnson answered that "nothing . . either required or justified" his
meeting reporters sooner.

He went on to point out that he "should

have some leeway" in deciding when to have conferences.

He said he
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had had "46" of then already and that only he would decide on the
timing, location, and content of his conferences.
To answer some queries Johnson told reporters to decide for
themselves.

On September 1, 1967, a correspondent asked L.B.J. to

respond to some remarks made by Governor George Romney.
answer was, "I'll just let you judge that statement.
more objective."

Johnson's

You could be

In another meeting, August 9, 1966, a reporter

presented some seemingly contradictory figures on an economic issue.
Johnson retorted, "I would let

you reconcile it," and then wenton

to admit that he was unable toanswer the question.

Two month's

after Johnson's March 31* 196B, peace proposal,

Robert Pierpoint asked Johnson about statements made by Nguyen Van
Thleu and Dean Rusk which "seemed to have changed the administra
tion's position" on the proposal.
"Mr. Pierpoint.
'seem.'

Johnson began his reply by saying,

I would think the key word in your question is

It does not seem that way to Secretary Rusk.

As Mr. Chris

tian informed you yesterday, it does not seem that way to the Presi
dent."

Johnson was apparently saying, why ask a question you already

know the answer to?

But he talked for about five minutes on the general

topic, perhaps to prove that nothing had changed in his policy.
President Johnson held a conference, with several governors pre
sent, on September 29, 1966, in which some rather testy replies ap
peared.

To one inquiry about a forthcoming conference on the war,

Johnson twice told reporters that they had already been briefed on
that topic.

The second time Johnson said, "For the eighteenth time

I will repeat:
plans."

Mr. Moyers will tell you as soon as 1 have made any

To another question on "some confusion . . . about the Viet

nam budget" L.B.J. said, "Yes.

I learned about that about 25 years
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ago.

Bill Whits used to represent the Associated Press long before

he got demoted by going to the New York Times. He used to come In
my office and he was always confused.

By the time I got him uncon

fused I found a big story on the front page involving me that took
me a week to get myself unconfused."

Johnson went on to say that he

had already answered the question before.

He made a long attack on

"people's impressions" and on "speculation."
vitriolic.

The attack became almost

At one point Johnson said, "In the

meantime anybody that

gets an impression, intimation, hunch, dream, or a little marijuana
is going to mislead somebody because I don't know myself."
reply, he said, "Is that true, Governors?
ment on it?

Ending the

Do any of you have any com

If you have any impressions, give them here now."

A variation of requesting sources was attacking statements which
supplied content for questions.

An inquiry on the possibility of

Robert McNamara's resignation came up on September 1, 1967 • L.B.J.
said, "That is the most ridiculous nonsensical report that I have
seen, I think, since I have been President."
The President sometimes argued that questions were unanswerable
because they were hypothetical, strictly speaking.

On April 20, 196*f,

a newsman wanted to know what Johnson would do if a current railroad
strike could not be settled by negotiation.

Before the reporter could

finish the question, Johnson cut in and said, "That is an 'iffy' ques
tion, and you know I don't want to admit it is about to fail to work
or predict it wouldn't work. . . . "

Having labelled the question,

Johnson then went on to say what he probably would do if the strike
could not be settled without his intervention.
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Die President also corrected reporters on occasion.

IVrice in his

November 1, 1967» meeting Johnson seemed to be attacking the press in
his corrections.

In a reply to a question on legislation which had

not passed, L.B.J. said, " . . .

Now, the press this morning called

these measures 'must bills' and that is your credibility, not ours.
You call them priority bills.
years. . . . "

I have gone through this for about 35

In answer to a later question, he replied, "First, I

want to correct you before you get a credibility charge.
anything about a stable economy.

I didn't say

I spoke of a prosperous economy."

Johnson continued by explaining the distinction.
Much of Johnson's fencing with reporters left a pejorative im
pression.

In some conferences, however, Johnson seemed to have been

more personable.

Although the transcripts indicate that Johnson

rarely addressed his Inquisitor's by name, except in the televised
conferences, he sometimes appears quite friendly with reporters.

In

some conferences he was even a bit playful, or humorous, in his re
plies.
In January of 1966 Senator Mike Mansfield, speaking for the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Issued a report of a visit to
Vietnam.

The President devoted a good deal of his "State of the

Union" speech to Vietnam on January 12, 1966.

On January 13, a report

er asked, "Mr. President, do you think that your report to the Nation
coincides with Mansfield's report on Vietnam?"
lt was somewhat later."

Johnson responded, "No--

Later in the same news conference was a ques

tion about "women in the military service."

The questioner said that

he had heard that some of these women were "distressed" because they
were not being sent to Vietnam.

In reply, L.B.J. said, "Well, there
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Is slvays a ohance of anything taking place when our women are suffi
ciently distressed. . . . "
The President's last press conference in the year 19^7 showed
some of Johnson's wit.

At the beginning of the meeting L.B.J. had

announced the appointment of Leonard Chapman to Commandant of the
Marine Corps.

Someone asked, "Mr. President, is he being nominated

for four stars?"

Here Is Johnson's reply, including explanatory

notes in the transcript:
sure.

"The Commandant may carry that— I'm not

I don't know how to— / At this point. Deputy Press Secretary

Robert H. Fleming handed the President a note. 7
touch the mike.
lation to start.

Stand here.

/ Laughter. 7

He says not to

Don't want any specu

I have heard about these notes being passed before,

so I want to clear that up right now."

Another question was whether

Johnson would "see Mr. Vance tomorrow."

The reply was, "Yes, if he

is here."
day.

The next question referred to Joseph Alsop's column that

Alsop had reported the "fact" that Johnson's cabinet had "made

a promise to . . . stay through the 1968 elections."

Johnson began

his answer, "I don't recall it," which again evoked laughter in the
December

b conference.

Generally, most of L.B.J.'s fencing with the press showed up in
non-broadcast, impromptu conferences.

His interruptions, demands for

sources, corrections, debating, and sarcasm simply may have reflected
his personality or mood. While the sparring may have been harmless,
it also may have shown some unwarranted defensiveness.
may have alienated some correspondents.

These tactics

Perhaps more tact, humor,

and even a more personal approach in the informal meetings might have
improved Johnson's rapport with the press and thereby increased his
general effectiveness with media representatives.
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The view of Johnson's controlling and fencing techniques gives
partial Insight into how he responded to questions, especially how
he reacted to the press in the conferences.

The next two sections

treat Johnson's responsiveness to questions in terms of his abilities
to supply the press and the public with useful facts and opinions.

Approaching
When Johnson wanted to answer a question, he was apparently
quite effective at times.

Although he frequently generalized, he

usually went beyond a mere "yes" or "no" when he chose to fulfill
reporters' needs.
own specific alms.

He also was quite effective in answers serving his
Examples of answers which served those alms and

the discussion of Johnson's methods of development revealed much of
how the President went about providing answers which were, to varying
degrees, positively responsive to the questions.

The present dis

cussion reviews and extends what was said in connection with L.B.J.'s
purposes and supporting materials.
While a good many of correspondents' questions were phrased so
that, technically speaking, a "yes" or "no" would have been a legiti
mate response, President Johnson frequently went beyond that kind of
reply in order to explain or justify.

Johnson's more responsive answers

may be characterized as "backgrounding," repeating, expanding, exhaust
ing, generalizing, arguing, and appealing.
Johnson did in his answers.

These terms point to what

Explanations and illustrations of each

technique appear in what follows.
"Backgrounding" refers in part to the answer categories which
prior presidents, such as Franklin Roosevelt, used.

Johnson rarely

Invoked the "background," "deep background," or "off-the-record"
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answers In his official news conferences.
In 1964 and early in 1965.

Because

The few times he did were

he and his staff met reporters

for "backgrounding" sessions rather frequently. It may have seemed
unnecessary to classify the responses in the official press confer
ences.

Not employing the traditional answer types may have prevented

confusion, awkward shifting from category to category, and a sense of
uncomfortable delay between question and answer.
Since It is not specifically known what Johnson said in his "deep
background" or "off-the-record" replies, evaluation is not appropriate
here.

On the other hand, a number of Johnson's answers were of the

background style.

Such replies provided the press with details on

the President's activities and programs and may have helped reporters
prepare materials for news stories.

Like Johnson's voluntaries which

briefed correspondents, narration, Itineraries, and explanations
appear.
Frequently, President Johnson responded to questions with a repe
tition or restatement of something he had said to another group or in
another situation on the same topic.

Whether as part of an answer or

as all of what he said, repetition and restatement were used most com
monly in reply to questions on policy, questions looking for previously
unannounced data, and questions which repeated or followed up previous
inquiries.

This method of reply probably added little to public infor

mation and in most cases did not aid the press in getting news.

John

son apparently used the device for rhetorical effect only.
On July 24, 1964, Johnson began a press conference with opening
statements, including remarks on American policy in Southeast Asia.
The voluntary was rather general.

It included this statement:

"Other
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friends suggest that this problem must be moved to a conference table.
. . . " but that "The North" did not seem able to "honor existing agree
ments."

A newsman asked Johnson to respond to a proposition by Charles

de Gaulle which suggested that the United States and France, Communist
China and the Soviet Union "all . . . get out of Indochina and leave
them to settle their own problems themselves. . . "

L.B.J. simply

repeated the point he had made in his voluntary about "those who are
ignoring the agreements reached at the conference table."
Again, on March 2, 1967, a reporter queried Johnson on policy in
Vietnam.

The answer began with a repetition of previous arguments

Johnson had made.

For example, Johnson said that North Vietnamese

"violation of two solemn agreements" (195^ and 1962 "Geneva Declara
tions") had caused American intervention and that "they" had made
no effort to settle the war because of continued "aggression."

The

points Johnson made were not at all new and seemed only to reinforce
what L.B.J. had said many times before.
Beyond mere repetition in answers was the technique of expanding
a point.

That is, Johnson frequently wanted to go further than a "yes"

or a "no."
President Johnson sometimes felt the need to explain or justify
his actions.

For instance, on September 30, 1967, he was asked if he

planned to request congress for "specific cuts in programs."
lengthy reply

L.B.J.

In a

explained that he had not asked for cuts because

he was waiting for congressional action on various bills.

The answer

shifted the responsibility for action to congress and seemed to justi
fy his waiting to trim the appropriations.
been unresponsive without the exposition.

A simple "no" might have
Further, Johnson's reply
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might have helped the press and the public understand how the President
Interacted with congress in budgetary matters.
Sometimes the expansion of a reply was used to amplify or heighten
what was said.

For instance, on January 13. 1966, the day after L.B.J.'s

"State of the Union," a newsman queried the President on the "reaction"
to the speech.

The response was "very good," according to Johnson.

He went on to show why he felt the response was favorable, mentioning
"50-odd applauses," "messages," and "wires."
Generally speaking, most of Johnson's attempts to expand what he
said were apparently useful.

While this type of answer probably did

not provide exciting "news," it supplied reporters with materials for
stories and sometimes helped explain Johnson's reasoning.
A less useful device is called "exhausting."

In this type of

response Johnson seemed to seize an issue and talk at length without
really providing new insights.

He seemed to be trying to cover as

many aspects of an issue as possible, to answer all major objections
to a policy, or to review all salient arguments he could make.

He

was, in effect, giving a speech on a broader topic than what the
stimulus question had brought up.

It is possible that by this Johnson

felt he could end discussion or questioning on a particular subject.
Or, perhaps, he wanted to demonstrate his ability to speak on the
issue.

By speaking for five or six minutes, he was limiting the time

available for other topics, Just as he had done with some of his ex
tensive voluntaries on Vietnam and the econony.

In fact, those two

Issues were commonly the subjects of bombardment in some of L.B.J.'s
replies.

Further, the content and style of such replies were very

similar to that of the voluntaries which had similar aims behind them.
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Less preparation and polish appeared In some of the protracted answers

than in the laborious voluntaries.

Johnson was evidently able to

speak at length, either extemporaneously or on an impromptu basis,
on certain themes.

Indeed, he had done so on the economy and on the

war so often that little preparation was probably necessary for his
short speeohes which existed in the form of answers.

This device

of exhausting a topic appeared Just as often in Johnson's televised
conferences as in his less formal meetings.

In the broadcast meetings,

however, employing this device probably was not effective except in
terms of Johnson's own purposes.

The types of reply seem

to have

been inappropriate for press conferences because the aim was usually
propagandists (and probably obviously so to the press), usually too
time consuming, and usually not very responsive to the basic needs
of the press and the public.

The exhaustive replies may have aliena

ted the press and bored the public because they were long and often
little more than restatements of other Presidential communications.
The President sometimes moderated the length of these replies, but
the "over kill" effect seemed to predominate anyway.
President Johnson's May 3. 1968, broadcast conference Illustrates
how he sometimes employed the device.

In that meeting the opening

statements took only about two minutes.
plies allowed only eleven questions.

The length of Johnson's re

None of the questions were longer

than the average of fifteen to thirty seconds a piece.

In answer to

one query regarding the possibility of a tax increase's passing con
gress, L.B.J. began with a point on budgetary "needs" for the tax.
He then reviewed his economic policies and practices, describing some
of his requests in 1966 and 1967. Next came a detailed discussion of
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currant works in the congressional committees responsible for the tax
Mil.

Johnson used the opportunity to chastise legislators for "this

continued procrastination" and to argue, again, the need for the tax.
The reply took about six or seven minutes to deliver.

With this rather

typical type of response the news conference became a public forum for
presidential persuasion.
Another instance occurred in the June 1, 19&5* news conference.
Johnson announced the removal of Marines from the Dominican Republic.
Many of the q\iestions had to do with the situation in that country.
The last questioner inquired about Juan Bosch's role in the conflict
and about the future of government in the Dominican Republic.

John

son had already reviewed some of the activities involving the United
States in other replies and in his voluntary on the topic.

Neverthe

less, he took the opportunity provided by the last query to spell out
again, in more detail, events of the crisis.
a defense of United States involvement.

The answer seemed to be

L.B.J. said, for example,

"Our citizens were under the beds and in the closets and trying to
dodge the gunfire."

Narration was colored with emotion.

Inter

spersed was praise for the military and diplomatic personnel.

John

son neither discussed Bosch nor did he speculate on the country's
future.

He merely dramatized and justified American involvement.

The justification may have been called for, not by the question, but
by criticisms.

Johnson's explanation was suasory in nature and did

not relate to foreign policy rationale, except for Johnson's hint
that "Communists . . . were active" in the hostilities.

Further, the

answer's content seems to have provided little new information.

End

ing the conference with this long response also postponed further or
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other Inquiry, which might have proven valuable.

Once more the Presi

dent's needs seem to have been met at the expense of the press, if not
the public as well.
Generalizing was a technique related to repeating and exhausting.
That is, repetitive responses and exhaustive replies sometimes totally
or largely were made up of generalizations, summaries, or broad state
ments of opinion.
plies.

The President answered in generalities in many re

He did not go beyond broad statements and supply specific

development.

Johnson could generalize briefly or at length.

More

over, such answers were often expressions of policy or philosophy.
Answers which were partially or wholly general were probably
antithetical in terms of reporter's

interest.

As for the largeraudi

ence, this type of reply probably added little knowledge.

Forthose

who were unaware of Johnson's policies, however, some of these replies
may have provided capsulized summaries, especially when the President's
policies or philosophies emerged.

Like repeating, the device appar

ently was used for emphasis or to provide a semblance of response when
more concrete data was not at hand.
A few days before a visit to the United States by India's Premier,
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Johnson met reporters.

In this press conference,

on March 23, 1966, a correspondent asked about what Johnson and Mrs.
Gandhi planned to discuss.

Here is the answer:

Q. Mr. President, can you say anything at all about
what you may be discussing with Prime Minister Gandhi?
The President. . . .1 am looking forward with a great
deal of pleasure to seeing the Prime Minister again. We
have met on several occasions.Mrs. Johnson and I spent
some time with her when we were in her country in 1961. I
had lunch with her Ambassador today, and spent a good while
visiting with him about the agenda.
We will be talking about our relations and what the
American people can do, working with the people of India,
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to promote peace end prosperity. I went to hear about
her Ideas and any suggestions she may have as to what
we can do that we are not doing In these fields.
We will, of course, talk about some of the things
that were on the agenda last year when a visit was
postponed, and again when I planned to see Prime Minis
ter Shastrl and was prevented from doing so by his
death. We will take up where we left off there. We
look forward to a very pleasant and very productive
visit.
The "agenda" was probably no surprise to anyone.

Neither did it

contribute much in the way of news or valuable information.
On February 1, 196**» Johnson was asked about the future of
South Vietnam.

In a brief reply L.B.J. reiterated an argument

that "Communist aggression" prevented "neutralization;" he con
cluded," . . . I think the course that we are following is the most
advisable one for freedom at this point."

Johnson had not made a

major policy statement on Vietnam this early in his administration,
although he had made the argument in previous statements.

This was

the first time in an official press conference that a request for a
policy statement had come up.

The answer appears to show that John

son had not yet formulated much of a "perspective," as the reporter
put it.

His answer, then, merely summarized an attitude he had

expressed previously, for example, in his "New Year's Message to the
Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Viet-Nam,"
(released to the press on January 1, 196*0.

It Is doubtful, however,

that the reply helped either the public or the press to better under
stand American aid to Vietnam, let alone what lay ahead.
That Johnson used the press conference for propaganda has been
seen.

A number of times he used his answers for arguing.

or blamed others for problems or apparent failures.

He accused

This technique

helped fulfill his goal of defending his administration.

But Johnson

also Argued to attack his political enemies.

Caustic retorts to such

politicians as Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and to those Republicans
who opposed his Great Society programs were made in several press con
ference answers, especially in 1964 and in 1966.

Although reporters

frequently "baited" Johnson with the criticisms of his detractors, the
President seemed unable, especially in election years, to curb what
was probably a natural or instinctive response.
have served L.B.J. well.

Such reactions may

He could vent his feelings and, at times,

place the blame for passage of legislation on his opponents.

He may

have been able to win public support for his own candidacy or for his
party.

Further, he often gave reporters material which probably al

lowed the heightening of a conflict.
This type of response seems, at times, to have beenundignified
and inappropriate.
cizing L.B.J.

In April of 196^, Richard Nixon gave talks criti

Nixon had returned from a trip to the Far East.

In a

press conference on April 13» a reporter asked if Nixon's remarks in
one speecn were "based on erroneous information about Viet-Nam."
son replied in part, "I don't know what it was based on.
talked to Mr. Nixon.

real information he got.

ponents.

I haven't

I assume that he spent a good deal of his time

out there looking after Pepsi Cola's interest.

doing."

John

I don't know how much

But at least, that is what he said he was

L.B.J. went on to say that he would like to talk with his op
He said, "I would like to have a relationship with the Repub

lican nominee similar to the relationship I had with President Eisen
hower, during the 8 years I was leader . . . "

Johnson ended the reply

with an appeal for bipartisan efforts in foreign affairs.

Had Johnson

avoided the attack on Nixon, the answer might have appeared more pala
table.

Moreover, attempting to quiet criticism of foreign policy may
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not have been in the best interests of the public.

It is understand

able that Johnson wanted "unity," even in a political campaign, but
attacking opponents in an attempt at unity may not have helped anyone
but Johnson.
A final technique of Johnson's strategy is called "appealing."
Johnson used emotional appeals to get support for his policies in his
speech making, in his press conference voluntaries, and often in his
answers to the press.

In these answers, he approached topics for

rhetorical purposes, circumventing the probable desires of newsmen.
These appeals, once more, seem misplaced.

It is doubtful that corres

pondents wanted public speeches in answer to their inquiries.

Never

theless, Johnson took the opportunity a number of times to use the
occasion for long, passionate pleas.

Given the many other channels

of communication available to a president, the use of this technique
in the news conference probably hampered Johnson's effectiveness,
especially with the press corps.
On March 9. 196?, Johnson used his first "live and in color"
broadcast conference to respond to a criticism made by Arthur
Schleslnger, Jr., on Johnson's peace efforts.

L.B.J. talked about

"the other side" which "continues to kill our men, to lob their mor
tars into our air bases, to seize South Vietnam by force."

Johnson

continued,
But I do not think it is fair to ask an American Comman
der in Chief to say to your men, "Ground your planes, tie
your hands behind you, sit there and watch division after
division come across the DMZ, and don't hit them until they
get within a mile or two of you."
I don't think that is fair to American Marines or
American soldiers.
We have talked before while acts of war continued. We
did that in Korea. We had the blockade on in Berlin while
we had conferences.
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So we are willing to talk unconditionally, or we are
willing to talk conditionally. All we ask Is equity and
fairness, and that the other side do likewise. We don't
think you ought to ask the American boys to do one thing
while other folks do nothing.
Generally speaking, backgrounding, repeating, expanding, exhaust
ing, generalising, arguing, and appealing were President Johnson's
chief devices for approaching questions.

For the most part the re-

qaonses appear to have been more designed to meet L.B.J.'s aims than to
serve the press and the public.Often the use of the techniques

led

to answers which do not seem to have been appropriate for thepresi
dential press conference.
Avoiding
Whether an answer approached or avoided a question involves de
grees.

The preceding section shows how Johnson seems to have responded

in approaching Issues.

As many, if not more of Johnson's responses

may be said to have avoided rather than approached Issues.

Some of the

devices he used for dodging are explained in this part of the chapter.
President Johnson's answers proved that he was adept at avoiding
Issues.

His abilities and the extent to which he passed over ideas is

interesting and significant.

L.B.J.'s frequent, apparent unrespon

siveness was not surprising considering his attitudes toward the press,
his press conference goals, and his practices of control, secrecy and
surprise.

From the standpoint of reporters, what Johnson said in his

answers probably had less news value than what he said in opening
statements and announcements.

While questions often got "reactions,"

getting new information or significant replies was even more difficult.
Johnson employed a wide variety of devices to avoid answers.
These devices may be grouped Into three categories.

Basically,
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Johnson refused to answer, referred a question to another source,
or circumvented an Issue.
First, the President had a number of ways of refusing to answer
questions.

He eschewed the "no comment" wording, although if asked

whether he would discuss a particular issue, he sometimes simply said
"no."

Other devices included stalling for time, discouraging a type

or area of inquiry, rejecting or cutting off a specific question,
denying an ability to answer, and withdrawing or generally retreating
from questions.
One refusal technique was to stall for time.

That is, Johnson

was able to evade by telling a reporter that the question was prema
ture.

For instance, requests for names of nominees, before official

ly announced, were usually met with the reply, "When we know, we will
let you know."
that.

This was commonly used and Johnson rarely went beyond

He did not discuss who might be under consideration or when

the press could expect the answer.
asking for speculation or prophecy.

Johnson also stalled on issues
He did, however, often express

hope and optimism for a happy outcome on those issues,
Johnson was frequently asked about his campaign plans.

In

1964, he was asked whether he would debate the Republican nominee on
several occasions.

The question came up in L.B.J's second press

conference, December 18, 1963. Johnson said that when he was nomina
ted, he would decide whether to debate.

He was thus able to table

the issue for eight months.
On the question of progress in arranging peace talks, which came
up in the October 24, 1968, meeting, Johnson put reporters off.

He

said that the October 16 statement by his press secretary was the latest

258
word.

Next he told of how much he wanted peace and said he was

doing all he could toward that end.
to make news until there is news.

He then said, "We do not want
And we realize that many times

diplomacy can be more effective in private than to have all your
discussions, recommendations, and prophesies carried in the press."
He repeated that nothing had changed and sald,"When there is anything
to report, you will be informed."
Another refusal technique was to discourage certain kinds of
questions.
sisted.

Sometimes the device worked.

Other times, reporters per

Johnson liked to discourage guessing.

In a conference held December 21, 1966, a reporter said, " . . .
how do you feel about the speculation that you may not run again in
1968?"

Johnson replied, "I feel about that like I do most speculation.

I have other things to do."

After two other inquiries, on other af

fairs, the question came up again.

Johnson answered, " . . .

expressed myself on speculation. . . . "

I have

The next question was, "I

wonder if you could make it more direct.’ Do you intend now to run
in 1968?" L.B.J. rephrased his reply, too.
that bridge when I get to it.

He said, "I will cross

This is not 1968."

There followed a

question on whether the appearance of Attorney General Ramsey Clark
meant Johnson planned to say anything about Clark.
at all.

Johnson said, "Not

When I have an announcement, as I said, you will be the first

to know it."

No more questions on Clark's presence occurred, nor did

L.B.J. say why his Attorney General was there.
Certain kinds of questions on Vietnam, especially those asking
for specific answers, were frequently rebuffed.
June 18, 1966, this question came up:

For instance, on

"Mr. President, would you please

259
explain for us why It's wrong for us to bomb the capital in North
Vietnam, and who has ordered this theory Into policy?"

Johnson dodged,

saying, "I don't think I would want to comment on the tactics or
strategy at this point."
In a question and answer session on July 18, 1967, a reporter
said, "Can I ask you about Chancellor Kiesinger, Mr. President?"
(Johnson had just announced that Kiesinger would visit the United
States in August).

Johnson said, "Yes."

you write a letter to him?"

The reporter asked, "Did

L.B.J. responded, "I dorft discuss corres

pondence."
Another technique, rejecting, was also used.

That is, Johnson

cut off or dismissed particular questions, sometimes without explana
tion.

Johnson did this in his January 27, 196*4-, meeting.

asked, "Do you agree with Wright Patman— "

A reporter

Interrupting, Johnson said,

"I have not discussed Mr. Patman*s ideas with him or anyone else."
Then L.B.J. told reporters that this was a "formal press conference"
and that he wanted to help them.

Nothing was "secret" except "some

things which may fall within the national interest which must be kept
secret."

Next he told the press, "I will see you next week."

er asked where.

A report

Johnson said he didn't know and that saying he would

meet them was "good enough."
Saturday Mr. President?"

Another reporter asked, "Will it be on

L.B.J. made no reply at all, according to the

transcript.
On July 9, 1965i a correspondent asked Johnson, "to what extent"
he was getting news about a British peace attempt "and what opportuni
ty .. . for a peace talk" might exist.
informed about it."

Johnson responded, "We are
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Another evasive device to refuse answering was denying adequate
knowledge or specific information to answer.

The argument might go,

"How can I answer if I haven't seen the report you are talking about?"
For Instance, Johnson was asked to comment on an article from "a
French magazine."

The article apparently reported a communication

of Ho Chi Minh to Russian leaders which involved the possibility of
United States aid to China.

Johnson passed over the question, saying

only, "I haven’t read tie Paris magazines."
One last kind of refusal was total withdrawal from a question or
issue area.

The effect was a "no comment" response.

usually a brief "no."
refusal to answer.

The reply was

That is, he did not explain or justify his

In a few conferences Johnson appears to have been

almost totally unresponsive.
On October

13,

1966, Johnson met reporters in New York City

(in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) and introduced Prince Souvanna Phouma,
Prime Minister of Laos.

After the opening statements, the first

question was met with "No.

Anyother questions?"

tions followed, all answered by "no."

Seven more ques

In only two of the eight nega

tive responses did Johnson go beyond the "no."
Johnson announced Chief Justice Earl Warren's resignation in his
June 26, 1968, conference.
ferent subjects.

Johnson heard nineteen questions on dif

To most he was unresponsive and had no comment.

Perhaps less unresponsive was the second general technique, called
"referring."

The use of this device was probably for evasion at times.

L.B.J. generally referred the press to previous or current statements
or to other sources.

Among others, he told reporters to take their

questions to attorneys general, to government leaders and agencies.
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and to persons or organisations mentioned as the sources behind
certain questions.
It was seen that President Johnson often repeated or restated
old ideas or materials In his answers.

On occasion, however, he

Just referred questioners to previous statements.
was in a brief recommendation.

Usually the device

Other times, the referral was developed

with a summary of what had been said.

Johnson referred questions to

previous speeches, to prior press releases, to previous press con
ference statements and answers, to handouts such as biographies avail
able at the time (or at the end) of the conference, and to volun
taries or answers just presented in a conference.
Channeling questions to others was somewhat less common than sug
gesting that a reporter go back to a prior statement.
Just over a week before L.B.J. was nominated by his party in
1964, Johnson held a press conference (on August 18).
naturally inquisitive about his plans.
his "plans for next week."
lenti, L.B.J.'s aide.

Reporters were

One asked if he would discuss

Johnson told the newsman to ask Jack Va

Johnson also said, "With regard to the conven

tion, I expect to go up later Thursday evening— I don't know what time—
if I go at all."

A moment later a reporter said, "Mr. President, did

I understand that you might not go to Atlantic City at all?"
son said, "No."
"Evidently.

The reporter replied, "I misunderstood."

I didn't say I would, or wouldn't."

John

L.B.J. said,

Whether Mr. Valenti

knew Johnson's plans, when apparently the President did not know, is
problematic.

Johnson might have offered to provide the information

at a later and specific time.
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In his nesting with reporters on June 18, 1966, the following
exchange occurred:
Q. Mr, President, can you give us your thinking, sir,
on the propriety of a United States Senator going abroad
and making critical comments about the Internal policy of
another nation?
The President. I think that it would be a better policy
to let the Senators judge the propriety of their own actions.
It is not for the executive branch to be passing upon state
ments of Senators.
There are a great many statements made by the Senate
that an Executive will approve of, and some maybe that he
will disapprove of. But I don't think as a general policy,
it is wise for us to set up any censorship down here. I
just have to leave it up to their judgment.
The answer further illustrates a referral which allowed Johnson to
dodge a question.
A third general avoidance strategy was circumvention.
President Johnson avoided direct comment but talked, anyway.

That is,
When

he did this, he often shifted to another topic, substituted an answer
on the general topic for a response to a specific inquiry, ignored
the question and interjected an announcement, digressed, equivocated,
groped for an answer, repeated or restated answers, rationalized,
transferred blame for failures, appealed to laughter, used semantics
to evade, and "forgot."

Not all of these eleven devices warrant dis

cussion here because some were similar to devices mentioned in connec
tion with the other three response strategies.

Below are illustrations

of a few of the devices used to circumvent Issues.
Johnson sometimes shifted from a point in a question to a person
ality or to another issue in response to questions.

For instance, on

November 4, 1966, (close to election day), a newsman asked about a mis
understanding of the policy set forth in the Manila Conference on the
war in Southeast Asia.

The reporter mentioned that Richard Nixon's
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interpretation would mean that the Intention of a withdrawal plan
proposed at the meeting "would leave South Vietnam to the mercy of
the Vietcong."

Johnson, rather than explaining the proposal, began

his reply with an attack on Nixon, whom L.B.J. called "a chronic cornplainer."

Johnson later said, "you can read the communique.11 He

then went into a defense of the motives of the participants in the
Conference, especially the United States.
communique "shouldn’t be confused."

He talked about why the

He closed the long answer by

saying, " . . . When the aggression, infiltration, and violence
ceases, not a nation there wants to keep occupying troops in South
Vietnam."

And to reshift emphasis, he said, "Mr. Nixon doesn't serve

his country well by trying to leave that kind of impression in the
hope that he can pick up a precinct or two, or a ward or two."
Johnson also substituted general replies to questions requesting
specific or other information.
specific issue and express hope.

A common response was to ignore the
For instance, in his August 3* 1967,

conference, L.B.J. was asked for a progress report on a nuclear non
proliferation treaty.
expressed optimism.

Johnson said, "progress" had been made and he
In a similar question on the progress of the

Paris peace negotiations, asked in L.B.J.'s October

2k,

1968, meet

ing, Johnson's response was to express hope and to assert that efforts
toward peace were continuing daily.
Good examples of other substitutions of interjections and of di
gressions came up in informal press conferences.

Johnson's birthday

press conference in 1966, for instance, illustrates how the devices
could be used.
cial problems."

L.B.J. was asked how he felt and if he had "any spe
He avoided "problems" and reminisced for approximately
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twenty minutes.

Although the length of the reply was not typical,

the style of the digression was.

Equivocation was also used.

One example was the answer on his

convention plans in 196**, described above.

In another session with

the press corps, August 2**, 1967, a newsman asked Johnson to predict
the outcome of congressional elections.

In his reply, L.B.J. referred

to a report in the Christian Science Monitor showing "an average gain
of **1 seats in off-year elections since 1890."

Johnson talked about

the general possibilities of gains or losses and then said, " . . .

I

don't expect to see any unusual changes from what you would expect
normally in an election this year."

He went on to downgrade current

predictions by Republicans and closed, saying that the indications he
had showed no certainty of "change above the expected change in an
off-year election."

A correspondent then asked if the "**1 seats,"

would then be acceptable as a "norm" in L.B.J.'s prediction.
President replied, "No.

The

No, I don't know of any /norm_7* . . . "

Johnson did not want to be held to a prediction although he apparent
ly had not minded talking "around" the idea.
On some occasions Johnson seemed to be "thinking out loud" or
groping for an answer while talking.
fairly simple requests.
he seemed to be teasing.
going anywhere today?"
no immediate plans.

Sometimes this occurred with

In one instance, Saturday, April **, 196**,
One question was, "Mr. President, are you
L.B.J. responded, "Not that I know of.

But I would not want to preclude getting out, if

I got through with the matters at hand and got my desk clear.
like to take a little walk.
anything."

I have

I might go out.

I would

I do not want to schedule

(The next question was: "But how far, sir?"

Johnson said,

265
"as far

as

I could, away from hare,")

usefulness.

Johnson's raply seams of little

Further, a simple "I don't know, but I have no plans,"

might have been more responsive.
One circumvention technique was transferring blame.

When particu

lar problems were presented to the President in questions, he was quick
to lay blame.

For the inability of his administration to bring about

peace in Vietnam he blamed the "enemy."

For domestic difficulties he

censured congress or accused critics in the press or in the Republican
party for creating or adding to existing problems.

For instance,

Johnson was questioned about a veto during his August 25. 1965. broad
cast conference.

Johnson argued that because his "best legal advisers"

and the Attorney General had determined that the act in question was
"repugnant to the Constitution," L.B.J. had no other choice.

The im

plication, of course, was that the Congress was at fault rather than
the President.
Another technique to dodge a question was to appeal to laughter.
One illustration appears in the President's September 8,1966, press
session, as follows:
Q. Mr. President, you have used the phrase which has
been repeated over and over again in regard to Vietnam, which
has become a measure of your determination in the Vietnam
war. You have used it in this message by saying: "This ad
ministration is prepared to recommend whatever action is
necessary to maintain stable growth," et cetera.
Does this represent a similar degree of determination
on the domestic stability issue?
The President. Ask your question again. I know what I
said but I am not clear what you said. What question are
you asking? /Laughter_7
Q. You have used the phrase "whatever is necessary"
to carry on the war in Vietnam over and over again. It
has become a measure of your determination to 3ee the
Vietnam war through to the necessary conclusion.
Now you have used that same phrase "whatever is
necessary" to keep domestic stability in this message
with respect to keeping the domestic economy stable.
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My question was singly: Does this represent a similar
degree of determination on the whole economy?
The President. When I say "whatever is necessary/'
I mean whatever is necessary. I mean It whether It is ap
plied to Vietnam or to the domestic situation or to
answering your question. J_ Laughter _7
Although Johnson's poking fun may have been justified, considering
the wording of the question, he apparently did not want to spell
out possible means of promoting economic stability.
In the conference just cited is an example of using the phrasing
of a question to avoid an answer.

In this particular case, a report

er asked, "Mr. President are you sorry, the way some economists say
you should be, that you did not raise taxes last spring?"

L.B.J.

said, "I am not aware of any economists who have said that to me."
This represents a twisting of the intent and phrasing of the ques
tion, or "semantic evasion."

Another example occurred in the Presi

dent's July 31, 1967, meeting.

One question was, "Mr. President, it

was reported on Saturday that Marshal Tito received a personal mes
sage from you.

I wonder if you would say anything about that."

Rather than not consenting, Johnson said, "Yes. We are in communica
tion from time to time with the leaders of other nations.
communicated with President Tito on occasion."
something.

We have

Indeed, Johnson said

But he probably did not offer what the newsman wanted.

The circumventional techniques were varied and clever.

They

were used extensively throughout President Johnson's years in office.
Tactics of evasion probably fulfilled the President's aims only,
except when "the national interest" was a justifiable excuse for
avoiding reply, or when questions were of so little import that no
real response was demanded.
doing, if not why.

The press probably knew what Johnson was

Correspondents often ignored circumventional
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responses and repeated specific queries.

Prom time to tine Johnson

was asked why he avoided answering on particular topics, or If the
public would not better be served by a more responsive reply.

John

son's ready argument was that he would accept the responsibility of
determining what was in the national interest, which was his function
as the President of the United States.

Audience Adaptation
The extent to which Johnson's responsiveness to his audiences is
reflected by the means of controlling and fencing with the press,
and approaching or avoiding issues reveals a lack of effectiveness
from the standpoint of audience adaptation.
use of announcements, as well.

This seems true of the

In terms of Johnson's goals, the

aims of the press, and public needs, Johnson distorted, to a degree,
the functions of the presidential press conference with his replies.
He was not the first or only chief executive to use the particular
devices studied in this chapter.

Neither were his goals and methods

of development necessarily unique.

President Johnson apparently often

gave useful answers in a manner that would benefit the public and the
press.

On balance, however, it seems that even more often Johnson's

answers were too calculated to meet his own purposes, especially his
aims of publicity, promotion, defense, ethos enhancement, and control
over the press.

Many of Johnson's news conferences and a general

view of his answers leave an Impression that this president was not
very effective in adapting to his immediate and eventual or distant
audiences, the press and the public.

This does not mean that vigorous

attempts to win public opinion for the sake of productive leadership
and power are inappropriate in presidential press relations,

because
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the White House has so many other avenues to accomplish that aim,
Johnson probably went too far to achieve his own ends in answers
at his press conferences.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
Impetus for this study came from two basic voids.

First and

most Important was the lack of serious attention given to the
presidential press conference by rhetorical critics.

Second.

Lyndon Johnson's news conferences have not been studied carefully
by speech critics.

The Presidential Press Conference
The president of the United States is not required by law or
by the Constitution to communicate with the press.

The presidential

news conference is an institution which evolved with the growth of
news media and with changing styles of presidential leadership.
The chief executives of the nation have determined the nature and
extent of their press relationships.

More specifically, they have

decided how, when, and why to meet newsmen in person.
Among controls which a president exercises over the press con
ference are timing, frequency, location, content, and even who may
attend.

Recently, presidents have chosen whether the conference is

broadcast to the public.

Moreover they have determined which ques

tions to answer, which correspondents might inquire, and whether and
to what extent the press could use the president's answers.
The functions of the news conference involve the goals or needs
of the participants.

Among presidential aims are informing, persuading,
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•nd especially Influencing public opinion.

For the representatives

of the media, the conference provides the commodity of "news."

The

press also functions as a vehicle of feedback by asking questions
which express public concern and Interest.

Another, related theory

sees the press as a "fourth branch" of government because of its
influence on the decisions and actions of a president.

The confer

ence may also serve the public's needs to monitor its leaders, to
gain understanding of presidential policy and action, and to learn
more of contemporary White House affairs.
The presidential press conference is unlike the question period
of the British House of Commons.

Among several important differences

is the extra-legal nature of the news conference.

The participants

and the formats differ considerably.
Presidential press relations before the administration of Wood
row Wilson led to the establishment of the modern news conference.
Prior to the Civil War, most American presidents relied heavily
on partisan, political publications for persuasion.

Until Jackson's

election, most presidents had little direct contact with reporters.
Andrew Jackson was probably the first president to use the press di
rectly and aggressively.

The presidents between Jackson and Lincoln

were undistinguished in their press relations.
Abraham Lincoln had considerable journalistic experience before
reaching the White House.

He, like Jackson, learned the intricacies

and potential of what was emerging as a powerful arbiter of public
opinion in America.

Lincoln succeeded at establishing productive

contacts with reporters, editors, and publishers.
avidly.

He read newspapers

He contributed articles and copies of his speeches to papers
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to further his effectiveness*

Lincoln wts Accessible to newsmen end

sometimes granted interviews.
After Lincoln, the next president who was enterprising in using
the press was Grover Cleveland.

But most of the time Cleveland rele

gated to his staff the task of dealing directly with newsmen.
Theodore Roosevelt became one of the most able chief executives
in rallying support in the news media.

He provided the first White

House press facility, wrote articles, prepared releases, and met with
selected correspondents in Informal exchanges.
William Howard Taft had held fruitful weekly news conferences as
Secretary of War but did not fare well with the press when he attained
the higher office.
The evolution of the modern presidential news conference began
with Woodrow Wilson.

President Wilson is credited with having estab

lished the presidential press conference, because, among other reasons,
he set his meetings on a regular basis and refined formal regulations
which provided patterns for later presidents.

Because of his personal

ity and questions of national security, Wilson's conferences deteriora
ted and were finally discontinued in 1917.
Warren Harding reinstated the institution, invoked a rule requir
ing written queries, and met regularly with reporters until the
end of his administration when his press relations waned.
Calvin Coolidge was cunning in his handling of the media.

He

met correspondents twice weekly but responded mainly on an off-therecord basis.

He used the conference to make announcements and to

build rapport with his questioners.

He disallowed quotation, but for

his political aims he encouraged reporters to embellish and dramatize
the relatively unimportant information in his answers.
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Herbert Hoover, like Taft, had begun good press relations as a
cabinet officer.

However, the White House press corps posed such a

challenge that Hoover was Ineffectual and finally quit seeing them
directly.
Franklin Roosevelt was a sharp contrast to previous presidents.
F.D.R. took the press practices of his term as Governor of New York
to his White House office.

His lively, frequent exchanges were evi

dence of an accomplished speaker and leader.

He met correspondents

two times each week for Informal, oral questions and answers.

F.D.R.

used four reply categories of which one, indirect quotation, seems to
have been his own invention.

Roosevelt was quite effective in promot

ing his administration through his news conferences, as he was in
other communications.

More than any previous chief executive, Roose

velt realized the full potential of the presidential news conference.
Harry Truman followed a number of F.D.R.'s practices with a good
measure of success.

He faced the press corps once a week and responded

to the increasing size of that body by moving his meetings to an
auditorium.

In 1951» he allowed the release of recorded excerpts

for radio broadcast.

This was an innovation.

Dwight Eisenhower also contributed to the presidential press con
ference.

After his once weekly meetings his staff Issued edited tran

scripts to newsmen.

Elsenhower allowed television films of his con

ferences to be broadcast.
of a press conference,

He was the first to permit a live broadcast

Eisenhower was somewhat aloof and formal, and

was unimpressive in ways.

He probably did not achieve the success

that F.D.R. and Truman had in press meetings.
John Kennedy jolted the public and the press with live, televised
conferences.

Kennedy established good rapport with his inquisitors
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and cane across well on television.

His meetings apparently were effec

tive In maintaining a favorable public Image and In sustaining support
for his leadership.

J.F.K. carefully prepared for his press meetings.

After brief opening statements, he faced about four hundred corres
pondents and deftly handled about two dozen questions In the thlrtymlnute sessions.

Later, he sometimes watched a taped replay with aides

to assess his own skill.
Lyndon Johnson took reporters back to the Roosevelt era with his
frequent, informal, and Impromptu meetings.

His approach was experi

mental, especially during his first two years as president.

He tried

a variety of formats, including broadcast meetings, walking confer
ences, and appearances with important guests.

He seemed most happy

with "surprise" conferences held in his office.
with reporters were mercurial.

L.B.J.'s relations

Johnson became the butt of much

criticism and even personal attack in newspaper and magazine re
ports.

Nevertheless, he continued to meet the press and vigorously

attempted to exploit the industry and the news conference to fulfill
his leadership alms.
Richard Nixon, too, has experimented with ways to communicate
with newsmen.

But Nixon generally has avoided direct contact with

reporters and has held few news conferences.

He prefers direct,

broadcast communication with the public, letting his aides deal with
questions from media representatives.

Nixon's failure to face repor

ters has been criticized and has postponed refinement of the presi
dential press conference as a means of leadership and communication.
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lyndon Johnson and the Press
President Johnson's early Interest In oratory, debate, politics,
and journalism may have Influenced his presidential press relations.
He was active at participating In those fields as a college student.
For a while, he taught and coached debate.
Many years In government at the national level gave L.b.J. the
opportunity to observe successful leaders as well as the chance to
develop his own press relations.

As Johnson rose to power in the

Senate, he established a style of handling the press which was charac
terized by a domineering manner.

He preferred Informal and impromptu

get togethers with small groups of newsmen.

Senator Johnson never

distinguished himself as a public speaker, although he gained in
prominence within the Democratic Party.

His press relations during

the years before he became president were not spectacular.

He was

secretive and unduly sensitive to criticism.
In developing his approach to the press conference, Johnson may
have emulated F.D.R.

Further, he may have been influenced by a desire

not to be compared with Kennedy.

There is some evidence that Johnson

distrusted the "eastern establishment" press which apparently had had
so much rapport with Kennedy.
Johnson's attitudes

toward the press were complex.

be fascinated with the news media.

He seemed to

L.B.J. read several newspapers

and monitored broadcasts daily and with much interest.

He was highly

conscious of the value of publicity and instructed his staff to make
calculated efforts at getting press attention to the achievements of
his administration,

Johnson got along well with some individual news

men and cultivated relationships with others.
service.

He expected loyalty and

He even attempted to trade favors with some writers.
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President Johnson had many dislikes.

He was bothered by reporters'

mistakes, personal criticisms, speculative and interpretative writing,
exaggerations, and "leaks" which he had not originated,
Although Johnson probably had no formal press conference philo
sophy, his practices led to some habitual ways of approaching the
speaking situation.

He was pragmatic and purposive.

He preferred

Informality with reporters and direct communication with the populace.
Broadcast conferences were uneasy events.

Further, he liked to sur

prise the press with meetings and with occasional dramatic statements.
The secretiveness of his senate days carried over to the presidency.
L.B.J. wanted control over the reporters who covered him and over the
format for communicating with the press.

He also exhibited an almost

impulsive need to experiment with different kinds of meetings with
media representatives.
President Johnson met the press just about every day and in an
interesting variety of ways.

He met with small groups for briefing

and off-the-record sessions.

He granted private and televised inter

views.

His official conferences varied in location, planning, for

mality, length, and timing.

He was unpredictable in ways.

He was

also well prepared for his conferences even if the press corps was
not.

Johnson's Press Conference Content
President Johnson's opening statements and the reporter's ques
tions were the main constituents of the content in the conferences.
Johnson made extensive use of announcements in his official news
conferences.

He discussed executive affairs, domestic issues, foreign

relations, and personal matters.
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Johnson's favorite area of announcement was executive affairs.
L.B.J. often used the press conference to announce changes in the
personnel of the executive branch.
of recent meetings.

He also talked about the results

He described itineraries, reviewed dally and

weekly plans and activities, announced decisions, and Issued state
ments of policy.

At times, Johnson Invited cabinet and military

officials, governors, and visiting dignitaries to make statements
to the press.
The President also made announcements on domestic Issues.

During

his first two years in office he was prone to dwell at length on the
prosperous state of the economy.
promote his legislation.

Sometimes he used voluntaries to

Current events directly stimulating his ac

tion were touched upon.
Foreign affairs also came up, but not frequently.
statements on the war in Vietnam from time to time.

Johnson gave

He occasionally

spoke on current relations and agreements between the United States
and other countries.

American involvement in the affairs of Panama,

the Dominican Republic, and the Middle East were discussed periodi
cally.
In a few conferences Johnson initiated discussion on personal
matters, especially his health.
The specific Issues raised by reporters' questions involved
similar topic areas.

Newsmen were interested in Johnson's public

and private life, in current domestic events, in politics, and in
foreign affairs.
Correspondents queried Johnson on the subject of Vietnam more
than any other topic.

In fact, the general area of foreign affairs

was most popular with the press.
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While Johnson was often questioned on his official activities,
reporters seemed just as curious about his political life.
Relatively speaking, the press asked few questions on the
nation's econotqy and on legislation.

They did, however, frequently

inquire about specific contemporary events in the United States.
A profile of an average press conference might show four ques
tions on the presidency, five questions on domestic matters, six
queries on foreign relations (with four on Vietnam alone), and at
least one miscellaneous inquiry.

Johnson's Opening Statements
President Johnson used his announcements for six specific pur
poses.

He wanted to explain, to get publicity, to promote the achieve

ments of his administration, to defend his leadership from external
criticism, to improve his image with the public and the press, and
to control the press and the news conference.

Most of his goals and

most of what he said in his voluntaries were for persuasion, to
mold public opinion, and to gain support for his policies and pro
grams.
Johnson used a variety of traditional methods of development and
supporting materials in his opening statements.

His materials were

similar to the development of ideas used in his formal addresses.
Further, he generally used appropriate means to carry out his alms.
He commonly employed statistics, details, narration, and testimony.
He used repetition and restatement for amplification.
L.B.J. had an assortment of special devices to meet the conference
format.

His techniques related to frequency, length, timing, issue

27*
Avoidance, anticipation, Interjection, and guest participation in the
opening statements.

Johnson controlled the content of his conferences with the devices
of scheduling and length.

He generally avoided Issues reflecting fail

ures of his administration.

His approach was to present good news as

often as possible and not to mention bad news.
anticipate reporters' questions.

Johnson attempted to

Sometimes he interjected announce

ments In the question period or at the close of his conferences.

He

also asked guests appearing with him to make comments to correspon
dents.

He was so expansive in using voluntaries that often a fourth

to one half of an entire conference was taken up by long preliminary
remarks.
Johnson's aims, methods of development, special techniques, and
extensive use of voluntaries showed more regard for his own needs than
for the needs of the press.

Johnson used reporters as a captive audi

ence for short orations, long promotional remarks, and defensive at
tempts to answer his critics.

Much of the material he presented was

not newsworthy because it was repetitive of older or prior state
ments.

On the other hand, Johnson sometimes made dramatic announce

ments and gave Informative explanations of interest and value to the
press and the public.

Reporters' Questions
The content of the questions was timely, important, appropriate
to the situation, and responsive to the needs of the public and the
President.

Reporters may have been too interested in current domes

tic affairs at times, but as a whole, the inquiry was highly appro
priate.
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Pour types of questions predominated.

Queries were used to ob

tain date, to elicit opinions, to evoke reactions, and to supplement
other questions or follow up voluntaries.

At least half of the in-

quliy was of the supplementary or follow up variety.

In general, the

types of questions were well suited to the conferences.
The stylistic qualities of the questions Included clarity, tone,
conciseness, and appropriateness.
The questions seemed generally clear, for only occasionally did
the President ask for restatement.

Usually, he responded without any

apparent hesitation due to misunderstanding or not understanding a
query.
The tone of the questions, at least on paper, was mostly neutral.
A number of questions were hostile and hard hitting, just as many of
the questions were rather friendly.

The press was Invariably polite

and generally respectful of the presidency.
In terms of conciseness, the average question took about fif
teen seconds to deliver.
somewhat longer.

In the broadcast conferences questions were

Further, the queries were seldom verbose.

In some

Instances, multiple questions were asked at one time by a newsman.
On rare occasions, correspondents presented rather lengthy background
statements before actually asking their questions.
Generally, Inquiry was appropriately worded and was free of tech
nical terms or jargon unfamiliar to the President.
Questions in the broadcast conferences were more polished and
better suited to both the President and the public than the ques
tioning at the Impromptu conferences.
factor of preparation.

This was probably due to the

As a whole, the questioning was excellent.
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Johnson's Answers
President Johnson's replies, ss was true of his voluntaries,
aimed at explaining, publicising, promoting, defending, and enhanc
ing the Image of his administration.

The goal of regulating the con

ference was especially Important because L.B.J. hoped to control the
flow of inquiry as well as the reporting of what he said in the press
meetings.
Johnson's alms In his answers were generally for persuasion.
The same methods of development used In the voluntaries appeared
In Johnson's answers.

Further, when L.B.J. was responsive to ques

tions, he used a variety of appropriate support.

His development was

probably best when he answered queries on his favorite topics.

Wheth

er Johnson would amplify and develop a generalization or a mere "yes"
or "no," was not predictable.

Again, when Johnson had good news to

report, he tended to become expansive and could be quite effective
in developing replies.

Notably, he used statistics, testimony, narra

tion, comparison, and anecdotes.
In some of Johnson's answers he tried to control and fence with
newsmen.
grees.

Other replies approached or avoided issues to varying de
Specific techniques were employed to accomplish each of the

basic types of replies.
In attempting to control reporters, Johnson used some devices to
anticipate and others to direct the press.
questions, Johnson had prepared answers.

In anticipation of some
He even read some responses.

He also interjected replies If the question he anticipated was not
asked.

Johnson interrupted reporters at times apparently because he

felt he knew what the rest of the question would be.

He probably
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overused these devices et times, especially when he denied reporters
the opportunity to finish Inquiries and to the degree that his expec
tations may have deterred his careful listening.
Johnson used directive answers to talk to the press rather than
talk on an issue.

He Instructed the press at times as to what he

expected and what they might expect of him.

He also made requests.

Some answers, but not many, were appropriately aimed at clarification.
In general, however, Johnson's didactic approach was probably unwar
ranted.
In fencing with correspondents, Johnson employed a number of tech
niques.

L.B.J. interrupted and demanded sources.

He replied with

He attacked questions and questioners.

Johnson corrected

sarcasm.

and debated with the press corps.
rected toward newsmen.

Sometimes he relied on humor di

Most of Johnson's fencing maneuvers were in

the Informal conferences so that the public seldom saw this side of
the President's press relations.

But even in the informal meetings

his lack of tact and the hard, debate-like nature In sparring proba
bly did little to improve his rapport with reporters.
President Johnson approached issues with the techniques of back
grounding, repeating, expanding, exhausting, generalising, arguing,
and appealing.

Most of these techniques are not unlike traditional

types of development.

They reveal In a different light the ways that

President Johnson could deal with Issues with varying degrees of effec
tiveness.

It is Interesting that Johnson frequently used a question

as an opportunity to give brief talks approximately four to eight
minutes long.
questions.

Exhaustive replies usurped valuable time for other

These talks probably bored the press and even the public.
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His lengthy answers were usually no wore than redundant summaries of
previous statements or were emotionalised petitions for support which
did not seem appropriate as answers In the press conference setting.
L.B.J. sometimes sought to use the news conference for political
advantage and to blame political opponents for slowing his "Great
Society" programs.
While Johnson often gave useful and effective replies, his ways
of approaching Issues were so obviously calculated to promote rather
than explain that correspondents may have become weary, If not wary.
In terms of providing news, Johnson wanted to be the Initiator.
So he presented most of what was really useful to the press and the
public in his voluntaries, not In his replies.

Correspondents con

sequently were often placed In a role of providing the stimulus to
incessant, and somewhat Invaluable, rhetorical response.

Since John

son had many other avenues available for promoting his alms, his
approaches to issues were too often out of place In the press con
ferences.
Johnson used a more extensively variegated style to avoid is
sues.

He employed three strategies to dodge problems raised by

queries: refusal to answer, referring the question, and circumvent
ing the specific Idea of the question.
In most cases, L.B.J. carefully worded his reluctance to reply.
More specifically, he stalled for time, discouraged topic areas, re
jected particular issues, denied adequate knowledge to answer, and
completely withdrew from questions.
dodge inquiry.

A second strategy was used to

Johnson referred questions to other sources or to

previous statements from the White House.

The most common and frequently
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used strategy was circumvention.

For axaaq>le, he would shift topics,

substitute answers on a general topio for replies to a specific issue,
digress, equivocate, grope, transfer blane, appeal to laughter, and
twist a question's intent or wording.

Because President Johnson used devices to avoid issues so exten
sively, his general ability in the press conference seems unresponsive
to the needs of the press and the public.

In terms of audience adapta

tion, he adjusted his replies as well as his opening statements and
other factors of his press conference style to accomplish his own ends
with less apparent regard for those who Interacted with him.
In Lyndon Johnson's first press conference he expressed a will
to be "flexible" in his relations and meetings with the press.
achieved that aim only in a technical sense.

He

Had he been more under

standing of and responsive to the needs of the press, he might have
been more successful in his dealings with newsmen, and, in turn, he
might have been more responsive to and effective with his primary
source of power, the people.
Suggestions
This study has demonstrated that press conferences can be evalua
ted from a rhetorical perspective.

Other studies might easily do the

same.
News conferences are held by so many government officials, nation
ally, and locally, and in such countries as Canada, Germany, and Vene
zuela, that a ripe body of speech materials representing an effective
means of communication exists.

zm
Knowing tho oxtont to which «nd how othor loaders of public
opinion use this speaking situation could add breadth to current
knowledge on how wan best coawunlcates.
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